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ABSTRACT
From Prison to Homeless Shelter
Camp LaGuardia and the Political Economy of an Urban Infrastructure
Christian D. Siener
Advisor: Ruth Wilson Gilmore
At this time of increasing housing insecurity, recent reforms in homeless shelter policy
have attracted the attention of scholars and activists. This research sheds light on these changes
by placing them in historical and political-geographic perspective, focusing on the role of
homeless shelters in stabilizing social displacement by destabilizing solidarity. It demonstrates
historical continuity between prisons and homeless shelters in New York City through a case
study of conditions surrounding the transition of Camp LaGuardia, a prison that slowly
transformed into the city’s largest, and longest lasting, homeless shelter. The case study is an
empirical demonstration of some of the theoretical underpinnings of an increasingly punitive and
regulatory state, its class, race, and gender dimensions, and its rhetorical classification of itself as
diminishing, aspects of social structural change that Ruth Wilson Gilmore describes as built on
prison foundations. The research argues from a position and program of abolition.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In its last fiscal year New York City moved more than the entire population of Albany,
the capital of New York State and its sixth largest city, through institutions known as homeless
shelters.1 This enormous logistical endeavor required massive amounts of money and labor. This
dissertation examines how this system came to be through an analysis of its history and political
geography. The institution at the center of the analysis is Camp LaGuardia, formerly New York
City’s largest homeless shelter until its closure in 2007, and an institution critical to the
transformation of its administrative practices with regard to poverty and displacement. I
juxtapose the system for managing homelessness that New York City built around this place with
its contemporary homeless shelter system. It is a study in political and economic change through
the evolution of one of New York City’s enduring institutions, and that institution's role in
fashioning social understandings foundational to the rollout of one of the city's most important
contemporary infrastructures.
What is it about its material infrastructure that can give insight into homelessness as
displacement? A primary contradiction of homeless shelters is that they individualize and at the
same time promote reintegration. They are supposed to be institutions that will restore those left
out of a particular social formation, but in so doing, they draw on an ideology of refuge to
promote social differentiation. From this angle, this thesis seeks to describe how material
infrastructure impresses ideology and how social difference and exclusion have been regularized
contemporarily. While homeless shelters are frequently understood as charitable exceptions to
hostile social and economic processes, I demonstrate how they are material objects of a structure
1

“New York City Homelessness: The Basic Facts” (Coalition for the Homeless, April 2017),
https://goo.gl/R4SSTZ.; US Census Factfinder, Albany, NY.
1

of feeling, developed within the shifting strictures of globalization, because they distill, make
coherent, and legitimate social and economic processes in a changing political economy. Refuge
is therefore at the core of what homeless shelters are meant to provide, and is simultaneously an
idea that exposes their central contradiction. How is it that these contradictory state institutions
have become a primary means of addressing displacement in New York City over the past 40
years? While Williams’ original conception of a structure of feeling was affective and emergent,
a temporal principle, this investigation explores this question from a geographic perspective. My
method is thus to view shelters in the “social present,”2 by bringing to light their contradictions
and their emergence as political tools of the state.
I envision the production of homelessness by the state institutions designed to manage it
as a partitioning process akin to the mass incarceration characterizing the carceral state: “a new
kind of state—an anti-state state—[that] is being built on prison foundations.”3 The appearance
and expanded use of homeless shelters is concomitant with the rise in prisons across New York
since the early-1980s.4 Yet while alienation in prison had a longer precedent as an aspect of state
power, the spreading out of a system composed of relatively new institutions was accompanied
by confusion as to their purpose and necessity, observable in an analysis of their initial rollout,
the narrative in the following chapter. This study demonstrates further, historical continuity with
a case study of conditions surrounding the transition of Camp LaGuardia, a prison that slowly
transformed into a homeless shelter. Through the 1990s, while homeless shelters represented
both innovation and expansion as they crystallized an emergent neoliberalism’s urban structure
of feeling, they also drew on a long, if changing, history. The continuity of the institution at
2

Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 132.
Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 245.
4
Eric Schlosser, “The Prison-Industrial Complex,” Atlantic Monthly, December 1998.
3

2

Camp LaGuardia allows insight into the changing ideology surrounding its specific functions,
given particular social and political conditions. These changes account for transformations that
accompanied the management of segments of the region’s relative surplus population. Homeless
shelters, therefore, as demonstrated by their historical appearance in New York City, are a
shapeshifting auxiliary of the carceral state. They respond to a particular narrative of crisis,
stretched over space and time. I explore the ongoing levels of interaction and contestation from
within this institution to understand one of the ways the changing prison system has remained
“an appendage of the capitalist state—as an instrument for class, racial and national
oppression.”5
Conceptually, I focus on the emergence of two productions of space in the state
management of New York City’s regional homeless populations, both of which had their genesis
in extended periods of social and economic crisis. Chapter two explores how the spatial
arrangement of contemporary homeless shelters came to be. Their main purpose has been to
circulate individuals and families, most of whom are people of color, through urban space to
maintain flexibility for investment in land. Rehabilitation of shelter residents through work
training programs, and the concomitant focus on self-discipline, has become the primary
underlying reason for their necessity. The social reintegration of shelter residents by means of
entry-level service employment largely provides the institutional justification. Shelters “train”
workers, therefore, for jobs that do not pay a livable wage. While chapter two outlines major
contradictions in contemporary homeless policy by describing the emergence of the
contemporary spatial fix for the problem of homelessness, constructed since the early 1980s, the

5

Angela Y. Davis and Bettina Aptheker, “Preface,” in If They Come in the Morning...Voices of Resistance, ed.
Angela Y. Davis (New York: Verso, 2016), xiv.
3

following chapters flash back to explore the emergence of a system for managing homeless men
that cohered around Camp LaGuardia during the 1930s. Evolving out of a women’s prison built
in the early 1920s in upstate Orange County, New York as a part of Progressive Era prison
reform (chapter three), Camp LaGuardia later became a labor camp for homeless men. Chapter
four follows this trajectory by examining the evolution of state-run labor camps in New York,
the ideology of which was eventually institutionalized in New York City’s first modern homeless
shelter in order to temper radical relief politics emerging on the left during the Great Depression.
Camp LaGuardia, the initial Depression-Era effort and the model for nationwide New Deal work
camps, was owned by New York City and operated in conjunction with the Works Progress
Administration. In this role, the institution, centerpiece of the shelter and rehabilitation programs
of Fiorello LaGuardia’s reformed Welfare Department, extracted white men from urban space in
order to immobilize them and integrate them into rural, farming-based communities (chapters
five and six). While Camp LaGuardia's intent was to train men as single-wage breadwinners, the
goal of today’s shelters is to prepare people for flexible part-time work as part of multiwage
households. Shelters in both periods are primary examples of historical and institutional “traps,”
the “exclusionary practices” which are part of the state’s efforts to delineate the possibilities of
social reproduction.6
In his history outlining the various sectors of the working class targeted for discipline by
the state, Peter Linebaugh uses biographies of men condemned to hang in London as an entry
point to examine crucial moments in the transformation of the state’s regulation of labor
practices. In his reading, almshouses were institutions that abetted the criminalization of certain

6

Clyde Woods, “Les Misérables of New Orleans: Trap Economics and the Asset Stripping Blues, Part 1,” American
Quarterly 61, no. 3 (2009): 769–96.
4

previously customary activities, being the charitable, reform arm of the punitive state.7
Workhouses brought together and centralized elite control over ideologies and work processes in
the transition from decentralized modes of production, such as handicraft and putting out.
Similarly, homeless shelters should be seen in the context of the transition to low wage service
employment and the naturalization of working class displacement as a result of increased
investment in urban land. In the structural adjustment of New York City over the past 40 years,
the local state has guaranteed by law one aspect of social reproduction—a place to sleep—in a
new disciplinary and reformatory order. This emergent shelter system in New York City,
beginning in the early 1980s, both drew on and reconfigured ideologies long present in the
political economy of the state’s management of crisis, including notions about work as a
rehabilitative aspect of state institutions. Writing about the first wave of gentrification in the late1980s, Neil Smith wrote, “The effort to recolonize the city involves systematic eviction. In its
various plans and task force reports for gentrifying what remains of the inner city, New York
City government has never proposed a plan for relocating evictees.”8 Smith's analysis makes
clear the temporal as well as spatial unpredictability and unevenness of gentrification, even as it
has become systemic. This dissertation argues that the shelter system became just that plan for
the management of dislocation, and therefore, that it currently acts as a buffer against
fluctuations in a volatile real estate market. While social dislocation was once managed by
criminalizing vagrancy, the homeless shelter now takes on much of that function.
The dissertation thus examines the continuities and ruptures between homeless shelters
and prisons, both of which have historically been institutions intending to effect individualized
7

Peter Linebaugh, The London Hanged: Crime and Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1992).
8
Neil Smith, The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City (New York: Routledge, 1996), 15.
5

behavior modification. Rather than seeing these institutions as disconnected, I position them in
their historical relationship: the invention of the homeless shelter out of prison restructuring
through its earliest example in New York City. I understand this relationship not only through
the overlap of people who spend time in each place,9 but also through the ideological
configurations of what the institutions are meant to do. This ideology grew historically out of
material conditions, as the state evolved to address crises of reproduction. As parallel institutions,
prisons and homeless shelters have each informed the development of the other, given state
engagement with contradictions stemming from social displacement, as it determines which
people are eligible for reform and which are targeted for punishment—good versus evil,
redeemable versus hopeless, first timer versus recidivist, deserving versus undeserving10—a
process reflected in the conflicting functions of its superintendent institutions as both punitive
and rehabilitative.11 Linking homeless shelters to the carceral state in this way is meant to
highlight the limits of reform and to advance a position of abolition, especially since homeless
shelters in New York resulted from prison reform.
One of the main programmatic aspects that demonstrates continuity between the
institutions of prison and shelter has been the prescription of work as rehabilitation, a program
which has remained virtually unchanged since the earliest houses of correction in Europe, even
as it has migrated into homeless shelters. Labor is one of the most important factors legitimating
homeless shelters, much as it did formerly in prisons. As the primary function of prisons has
become incapacitation, their work aspects did not go away, and much of the ideology
9

Nino Rodriguez and Brenner Brown, “Preventing Homelessness Among People Leaving Prison” (Vera Institute of
Justice, December 2003).
10
V. J. Del Casino and C. L. Jocoy, “Neoliberal Subjectivities, the ‘New’ Homelessness, and Struggles over Spaces
of/in the City,” Antipode 40, no. 2 (2008): 192–99.
11
Dario Melossi and Massimo Pavarini, The Prison and the Factory: Origins of the Penitentiary System, trans.
Glynis Cousin (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble, 1981), 186.
6

surrounding work as definitively rehabilitative has been taken up in the programs of
contemporary homeless shelters. As the city’s Department of Homeless Services, which runs
“the most sophisticated and comprehensive [shelter system] in the nation,” puts it, with regard to
its singles shelters, “Now, more than ever, employment-focused programs and work supports
remain a cornerstone of DHS’ efforts to help clients move out of shelter and into permanent
housing.”12 But this type of labor has historically created grounds for further contradiction,
notably in the “competition” that work programs under state control pose to free labor.13
This thesis remains focused on the changing geographies of coercion and consent. As
auxiliaries to the prison system, homeless shelters and similar institutions have historically
helped the state manage contradiction. In its efforts to “individualize disorder,”14 the state has
given spatial expression to punishment and rehabilitation as extraction and circulation. There are
therefore spatial contradictions, which map onto ideological ones. This tension once existed
within the prison system itself, expressed in the transformation of the ideology surrounding
“labor.” While once meant to be punitive, the labor done by inmates subsequently came to be
understood as rehabilitative, a process, which chapter three takes up, in which gender was central.
As the homeless shelter has now taken on much of the prison’s rehabilitative agenda, its intended
function appears to be reintegration. Addressing flexibly both sides of this contradiction, the
state has taken on the role of managing alienation, given historically specific conditions. Camp
LaGuardia upsets the neat clarity of these spatial processes, demonstrating overlap in its

12

“Single Adults: The Shelter System” (New York City Department of Homeless Services), accessed March 20,
2018, http://www1.nyc.gov/site/dhs/shelter/singleadults/single-adults-shelter.page.
13
Glen A. Gildemeister, “Prison Labor and Convict Competition with Free Workers in Industrializing America,
1840-1890” (PhD Dissertation, Northern Illinois University, 1977).
14
Feldman, quoted in Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California,
235.
7

transitional functions and providing insight into the contradiction that alienation in homeless
shelters has been both extraction and circulation.
Camp LaGuardia, over the course of its history, demonstrates the gendered and raced
aspects of the state’s process of managing the alienation of working class displacement, at
specific historical moments of changes in the structure of capitalism. This process of the
changing function of labor in punishment and rehabilitation in New York State unfolded in the
institution that became Camp LaGuardia (chapter four), and subsequently has provided currency
and balance for the expansion of completely new areas of state practice, making the historical
appearance of the homeless shelter possible (chapter two). Welfare Department officials
imagined much of the current prison geography of New York State during the depression. The
difference was that they envisioned it with camps for homeless men modeled on Camp
LaGuardia (chapters five and six).15
I have chosen to focus on various artistic and creative aspects of men living in shelter at
different historical moments to highlight these institutional contradictions, and the ways in which
shelter residents came to terms with them. In each section of the thesis, I have drawn attention to
music produced by people living in shelters, and what it means for an understanding of unfolding,
systemic programs and the social relationships formed in them. This decision was motivated by
15

Contemporary budget expenditures provide a window onto the different trajectories of the institutional functions
in terms of coercion and consent with regard to the labor which makes them go. A majority of New York City’s
Department of Homeless Services budget, 91%, is taken up by “other than personnel services.” In contrast, of its
budget for Corrections, 87% is reserved for personnel. (See "The City of New York Financial Plan, Fiscal Years
2018-2022." (Mayor’s Office of Management and Budget, February 2018),
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/omb/downloads/pdf/feb18-fp.pdf.) This shows a bifurcation in the strategies for
managing social displacement into a decentralized homeless shelter system that minimizes labor costs and prioritizes
consent and a porous boundary between the efforts at coercion and consent. This boundary shifts as the composition
of the institutional arrangement is overdetermined by historical, political, and geographic conditions. In other words,
there is not one specific, universal “function” for carceral institutions. They are flexible institutions that manage
alienation in a changing political economy by naturalizing displacement. In this context they demonstrate continuity
as well as transformation in their development as "catch all solutions to social problems" (Gilmore 2007). The
following chapters examine some of these changing relationships at specific historical and political moments.
8

the desire to understand the consciousness of people experiencing extended dislocations, a desire
sparked by musicians playing the blues on improvised instruments on a subway platform. This
work shows that their stances have been sometimes conciliatory, sometimes oppositional, but
always ambivalent, conflicted, and fraught. This fact allows a vision of state power that is both
potent and calculating, but also malleable and inconstant. It shows a distinction between what
these institutions are designed to do and how they are understood and used by people living in
them. For a program of abolition, my hope is that coming to terms with this reality leaves open
the possibility of an alternative, revolutionary future. This means noting state failures as well as
the successful establishment of policy. I base much of chapter six, for example, on a
reconstruction of an administrative vision of the future that never came into being, in order to
describe a world of social relations in which certain ideas about it resonated. As long as
homeless shelters are understood to be naturally the only response to widespread urban poverty
and dislocation, we will continue to be stuck in the same kind of thinking that has characterized
general political action toward their eradication.
Accordingly, I have been interested in how the contradictions outlined above play out in
everyday life, and the project examines power in its daily, mundane aspects. This research
attempts an ethnographic standpoint to narrate everyday aspects of power in institutionalized
settings. I am interested in how meanings and values are produced in everyday life, and how
experiences are interpreted given specific, historically-produced ideological tools. While
homeless shelters have become a primary means of addressing and managing displacement, they
have been molded and used strategically by people living in them. Shelters readily depict a
limited picture of what displacement is and how it came to be, a tapered frame that has been built
by disempowering shelter residents. My method is a critique of this exclusive understanding of
9

the production of space by taking into consideration the views those experiencing displacement
and their actions given those constraints. It rejects a view of shelter residents as insular, keeping
them centered within ongoing mainstream relationships that have produced contemporary cities.
It places these views and actions in a fuller range of relationships acting during crisis in order to
highlight the structural limitations placed on groups of actors. It attempts an analysis that
recognizes historical space for the displaced, and their capacity in the face of precarious
circumstances and limited options.
Thus, while infrastructure stamps ideology, that does not mean that its program is
accepted in full. I examine the music produced by men in shelter programs at each point as a
window onto wider processes and policies aiming to establish normative relationships of power
and to highlight various forms of resistance and solidarity within shelters. The music produced
by people living in today's shelters is an example of Clyde Woods’ blues epistemologies.16 I look
at the relationship of the members of seminal hip-hop group Boogie Down Productions, who,
though initially antagonistic to one another, began making music together in a makeshift
homeless shelter housed in a converted armory. Their music is a lens that brings everyday
experiences of shelter into relief as an already-present and widespread repudiation of policy,
including the contemporary criminalization of homelessness and the hierarchical organization of
relationships within shelters.17 In contrast, Camp LaGuardia's traveling minstrel band,
performing in blackface and based in the city’s original homeless program, formed an
16

Clyde Woods, Development Arrested: The Blues and Plantation Power in the Mississippi Delta (New York:
Verso, 2017).
17
Smith, The New Urban Frontier; Don Mitchell, “The Annihilation of Space by Law: The Roots and Implications
of Anti-Homeless Laws in the United States,” Antipode 29, no. 3 (1997): 303–35; Neil Smith, “Giuliani Time: The
Revanchist 1990s,” Social Text, no. 57 (1998): 1–20; Don Mitchell, “Anti-Homeless Laws and Public Space: I.
Begging and the First Amendment,” Urban Geography 19, no. 1 (1998): 6–11; Don Mitchell, “Anti-Homeless Laws
and Public Space: II. Further Constitutional Issues,” Urban Geography 19, no. 2 (February 1, 1998): 98–104;
Randall Amster, “Patterns of Exclusion: Sanitizing Space, Criminalizing Homelessness,” Social Justice 30, no. 1
(2003): 195–222.
10

ideological core which cohered consent among the men there for their rehabilitation and
prepared the ground for their subsequent integration into the local community. An idealized
conception of work anchored this program, a conception that underpins policy to this day.
These histories, understood within a context of daily life, uncover both acceptance of, as
well as counter-narratives in opposition to, state practice and are situated within the development
of the city’s welfare policy as a whole. What do these creative practices have in common, and
what about them are drastically different? Each is a way of addressing displacement and linked
to an understanding of what the function of shelter is. Individuals and groups necessarily
interacted with and addressed these primary understandings in a variety of ways. Boogie Down
Productions' existence was based on a rejection of the hierarchies of labor and custody that make
homeless shelters go, hierarchies that continue to be the source of critique by contemporary
shelter residents, as outlined to me in conversations that form the basis of chapter two. The music
program at Camp LaGuardia, by contrast, bolstered existing hierarchies present in New York
City's relief program, and were a centripetal, motivational force in its rehabilitation program.
While Boogie Down Productions forged relationships that bucked the hierarchy within shelters,
the theater program at Camp LaGuardia upheld hierarchies that supported the function of
homeless shelters as institutions.
Both contemporary shelters as well as Camp LaGuardia represent forms of
decentralization, a fact that suggests their suitability for administrative control of social
disintegration and discontent. But to say that shelters are merely individualizing would be too
simplistic. They differentiate at the same time that they make coherent (chapters 2 and 5). In the
early days of its articulation of the problem of homelessness, New York City developed a
11

program at Camp LaGuardia where men would mix their labor with the land, a process that was
supposed to be rehabilitative in itself. Men who had been out of work and normalized the habits
of “vagabonds” would regain their vitality through a connection with their origins, reawakened
in them by working in the soil. The city naturalized this autochthonic program with an analogy
of cultivation, in a press release in 1935, “Eight hundred homeless men, wrecked by the
economic debacle of the past stormy years, have been rescued from the sidewalks of New York
and transplanted to Camp LaGuardia where they have become tillers of the soil.”18
In contrast, as homelessness has increasingly been de-linked from employment status in
the contemporary political economy, many people rely on the shelter system to supplement poor
wages that do not sufficiently pay for housing and other necessities. The use of homeless shelters
is no longer pegged to unemployment. As regional unemployment decreases, use of shelters
remains constant or increases. With New York City’s unemployment at its lowest rate since 1983,
the number of people living in shelter is at its highest. During the Depression, administrators
viewed Camp LaGuardia as a temporary holding place until the “business cycle” rebounded and
absorbed those on the welfare rolls. Today, homelessness is understood to be a generally ongoing
problem, unhinged from economic crisis, a permanent aspect of contemporary political economy.
Its management consists of the logistics of moving people through a system required to provide
them with the material benefit of having a roof under which to sleep.19

18

“Press Release: A Human Repair Shop” (Emergency Relief Bureau of New York City, Division of Public
Information, July 25, 1935), Welfare Department Correspondence, 1935, Folder 7, LaGuardia and Wagner Archives,
LaGuardia Community College.
19
For language showing this tendency during the Bloomberg Administration see Bloomberg Administration Press
Office, “Press Release: Mayor Bloomberg, Deputy Mayor Gibbs and Homeless Services Commissioner Diamond
Open the City’s New Prevention Assistance and Temporary Housing Center in the Bronx After Eight Years of
Development,” May 11, 2011.
12

New York City Unemployment Rate Versus Total Number Living
in Shelter, 1983-2018
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Figure 1.1 New York City Unemployment Rate Versus Total Number Living in Shelter, 1983-2018
Source Data: New York City Coalition for the Homeless, New York State Department of Labor.
Total living in shelter represents an average of the “point in time” number. The number of people who
lived in a homeless shelter during any given year is much higher.

In these ways, shelters have attempted to resolve various historical contradictions as they
both maintain and reconfigure social relations among people. This means that they provide
narratives that attempt to obscure those contradictions, and are designed to maintain the power of
management, the power to move people, and the power to maintain people as moveable.
Homeless shelters are reactionary institutions of counterrevolution, a process that is hidden by
focusing on material conditions. Contemporary shelters have attempted to reduce the solution to
homelessness to material conditions, turning problems of social relations into material
problems—lack of a home, for example, or lack of work—a simplification that requires the
13

depoliticization of homelessness. This dissertation attempts the opposite. The chapters that
follow describe a historic trajectory in New York City to demonstrate the contradictory stories
homeless shelters tell about themselves.
At this time of increasing housing insecurity, recent reforms in homeless shelter policy
have attracted the attention of scholars and activists.20 This research sheds light on these changes
by placing them in historical and political-geographic perspective. It focuses on the role of
homeless shelters in stabilizing social displacement by destabilizing solidarity. The case study is
an empirical demonstration of some of the theoretical underpinnings of an increasingly punitive
and regulatory state, its class, race, and gender dimensions, and its rhetorical classification of
itself as diminishing, aspects of social structural change that Ruth Wilson Gilmore describes as
built on prison foundations.
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Chapter 2
Homeless Shelters and the Blues

Figure 2.1 Franklin Avenue Homeless Shelter in 2018.21
[Homelessness] pretty much gave me a straight-ahead look at reality, and
it made me say, “Damn, all this is goin’ on out here and nobody got
nuthin’ to say to nobody?” So I just started talkin’.22
The dynamic factor is the change in the way this objective process [crisis]
is collectively understood and resisted. Thus, the social content and
political meaning of “worklessness” is being thoroughly transformed
from inside.23
If not for the blues, many individual tragedies affecting black workingclass communities might never have been recast as social, collective
adversities.24
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Introduction
In 1985, Scott Sterling, a social worker at the Franklin Avenue Men’s Shelter in the
Bronx, got in an argument with Chris Parker, a resident of the shelter.25 The encounter, initially
over the apparently innocuous procedure for dispersing subway tokens, did not go well because
each man recognized in the other a specific role that had been designated for him by the state,
one an employee and the other homeless. As a journalist subsequently recounted:
The resident called Scott a “house Negro, one paycheck away from
homelessness.” Scott countered that the homeless man was “obviously
lazy, otherwise he’d have a job.” Security was called to separate the two
before they came to blows, and the resident left the shelter.26

It is perhaps not difficult to imagine how bureaucratic and hierarchical organization
within homeless shelters reproduces this type of antagonistic and surveilled relationship on a
daily basis. Yet in the weeks following the altercation, the men found common ground. Little
more than a year later, they had produced Criminal Minded, the first studio album of DJ Scott La
Rock and MC KRS-One’s newly-minted rap duo Boogie Down Productions.27 It may not be
surprising, further, that one of the most influential and intentionally political hip-hop groups to
emerge in the mid-1980s had its radical origins in the midst of the creation of New York City’s
homeless shelter system. Mainstream classification of Criminal Minded as the first album in the
“gangsta” or “hard core” rap genre smoothes over many of the criticisms that it waged of an
emergent neoliberal regime and the attendant carceral state.28 Rapping in a signature
confrontational and narrative style, which upset liberal sensibilities and rejected the paternalism
of shelter life, KRS-One’s lyrics applied and extended a system of critique in the Black radical
25
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and Black Nationalist tradition.29 As Jeff Chang, biographer of the “hip-hop generation,” put it,
along with Public Enemy, Boogie Down Productions from the outset presented itself as a “return
of the black radical.”30 Later, KRS would formulate himself as the “Teacher” within hip-hop,
take on an image that directly channeled Malcolm X, and wage critiques of the police and their
historical link to slave patrols,31 intergenerational and institutionalized racism, the crack
epidemic, and the drug industry. In this sense, his career follows the trajectory of hip-hop itself
as it “jumped scale,”32 extending from its origins in the South Bronx into a global movement.
The quotes that begin this piece, therefore, suggest an example of a “blues tradition of
investigation and interpretation” that is continually reformatted to “[organize] communities of
consciousness”33 amid the perforated “social ideology” of racial capitalism.34
This chapter describes the shifts in consciousness that accompanied changing material,
ideological, and geographical conditions within the local state as it attempted to manage an
expansive regional relative surplus population beginning in the 1980s. In the process, it seeks to

29

My use of hip-hop as a window into a critical consciousness of New York City’s shelter system is not intended to
romanticize all aspects of hip-hop music, which itself is always contested (for example:Walter Dawkins, “Is Hip
Hop Dead?,” Davey D’s Hip Hop Corner: Where Hip Hop and Politics Meet (blog), n.d.,
http://www.daveyd.com/commentaryishiphopdead.html.), or even all politically-oriented hip-hop music, but to
highlight the unsettled nature of state-institutional roles and to recognize an existing archive and system of critique.
For the gendered political posturing of rap music in its second generation, see Cherise Cheney, Brothers Gonna
Work It Out: Sexual Politics in the Golden Age of Rap Nationalism (New York: NYU Press, 2005). Cheney
summarizes this aspect of her argument as follows: “Rap nationalists considered it their duty to both inspire and
cultivate a racial consciousness among young black folk, to promote a sense of race pride constantly put in jeopardy
by white cultural hegemony in mass media, popular culture, and public educational systems. They were, in fact,
‘standing in for the state.’ Despite their limitations, rap nationalists provided a counterideology to white supremacy,
a system of knowledge that was both race and class conscious.” (Pages 95-96).
30
Jeff Chang, Can’t Stop Won’t Stop: A History of the Hip-Hop Generation (New York: Picador, 2005), 248.
31
Josmar Trujillo, “No BackSpace: The Case for Abolishing the Police,” City Limits, August 16, 2016,
citylimits.org/2016/08/16/no-backspace-the-case-for-abolishing-the-police; Boogie Down Productions, By All
Means Necessary (Jive Records, 1988).
32
Neil Smith, “Contours of a Spatialized Politics: Homeless Vehicles and the Production of Geographical Scale,”
Social Text, no. 33 (1992): 55–81.
33
Clyde Woods, “Do You Know What It Means to Miss New Orleans?: Katrina, Trap Economics, and the Rebirth
of the Blues,” American Quarterly 57, no. 4 (2005): 1005–18.
34
Cedric Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2000).
17

examine the following key questions in historical context: How can we understand the
“relationship between classes constituted in the economic relations of production and the forms
in which they appear as political forces in the theater of political class struggle?”35 What is the
relationship between experience and consciousness? What is the structural relationship between
the waged and the wageless poor? In doing so, I hope to shed some light on various
contradictions in the state’s role in the management of surplus labor.
Structures of Feeling
Raymond Williams defines a structure of feeling as an emergent, affective social
formation, prior to being “built into institutions and social formations.”36 It provides a method of
analysis that avoids “the reduction of the social to fixed forms” as well as the “mistake…[of]
taking terms of analysis as terms of substance.”37 In this case, I use the notion of structure of
feeling to bring out the polyvocality of the social forces acting and understanding during intense
moments of social and institutional change. While Williams’ original conception of a structure of
feeling was affective and emergent, Cedric Robinson showed how film cycled counterfeit
histories to consolidate consent for racial regimes in the present. The linear narrative techniques
of mainstream media structurally reinforced this process because they presented a template for
arranging temporal strands of thought. Ideological manipulation of time was therefore paramount.
In Robinson’s understanding, these “forgeries of memory and meaning” were both assembled
and resisted through artistic creation: the dominant and subversive techniques of filmmaking
during the early days of film. Films of the “dominant movie picture industry” 38 entrained a
35
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structure of thought with respect to history and culture through a linear narrative that was
presumably an exhaustive representation of reality, a social perspective that prioritized the needs
and desires of individuals, and a syntax that was terminal (i.e. happy or sad endings). This was in
contrast to the “polyvocality” of many Black radical independent filmmakers, such as Oscar
Micheaux, or the montage of Sergei Eisenstein. The mainstream Hollywood films were “closed
texts,” while Micheaux's films, for example, drew on an open, polyvocal jazz template.39
These ideas about temporal patterns, history, and structure can be thought of in terms of a
compositional technique called hemiola. Hemiola is an interruption in the underlying pulse of a
piece of music in order to reinforce stability and continuity. Designed to jar the listener by
introducing a temporal juxtaposition, the composer temporarily shifts the feeling of the music
while maintaining the overall rhythmic structure. Where the music was once felt in three, it is
now felt briefly in two. The shift in feeling relies on the listener's internalization of one rhythm,
simultaneously felt as the rhythm shifts but remains structurally identical. While the structure is
obscured, or complicated, for a moment, it usually returns momentarily. Moreover, a hemiola
occurs precisely at the moment that the pattern is reproduced. Notes are tied across a bar line so
that the downbeat is hidden or ambiguous. It is jarring because it appears to be different precisely
because both tempos are experienced simultaneously before the structure, reinforced through the
contrast, returns.
Like Robinson, I am interested in the relationship between artistic and creative
production and changes within racial capitalism. How can we think of spatial templates in the
same way? The following focuses on both the temporality and the spatiality of the onset of
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neoliberalism. KRS and Scott met at a time of great transition in the local state’s reorganization
to address and contain crisis, which appeared in the public consciousness as a moral panic over
“homelessness.”40 It was therefore also understood by elected officials as a political crisis,
especially since the city and the state faced pressure about their early methods of co-management:
housing families in welfare hotels and single adults in state armories. Yet the moral panic
surrounding homelessness, particularly in sensationalized media accounts, contrasts the
mundanity of building a state infrastructure around it. Thus, this chapter examines the process of
institutionalizing homelessness as a permanent feature of the region’s political economy and the
naturalization of shelters as the singular response to the “homeless crisis.”41
While homeless shelters are frequently understood as charitable exceptions to hostile
social and economic processes, I seek to demonstrate how they distill, make coherent, and
legitimate these processes because they are material objects of a “structure of feeling” within a
dramatically shifting political economy. In the opening quote, KRS described his coming to
political consciousness and artistic activism through the mundanity of violence inflicted in
homeless shelters and in the context of extreme alienation. While in his music he approached
social problems as structural, and therefore challenged the idea of homelessness as a static,
individualized category, his experience as homeless and in the shelter, including presumably his
relationships with LaRock and the other residents, catalyzed his critical voice. Homeless shelters
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were designed to incapacitate, depoliticize, and alienate those dispossessed in the ongoing crisis.
Part of this incapacitation was to “individualize disorder”42 by attributing homelessness to
individual deficiency, a process experienced by KRS and others as alienation. Instead of giving
voice to homeless people as individuals, this chapter attempts to give those living in shelter a
collective voice—one that is in clear opposition to the “reformist reforms” outlined in the
following section. Recognition of this collective voice avoids reinforcing the prevailing
ideologies and justifications for the shelter system as a whole as well as its programmatic goals
of reform, charity, and improvement, and presents homeless shelters as “sites for the production
of geographical knowledge.”43 Taken together, I believe that this voice is one of abolition: the
view that homeless shelters themselves are a reformist reform.44 I hope to establish, like the
reallocation of emphasis in temporal patterns, the spatial elements of structures of feeling as they
pertain to homeless shelters as emergent institutions in New York City. The sections that follow
demonstrate how various groups consciously understood crisis as it unfolded: administrators and
elected officials, men living in the shelters, and people working in the shelters.
Shelters Emergent: The Politics of Reformist Reform
State restructuring was part of a regional plan to “respond to, and anticipate, the general
processes of uneven development” 45 in post-fiscal crisis New York City. The Franklin Avenue
Men’s Shelter, where LaRock met KRS, was put into motion in 1984 as a key transitional
42
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element in this institutional restructuring. Housed in a repurposed armory at 1122 Franklin
Avenue and 166th Street in the Bronx, the shelter continues to be used as a women’s intake point
for the system as a whole.46 In 1979 New York State and New York City were mandated by law
to provide shelter to anybody who needed it. This “right to shelter,” as it is colloquially known,
was a result of the Callahan Consent Decree of the New York State Supreme Court.47 Written in
1979, but with precedent extending back to New York State’s 1938 Constitution,48 the decree
was a response to organized abandonment, capital flight, and the fiscal crisis of 1975, which left
the South Bronx burning. By the early 1980s, Mario Cuomo, Governor of New York, and Ed
Koch, the City’s Mayor, sought any vacant state or city institution for the purpose of
accommodating the estimated “36,000 homeless people wandering the streets of New York City,”
as a Deputy Administrator for the New York City Human Resources Administration (HRA) once
described the crisis.49
The first round of shelter rollout, before 1986, was to attempt to repurpose large,
abandoned structures such as schools, psychiatric centers, hospitals, Department of Defense
fortresses, floating barges, Quonset huts, FEMA “surplus mobile homes”50 and armories, as
sleeping accommodation for homeless adults. Families were placed in welfare hotels. In the
armory spaces, dormitory-style arrangements predominated, and the beds were in rows on the
drill floor. Governor Cuomo was intimately involved in this policy’s design and its results. He
46
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was urged by his “housing czar” William Eimicke to accept an invitation from the Coalition for
the Homeless to tour the Fort Washington Armory shelter in 1983, which he did on October 27.51
The following winter, after the Kingsbridge Armory and two others were opened, armories
provided nearly 40% of the sleeping quarters within the city limits for men without homes.52
Yet it was unclear what these institutions were for. A press release at the opening of the
three new armories as shelters required a “fact sheet” that explained what they did: “Each shelter
provides three hot meals a day, beds, showers, delousing, clean clothing, medical services,
mental health referrals and social services. They are open 24 hours a day, seven days a week.”53
As with prisons, the capture and immobilization of a segment of people by the state made them
visible and understandable in a particular way: as homeless people. This was part of Mario
Cuomo’s larger project—to renovate “government”54—as he positioned himself in national and
statewide electoral politics.55 Cuomo ended up building more prisons in New York than all
previous Governors combined56 and set the course for the construction of the nation’s largest
homeless shelter system. Subsequent efforts to define the institutional purpose of homeless
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shelters included implanting formalized work programs, so that residents would work for their
placements there, receive job training, and contribute to building and programmatic operation.
“Not in my backyard,” or NIMBY, pressure affected how these emergent institutions
were rolled out, an aspect of the process which added to their transitory nature. The Franklin
Armory had been activated as a shelter after community residents protested the use of the bigger
Kingsbridge Armory, because Kingsbridge was located in a busy commercial district. The Vice
President of Associated Supermarkets, whose office and flagship store were across the street
from Kingsbridge, wrote a panicked letter to Mario Cuomo in 1983, in which he advocated the
relocation of the Kingsbridge shelter residents “to the south”:
The Kingsbridge Road area is a northern Bronx community that has
witnessed changing demographics, but where a large percentage of the
area’s historical communities of Irish and Jewish residents still live.
Kingsbridge Road, itself, has been one of the busier commercial areas in
the west Bronx containing dozens of various retail establishments. The
neighborhood has organized to inhibit the blight of abandonment and
destruction experienced to the south, with many government programs
supporting their efforts. Now in one move, with the establishment of the
men’s shelter, all these efforts are being sabotaged with a vengeance.57

He went on to distinguish contemporary homelessness from an idealized image of the
rail-riding laborer: “These are not, by and large, friendly unemployed hobo types who cause no
one harm.” The president of the Merchant’s Association had written a less-shrill letter the
previous month that made similar arguments to James Krauskopf, Commissioner of New York
City’s Human Resources Administration (HRA). He likewise attributed crime in the
neighborhood, perceived to be on the rise, to the homeless, but presented no evidence of this
claim. He even provided evidence to the contrary. The community had raised $200,000, plus a
$200,000 match from the city, “to effect programs to bolster security and commercial
57
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revitalization” in the area. These programs were in place prior to the armory’s opening as a
shelter.58
Almost immediately after he took office in 1983, the military also put pressure on Mario
Cuomo with regard to the armories. Major General Vito Castellano of the New York State
National Guard sent him a long memo in mid-1983 about the problems he saw with housing
people in armories. Castellano worried that, though they were supposed to be a temporary
solution, the armories were becoming part of HRA’s long-term plan, even though the National
Guard was paying all the costs of their operation. He argued that many “Guardpersons” were
leaving for other assignments as a result of the shared space with a homeless shelter, and that
attendance at training events was decreasing. As the largest annual training was upcoming, it was
crucial that the Fort Washington and Kingsbridge Armories be vacated by the HRA.
The city did relocate a portion of the shelter to Franklin Avenue, but the complete closure
of the Kingsbridge Armory shelter was disputed. Lawyers for the Coalition for the Homeless, the
most prevalent advocacy group in the city, won a temporary stay in the State Supreme Court in
1984. The Human Resources Administration, opposed to this ruling, argued that it could find
vacancies in other shelters in the city for some of the men, but that the majority “would be sent to
Camp LaGuardia in Chester, NY, 60 miles from the city.”59 Kingsbridge remained open for a
number of years even as Franklin opened.
KRS and Scott met in the Franklin shelter during this initial, transitional period, a time
when its institutional aesthetic and purpose were ambiguous and temporary. The shelter in the
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armory opened in July 1984, but it wasn’t until the following year that the City began the
renovations which transformed the building functionally from an armory into a homeless shelter.
Acknowledging that “the shelters opened [in 1983] had not been designed to house the homeless”
the Koch administration allocated $13 million in early 1984 for the renovation of seven shelters,
including Franklin Avenue, as well as the Bedford-Atlantic Armory in Brooklyn and the Fort
Washington Armory in Washington Heights, all of which are still in use.60 The State
simultaneously contracted out $6 million to non-profits across New York for the “construction or
rehabilitation of housing for the State’s homeless population” as part of the second round of its
Homeless Housing and Assistance Program. Nine of the non-profits were in New York City.61
Centralized admission to the shelter system had been suspended, and so many of the men
living at Franklin were from the surrounding neighborhood. As Kostas Gounis described, “Men
displaced from housing in the deteriorating environment of the South Bronx could simply walk
over to the shelter.”62 Gounis was part of a team that used the shelter as a basis for designing a
program for men with “chronic mental disabilities,” and further describes the building before its
renovations.
Sometimes in the summer when the weather was too hot, a huge garage
gate through which National Guard vehicles used to enter the building
was left open, and then one could see the beds from the street.63

Originally, a portion of the staff at Kingsbridge was transferred to Franklin.64 Institutional
Aides, an ad hoc employee position, were subsequently given uniforms to mark them as distinct
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from the men who lived there, and thus felt empowered to move toward unionizing. Permanent
office space eventually replaced the “prefabricated…building within a building” social services
office. “These changes,” Gounis concludes, “reflected the realization that, for the foreseeable
future, the shelter was here to stay.”65 By the end of 1988, according to its original agreement
with the City, the New York State Division of Military and Naval Affairs completely vacated the
building.66
Gounis also described the “types” of men that lived in the shelter in the mid-1980s. The
following is a description of the group with which Scott and KRS, organic intellectuals in their
early 20’s, may have partly identified.
A fourth group was made up of young black men in their twenties who
seemed to be highly mobile. As a shelter worker put it, “they are always
on the move, going places, hustling, trying to get something for
themselves.” Crack use was widespread within this group and a
significant number of them had been in some kind of legal trouble, or
still were. Jail and/or prison experience was common among them and
their work history was either non-existent or highly sporadic and in “jobs”
such as messengers or security guards.67

Contrary to prevailing notions about people living there, almost one quarter of the
residents of the shelter were employed, a higher number than the percentage of those working
when they arrived.68 An additional segment of the shelter residents were “trainees” in the City’s
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“Work Experience Program,” doing janitorial work in the shelter. They had “higher status” but
were seen by some as “slave labor.”69 Much of the outside work that the men found while living
there was provisional or short-term, such as “loading and unloading trucks at the Bronx Terminal
Market or at the Hunts Point Market,”70 indicating that, while many of the men were employed,
they did not earn enough to pay for their own apartments or rooms. For those living in shelters or
on the streets, the insufficiency of wages in service sector and temporary employment was not
the only problem. There were extremely difficult challenges getting and holding these jobs on a
regular basis given the alienated social geography of their daily lives. A man I spoke to, who was
living in a different shelter, illustrated this point brilliantly in the course of describing what it
was like to do per diem work at Hunts Point:
Once I went to Hunt’s Point to try to help load, unload trucks. And I did,
but had this big knapsack on, and I asked the guy, it was produce, taking
you know lettuce and tomatoes, and I asked the guy, I said, “Yo, you
have any part time day work?” He said, “Yeah, I’ll hire you for the day.”
I said, “OK, how much is it for the day?” He said, “Sixty dollars. I’ll
give you sixty dollars for the day. Start now, you off at 5:30.” And I was
like, “Jesus, that’s not bad, I could eat for two days on that money.” But
then I was like, “You got some place where I could put this?” He said,
“Naw, naw, naw, naw. I’m not being responsible for no bags, nothing
like that. You find somewhere to put that and come back.” And then I
was like, “Could you please give me like half an hour?” So now here it is,
I’m walking around, up there in the Bronx, trying to find a safe place to
put this. That’s my property. It’s all I got in the world now. And I don’t
want to lose that. My blanket is in there, my few clothes, my toothbrush,
my little soap. You know so, I found a store. I went into it. I said, “Sir,
um, please, um, the guy’s gonna let me help load and unload trucks. I
don’t have nowhere to go. This is my bag. It’s no drugs in it or nothing,
it’s just got my clothes in it. I’m trying to earn fifty.” It was a Spanish
guy, bodega. “Could you please hold this bag till later?” So he was like,
“I’m gonna leave, I’m here in the morning. I’m leaving at four.” He said,
“What’s your name?” I said, “My name is R.” He was like, “Hold on.”
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Went and got a piece of paper and said, “Yo, don’t make this a habit.” I
said, “No sir, I would never make it a habit.” Got a piece of paper. “Here,
write your name on that. Alright, come to the end.” Came around to the
end of the store and he took the bag. “It’s gonna be right here, right here.”
“OK, God bless you, thank you!” And that was the first and last time that
I did that little work. Because I said, “I can’t do that.” This guy, you
know and I guess all the other spots were like that too. Now here it is
again, with this concept, this was only one guy who told me, “You know,
I can’t hold your bag, I don’t have nowhere to put your bag.” So the first
thing I said was, “Shit, all the rest of those guys are like that too. They’re
not gonna let me put my bag down by the side. Or they’re not gonna let
me put my bag in the place. They’re not gonna be responsible for it any
way.” So I got that fifty, he gave me, matter of fact, he gave me sixty
three dollars, and that held me for a few days.71

Another man I spoke to alluded to a primary difficulty of temporary work in general:
Yeah, [I did] temp work or handing out flyers and stuff like that. So you
know, you’re putting flyers on people’s houses and stuff like that in
certain parts of Brooklyn. And you know, to this day, there’s this guy
named Ray. If I ever see him I’m gonna break his arms. Right? Because
he had me work all day and then he left us out in Brooklyn. We didn’t
get paid. I never seen that guy.72

By 1989, the City was utilizing five State armories as homeless shelters for 3,760 men
and six as shelters for 750 women. At the same time pressure was mounting to discontinue their
use. William Grinker, Commissioner of New York City's Human Resources Administration at
the end of the Koch Administration, wrote a confidential memo in early 1989 titled “GETTING
OUT OF THE ARMORIES” in which he outlined his “strategy … which could be reflected in
the 5 Year Singles Plan,” the upcoming round of shelter construction.73 Grinker's plan was
simple. In exchange for closing the armory-shelters in various community districts, the city
would ask the community boards to “trade in their current armory population” for one 250-bed
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shelter. According to the plan, this would be much more palatable given the problems people
associated with the bunker-type homeless shelters on the drill floors, attribution of crime in the
neighborhood to the shelter residents, and actual or expected community opposition. To
supplement the decrease, the City would make arrangements for 250 and 2,000 new beds on
isolated Ward's and Hart Islands, respectively. This was the political aspect of the City’s
preparations for new shelter construction, which were already under way. There were seven new
Tier II shelters scheduled to be built between 1989 and 1990, plus 20 buildings slated to be
renovated into 1992 to expand capacity. The Franklin Armory, for its part, was again expanded
to make room for 82 more beds. The basement was renovated as a recreation area.74 Soon after,
the city began targeted raids on homeless encampments across the city, including at Columbus
Circle in March 199175 and in Tomkins Square Park in June 1991.76
The city was also reforming its family policy. A combination of city, state and federal
money had paid for tenancy in commercial hotels, such as the Martinique, the Prince George,
and the Holland, each housing hundreds of families in Manhattan. In the mid-1980s the number
of these welfare hotels had grown to about 60, and the city was facing criticism about their
condition as well as over the cost of housing families in them on an ongoing basis. Conditions in
the welfare hotels deteriorated to the point that the federal government, which paid half the cost
of rent, threatened to remove $70 million in aid if the city did not end its reliance on them.77
There were already rumblings of support for shelters run by non-profit organizations, including
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from the non-profits themselves, which, it was argued, could place people in permanent housing
more successfully and quickly, and could do it for less money. As they were phased out, many of
the welfare hotels were converted or demolished in rounds of gentrification.
The city turned to building or converting buildings for use as family shelters. The first
was HELP I, in Brooklyn. In this project, Andrew Cuomo developed a funding model for newconstruction homeless shelters using bond issues from public corporations. The Urban
Development Corporation seized the land from the city and turned it over to Housing Enterprise
for the Less Privileged, or HELP,78 and the Housing Finance Agency (HFA) issued $14 million
in bonds for its construction. HELP acted as a non-profit broker for the deal, diverting a portion
of welfare dollars, then being paid to landlords as rent at welfare hotels, to debt service on the
bonds.79 Tishman Speyer built the 200-family (800 person) facility and the city hired the Red
Cross to run social service programs.80 The shelter was regarded as a break from the costly
protocol of placing homeless families in welfare hotels and housing costs were advertised as
halved.81
In May 1990, the City had assembled a “Tier II Development Pipeline” of 62 sites
identified for conversion to homeless shelters. Tier II shelters, as they are still called, provide
“apartment-style” units, as opposed to Tier I shelters, which are “congregate,” or dormitory-style
shelters. Some were sites where existing buildings would be renovated and others were sites for
78
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new building construction. Construction or renovation was funded by the city, but the shelters
were run by non-profit organizations. 22 of the sites were in Brooklyn, and 20 of the sites each
were in Manhattan and the Bronx. Two were in Queens.82 By 1991 the city had embarked on its
five-year strategy, made more urgent because there were still families living in Tier I shelters.83
The plan was outlined in its “Comprehensive Homeless Assistance Plan,” formulated in order to
“establish the compelling need and justification for subsequent McKinney grant applications,”84
the first federal legislation with regard to homelessness since the Great Depression.85 750 Tier II
units were added in FY91 and 600 were projected for FY92.86
To coordinate all of these new shelters, the City institutionalized the Department of
Homeless Services in 1993, separating the provision of homeless services from the Human
Resources Administration. This was one of the recommendations of Mayor Dinkins’ early
1990’s Commission on Homelessness.87 The Commission’s head was Andrew Cuomo, and it had
members who were non-profit leaders, real estate executives, investment bankers, and corporate
lawyers. “Homelessness” had become institutionalized in a stand-alone agency, apart from the
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City’s other welfare services.88 While the City had departments that targeted homeless services
before this time, they were now organized around an infrastructure with a separate budget. Thus,
while “in the fall of 1979, the city offered homeless men three options: a bed in a Bowery
flophouse, a bunk in Camp LaGuardia where two men were confined to a five by seven foot cell,
or, for the overflow crowd, space in the ‘big room’ at the City's ‘Shelter Care Center for Men’
located on East Third Street,”89 the city now maintains a system composed of nearly 300 shelters,
the majority of whose residents are families.90
This is an outstanding growth of the local state’s infrastructure. The New York City
Department of Homeless Services budget topped $1 billion for the first time in its last fiscal year.
The DeBlasio administration, after a brief moratorium on the opening of new shelters, has
continued in this direction. The Mayor recently released a new plan, which proposes 90 new
“purpose-built” shelters across all five boroughs and the expansion of capacity in existing ones,
in order to anticipate the increase in homelessness in the upcoming years. To begin, through
2023, a minimum of five new shelters will be built each year. The plan, released in late February
2017, reads:
Over the next two years, the City will spur shelter development by
removing barriers to nonprofit ownership of purpose-built shelters, for
instance, by establishing mechanisms to help nonprofit partners finance

88

The National Union of the Homeless, “a national organization of homeless people,” active in the 1980s and 1990s,
continued to use the term “homeless” politically, even while understanding it in terms of class (“Homelessness is a
class issue”) which is my practice as well. This group also “[established] a shelter run and managed by currently and
formerly homeless people” and led an effort to take over federally owned, yet vacant, housing for use by homeless
people in 1990. Emily McNeill, “The National Union of the Homeless: A Brief History” (The Homeless Union
History Project of the Poverty Scholars Program, July 2011), https://goo.gl/RKcMXH; Angela Yates and Peter
Kinoy, Take Over (Sylight Pictures, 1990).
89
Hopper, Kim, quoted in Gounis, “The Domestication of Homelessness: The Politics of Space and Time in New
York City Shelters,” 96. Actually, the quote should begin “At the outset of 1979…” because the City had opened its
first women’s shelter in January of that year.
90
See Appendix A for a chart depicting the emergence and growth of New York City’s homeless shelter
infrastructure over this period.
33

large-scale capital projects and by expediting the shelter approval
process to meet the realities of the real estate market.91

Figure 2.2 The Constellation of Homeless Shelters in New York City
Mapped by cross-referencing data sets from New York City’s Department of City Planning and
its Department of Finance and Taxation

Negating the Negation: Blues Geographies as Remix in the Production of Space
Criminal minded, you’ve been blinded. Looking for a style like mine?
You can’t find it.–KRS-One, Criminal Minded
Essences get extracted from things so that they can be sold. And then
when the essences are there no more, it's discarded and something else is
sucked up as essence. That's just the way that the capitalist society moves
in America. It finds something that has some soul, extracts it, sells it,
then you move on to the next thing.92
I study the consciousness of the masses of the people. I study and teach
them of how they are perceiving themselves and how America perceives
them.–KRS-One93

91

“Turning the Tide on Homelessness in New York City” (City of New York, 2017), 90. See especially Chapter 5,
titled "A Reimagined Shelter Strategy." Not Really.
92
Interview with Ishmael Butler, formerly of Digable Planets and currently of Shabazz Palaces, on stress.fm, 2014,
http://stress.fm/post/106623191114/ishmael-butler.
93
Quoted in Ro, “Build and Destroy.”
34

According to Woods, the blues tradition is a system of knowledge and explanation that
serves as “a permanent countermobilization against the constantly re-emerging plantation blocs
of the world and their intellectual fountainhead in the South,” and which has “consistently served
to unite working-class communities across different spatial scales.”94 Davis, in her study of black
working-class feminist consciousness both emerging from and impressed by the music of 1920’s
blues women, figures the blues as “experience … emotionally configured by an individual
psyche,” in which the individual always is expressed through collectivity. This epistemology is
epitomized in her observation that “ ‘the blues’…designates both feelings and the circumstances
that have provoked them,” a dialectic which refuses the traditional separation between subject
and object. As she writes:
Black people’s inflected appropriation of this term [“the blues”] did not
make such a rigorous distinction between a subjective, psychological
state of depression and an objective, socially defined status of oppression.
Indeed, it seems likely that in the African-American consciousness of the
period of their origins, the blues were considered to be both a subjective
state and an objective phenomenon.

I posit this understanding of space as the antithesis of individualization, which is the
fundamental intent of the function of homeless shelters. This dialectical space is kept open by the
blues aesthetic. In this space lies consciousness, critique, and the imagination of something
different, even if the blues contradictorily “[testifies] to and [registers] the lack of real,
objectively attainable possibilities of social transformation” through official and institutional
political channels. The blues, in a transformation of West African philosophical tradition, names
existential “threat[s] to physical or psychological well-being…so that menacing problems are
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ferreted out from the isolated individual experience and restructured as problems shared by the
community.”95
I draw on the blues tradition here to realize how partial, dialectical knowledge moves
through and produces space in an attempt to offer insight into the political consciousness of those
living in homeless shelters. Blues geographies are the spatial patterns of the blues tradition.96
Hip-hop music, extending and reformatting that tradition, is a type of musical creation that
extracts and recirculates. Sampling from older cultural artifacts, it puts them back into motion as
remix, preserving collective memory by reconfiguring primary understandings of “modes of
existence.”97 Hip-hop, descendent of the blues, is therefore both critique and reconstruction.98 If
extraction is destabilization, immobility, and disruption, circulation is stabilization through
motion. In short, blues geographies allow an understanding of the lived reality of contradiction
and a recognition that the production of space is always contested. In this tradition, KRS and
LaRock set out to “provide a new vocabulary and syntax of rebellion much more closely attuned
to the material existence as well as to the emergent consciousness of those condemned to the
drifting life of the streets.”99 Their music is an example of Amical Cabral’s observation that “it is
generally within the culture that we find the seed of opposition.”100
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Boogie Down Productions, rather than acting as a type of vanguard, as was their claim,
drew on and articulated a blues consciousness which was informed by their experiences in the
men’s homeless shelter system in its armory period, as described in the previous section.101 The
artists give expression to an emergent “structure of feeling” of resistance taking hold during
intense political and economic change. The “reasons” for homelessness in BDP are historical and
multifaceted. For BDP and others, this was experienced in a novel and unfolding institutional
environment. This section will draw on oral life histories recorded by men living in homeless
shelters to demonstrate a widespread critical consciousness among shelter residents through a
blues epistemology.102 Despite sometimes reiterating the powerfully reformative state narrative
for their homelessness, such as personal deficiencies, lack of responsibility, drug use, or life
mistakes, these men also provide a counternarrative to individualization, which is the primary
structural function of the state's clinical intervention within homeless shelters.
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These interviews were open-ended. While they were not specifically oriented toward
politics, they attempted to get a sense of the men’s socio-spatial consciousness.103 The men
interviewed were participants in a program of work similar to that of the Camp LaGuardia’s
original format, which is described in subsequent chapters, except that it was in an urban context.
They were asked to recount their life histories and experiences in any way that they saw fit and
in their own words. The initial request was for them to describe what led to their homelessness
and their utilization of the homeless shelter system. Their words are quoted at length in this
section in order to emphasize how their explanations “traverse multiple scales of consciousness
and space.” As the single “South Bronx” attests, “every instance of blues music, literature, art,
film, and criticism is concerned with mapping places and consciousness.”104 As opposed to
administrators, who flattened homelessness into the lack of a place to sleep inside, these men
recognized the myriad social forces that go into producing homelessness, and which structure its
experience and institutionalization.
This epistemological method provides an entry into the substance of Boogie Down
Production’s early work. Contesting the simplified flattening of space and time was the source of
the title of their first album. They were criminal minded, rather than criminal. As one crew
member put it, “The title Criminal Minded was really [La Rock’s] plan…He was like, ‘Let’s talk
about reality, and do what we have to do to get the money, but not become criminals
ourselves.’”105 In this explanation, Criminal Minded appropriates criminality to also appropriate
power—it “Flips the rhyme upside down” as KRS raps in “Say No Brother (Crack Attack Don’t
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Do It).”106 This composite view of “crime” and “criminality” was expressed in numerous
interviews. For example, as L. described to me:
My thing was that, OK, I had no problem because I used to go up in
those stores. I would shoplift in the stores because my justification, this
is my warped thinking, my warped thinking was, “They’re insured.”
That’s how I look at it: they’re insured. They’re not gonna lose it. Like
I’m not gonna go into, Christian goes to work every day, he’s taking care
of his kids over there. As crazy as that may sound, I’m not gonna go
break up in his house because it’s taking away from him.107

J. gave a variation of this theme in the process of describing how he arrived in a homeless
shelter, describing the objective conditions of crisis: “You know to not face reality and life on
life’s terms, like going out and getting jobs, paying bills, I figured if I could just get high and not
be able to take care of nobody or worry about nobody but myself, regardless of who I was
hurting, then … I would be good.”108
The term “homeless” was similarly contested as an inadequate category, and many of the
men addressed it because I had used the word in my initial question. First, their identification as
“homeless” was sometimes a source of embarrassment, like for J., for whom homelessness was
the condition of being in a shelter: “I’ve been blessed with a lot of things and I didn’t want
people to see me down at the bottom of the bottom to the point where I was quote-unquote
‘homeless,’ you know, and had to stay in a shelter.” A.’s first words when I asked him how he
became “homeless” were, “I haven’t been homeless for a long period of time.” And later
explained that he became “homeless” when he came out of prison and had to access services in
the shelter system: “I didn’t want to tell [the intake counselor] that I’m homeless, you know what
I’m saying, because it’s an embarrassment. It’s embarrassing for a grown ass man, forty years
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old, you know what I’m saying, he’s homeless.” Even though V. had lived for nearly a year on
the street as a kid, he told me right off the bat that “this is my first time really experiencing being
homeless.” For T., being “homeless” was also identical to going to shelter, even though he had
experienced long periods of hustling on the streets. First, he said, “I was still like, living in
people’s houses, so I was technically homeless because I wasn’t … it’s not my house.” And later
added, “I didn’t feel like I was homeless because I always had somewhere to go. Not like now,
since, like, thirty-something and up it was like, ‘What do I do? Where do I go? Oh my God, I
gotta go to the shelter? What?’”
A scene from a Bill Brand film from the period of BDP’s meeting reinforces this point.
Though released in 1991, the film was made in the late 1980s. Brand speaks to a group of men
standing outside of the Sumner Armory in Brooklyn, then with cots for 720. The scene begins
with a camera’s-eye view of the drill floor, and we see security guards and staff standing around,
some men sleeping in the cots which have numbers scribbled in marker on the floor at their foot,
and endless rows of lockers edging the walls. The camera passes through the security station as
people try not to be filmed or can be heard murmuring, “What are you doing?” These techniques
convey the tension in the shelter, and the unauthorized presence of the film crew is palpable.
Later, standing in front of the entrance, the filmmaker interviews the men. Over the course of the
interview, none of the men refer to themselves as “homeless,” but rather in class terms: “I have
no rights. I’m just a poor man,” said a man in the process of describing his work in construction
trades, which he was able to continue until the shelters confiscated his tools.109
Sometimes the critique came in a different form, with the speaker setting himself apart
from what he considered to be “authentic” homelessness. “I’ve always worked,” said O., right
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away, describing both his on-the-books jobs and “side hustles.” “I didn’t have to go through the
real horrors of homelessness.” He later clarified this earlier point, while also describing his
identification with a “common” experience of “the homelessness situation,” which was precisely
KRS’s point in the quote that opens this essay. There is a subtle suggestion in this quote that if I
wanted to be talking to “authentic” homeless people (in a clinical sense) I should be interviewing
somebody else.
I could tell you one aspect of being homeless but as far as the horror,
horror of being homeless, being fully out there homeless, you know, it’s
like I can’t. But I identify with it though... I don’t have a story about
eating out of garbage cans and, you know, sleeping on the train and all
this other, that’s not me. You know what I’m saying? Although I identify
with not having a home, you know? ... Although me and a couple of
individuals shared common, you know what I’m saying, certain, the
homeless situation and stuff in common, our ways of trying to get out of
it was different, you know what I’m saying?110

T., who offered comparisons between shelters and prisons on more than one occasion,
went even further in his categorical deconstructions, when he described how he thought about
state institutions strategically.
I actually wanted to stay in prison for the rest of my life, you know? I
was hoping that maybe. I won’t kill nobody. I won’t hurt nobody. Not
intentionally, you know what I’m saying? Most of my felonies are for
drugs and drug related things not really no violence or nothing like that.
It was because of being homeless, like we say people make a joke,
people say, “They didn’t arrest you, they rescued you.” Because, you
know, most of, well me, per se, I’m weighing 140 pounds, I’m like, sixone, I’m looking all horrible like I got a real illness or something. I’m
real sick because I’m all drugged out. So I’m like happy to go to jail. I’m
like, “Thank you!” You know and then people like don’t understand.
Because I don’t do drugs in jail.
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Clearly, T’s “preference” for jail if given the option between the two types of institutions
demonstrates that he did not view their desirability based on a gradient of incapacitation or
presumed leniency. Brand also asked about this connection: “Have either of you ever been in
prison? … How does this compare?”
Mister, I’ve been to Dannemora. I’ve been to Greenhaven. I’ll tell you,
I’d swap positions right today if they’d allow me to come in and out. I
would swap with Greenhaven. The food is better. And people…they treat
you like you’re paying a debt to society. Here, we’re paying no debt to
society. We just happen to be poor.

The man interviewed could place prisons in a framework of relations necessary for the exchange
of equivalents in capitalist society,111 but homeless shelters were beyond the boundary of a
possible explanation based on retribution. They were unmoored from any ideological grounding
that had historical or material resonance.
KRS-One’s experience with the multiple pieces of the state therefore paralleled that of
many others. He describes his admittance to the Franklin Avenue Armory shelter after aging out
of the services in the Bureau of Child Welfare.
I got kicked out of the group home on my twentieth birthday, in 1985. I
went to the YMCA for three months and after that I was supposed to get
a job. Of course I jerked all the money and wasted my time and they
kicked me out of the Y, so I was homeless again. So I went back to the
[East] Third [Street] Men’s Shelter on the Bowery and they shipped me
and a bunch of other guys on a school bus up to 166th Street and Boston
Road in the Bronx.112

This was a theme I encountered more than once: men either became legally too old for
services they had received in their youth, or simply grew tired of hustling as they got older. L.
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riffed on a Bob Marley blues lyric113 in order to explain to me why he decided to enter shelter
after years on the street. He acknowledged that he was getting old to be out hustling every day,
then described for me the change in attitude which led him to come into the shelters:
I had that perception, that real crazy thinking where I’d rather make a
rock my pillow and the sidewalk my bed before I’ma subject myself to
being with you under these rules and regulations. And what’s the rules
and regulations that they were asking? It wasn’t like no crazy stuff,
Christian. All I had to do … was be a responsible man.114

V. was immersed in the same hip-hop culture as KRS, and also on the street very young.
He ran away from a foster home where he was being abused. He was talented and made some
money before the age of ten doing “breakdance, electric boogie.” He even auditioned for the
classic film “Beat Street,” released in 1984, about a DJ from the South Bronx in the early days of
hip-hop. Since he was on the streets so young, he looked to the older teenagers with whom he
used to hustle for important lessons about how to survive. He describes the importance of these
relationships, developed among the notorious “squeegee men,” who later became an obsession
for Rudy Giuliani.
And during our get-high process, like at the end of the night time,
sometimes they used to, one guy in particular, he used to take us up to
the roof and we used to climb into the [elevator] shaft and we used to get
high there. And I used to just think to myself, “Yo this would be a nice
place for me to rest my head.” You know what I mean? And no one
knew my situation that I was going through. They just knew that we were
young, we were hustlers, and that we wanted to get high. So after
everybody would leave and the partying was over and we would climb
down I would pretend like I was going home, come back around, and go
up in there. And that’s how I began to live in there. That’s how I was
introduced to being able to climb in elevator shafts. And I did that for
almost a year and they finally caught up to me, the police or whatever,
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and they told…you know I had to go to another foster home. I went to
another foster home.115

The experience with multiple shelters and institutions, as opposed to just one, is not
exclusive of KRS’s experience, but a common theme. Exemplary is O.’s response, when I asked
him how many shelters he had been to: “Wow, I’ve been to [pause] Bellevue, Bedford and
Atlantic, Pamoja House, Willow, Camp LaGuardia [pause] yeah Camp LaGuardia, I think six or
seven shelters. [pause] And here.” In fact, this movement, while partly organized by City policy
for the segregation of different “types” of homeless men (an internal HRA database printout
from 1990 refers to one shelter as reserved for “SPECIAL POPULATION: employable men”116),
is also a strategy utilized by those seeking out the services they need. Here, J. describes how he
got into a program that he thought could link him up with a job. His own initiative and social
networks, rather than official referrals, got him to where he wanted to go.
I went to the detox, they referred me to a place called [pause] I forgot
what it was. I forgot the name. But it was like more of a three quarter
house, or a halfway house or something like that? … And it was in the
Bronx. But there was a guy that came through, about my seventh day
there, from New Jersey, who I actually knew growing up. We played
football together. And I hadn’t seen him in probably thirty years. Well
the last time I did see him…he’s in here now, but the last time I did see
him prior to thirty years ago was probably two years ago when I was
running in New Jersey, my last run in New Jersey, and I robbed him. But
now he’s here. He came into detox about my seventh day. And he had a
[program] shirt on and everything. And I said, “What you doing?” “Man,
I’ve been over here in New York for a while now man. I’m doing my
thing. Where you going from here?” And I said, “They sending me
someplace.” He said, “Man naw, you need to get to [name of program].
You need to get here, right here, this is it.” He had the shirt on. He’s like,
“This is where you need to be at. This is where I’m at. This is the spot.
It’s a shelter slash work program. It’ll get you on your feet. Get your
trades. Help you out. Apartments, jobs, before you leave, bank account.”
So I said, yeah, and I went back to my counselor at detox and I said, “I
want to be referred to [program name].” And they said, “Well we don’t
115
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refer there but I’ll put it on your paper and the next spot that you go to
you can ask them how do you get a referral to [program].” Anyway,
upon me leaving detox, me and three other guys seen a [program] van
riding, flagged him down. It was a lady here.
C: You just flagged him?
J: Yeah, flagged him down. Actually, one guy, another guy had been in
[the program] before knew the driver. So when we seen him, because I
was telling him, because I knew he was leaving the same day, “I’m
trying to go to [the program].” He was like, “Yeah, that’s a great
program. I used to be there.”117

While describing the conditions in the armory and other shelters, T. also demonstrated
that his agency was a factor for why he had been to so many shelters. Below he tells of his
experience in the Beford-Atlantic armory, years after it had been established as a permanent part
of the shelter system, and even referred back to its original, improvised days.
The shelters here, I’ve been to Bellevue, I’ve been to … they call it
Castle Greyskull, it’s Bedford and Atlantic, that’s what they call it, you
know, because it’s a horrible place. It was a lot worse back in the days. A
lot of the shelters were treacherous back in the days. Now, they’re a little
more secure but still shit goes on. Like Ward’s Island, I didn’t even … I
honestly gotta say I never went in … I went right to the front of that shit
and I was just like, “I’m not staying in this motherfucking … no!” I said,
“Take me the fuck back over or I’ll walk back.” Or whatever the fuck.
And I left because I was like something … I was like, “I’m not staying
here.” Just like in Castle Greyskull … I slept there a couple times but
then one time I came, I had … you know I always got stuff with me. I
got some shit, you know what I’m saying, where I drag it with me or I
leave it at my friend’s house, I couldn’t leave it no more. So I bring it in.
So now I start taking it out of my pockets, like, here with the [?] and shit.
So these young boys, a bunch of them, they looking at it. So I’m like, “I
know these motherfuckers going to try to rob me.” You know what I’m
saying? So I’m like, “Fuck that. I don’t even want to go through that shit
right now. I’m too old for that shit.” Really, I knew they was going to get
me because it was too many of them and I don’t want to have to hurt
somebody and I don’t want to get hurt. I’m not trying to … I just want to
go to sleep, you know? So I just took all my shit and I told the officer,
“Yo, I don’t want to stay here. Look, I’m leaving.” He was like, “No,
what are you leaving for? Don’t leave.” This and that. I was like, “Naw, I
don’t want to stay here.” So I went, I left. I had the two dollar metrocard,
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not two dollars, but I had a metrocard or whatever the change for the bus
it was at the time, and I got on and I just rode the train all night.118

This institutional knowledge formed the basis for unexpected strategies. T. was an
extraordinary hustler, and viewed all sides of any situation from a variety of angles. In the
interview he was almost in a dialog with himself, narrating from one position, then subtly
switching to another and giving more insight. He had also aged out of youth services. Once he
got into the shelter system and saw the disastrous conditions, he immediately began to think of
his options. He had described numerous times the ways in which his ability to be “crazy” on the
streets was an asset. When inside, he tried to use the strategy to get better accommodations, even
though it failed.
I started telling Bellevue I hear voices so I could go to the shelter … I
mean go to the nut-job house, the lockdown, to sleep! And the doctor
was like, “There’s nothing wrong with you.” I’d say, “Well, they told me
I got these kind of problems with me.” And he was like, “Well, I’ll see
and I’ll assess you.” And stuff like that. But I actually started telling him
that and he’s like, “You shouldn’t do that.” They said, “Why’d you do
that?” Because I don’t want to go to that shelter, man, it’s disgusting. It’s
nasty, you know? I still got some kind of morals or thing with me with
the cleanliness, you know?119

A. had been in a wide array of institutionalized settings, including treatment centers,
prisons, and homeless shelters. From his appearance I knew that he would be able to hold his
own in any situation he found himself in. He was tough, and had a long scar down the side of one
cheek. But when we spoke he opened up. During the interview he described repeated instances
of trying to get various forms of help that he needed. I asked him, given that he was so proactive,
was he concerned with all the moving around between different programs or was he going to
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make the most of it, wherever he was?120 His response was structural, and about the staff’s place
in that structure, as he alluded to their other interests, which limited their ability to provide him
with what he needed. He even had trouble finding the right word that described what the staff do.
While he seemed to conflate the interests of front line staff with those of the organization, at the
same time he didn't want to individualize the staff. He couldn't place their actions outside of this
social web. This was his response.
Believe it or not Christian, man, I mean, the system’s real fucked up.
Umm … the different types of programs I went to, you know what I’m
saying, it felt like the counselors there, the staff there, you know what
I’m saying, was concerned about one thing: receiving a client into the
facility, the establishment, to receive money. As far as really reaching
out, extending a hand to actually help the individual and assist … I mean,
what, assist, I ain’t gonna say help! … assist the individual in the right
direction, I haven’t seen that. Know what I mean? That’s why I was
going from place to place to place to place to place to place.121

R. painted a poignant picture of the fractured and alienated life of survival in the carceral
state. He gave an intimately detailed account of his path from the depression and stress of
holding down a job with the city while homeless, getting fired and ending up in Rikers, and his
active engagement and navigation with the homeless shelter system after he was released. He
had a magnificent talent for and attention to narrative and explanation. Of particular interest here
is that R.’s description of his relationship with city and non-profit employees is generous, even
with regard to interactions with police officers, often described as antagonistic. In his account he
found many sympathetic individuals who helped him as much as they could, taking into
consideration their specific roles and relative power. At the same time, he identifies the limits of
their support. He was sent to a city employee who administered his drug test. “She was required
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by law, because they was paying for her to report to the job of my participation and my urine and
things of that nature. She gave me a break the first time my urine was dirty. She said, ‘[can’t hear]
Officer W, I’m sorry, I’m gonna have to report this.’ “122 In the following section, I take up this
theme—the structural position between staff and residents—in a broader context.
Social Reproduction and the Limits of Welfare
Measure me with memory.123
The largest proportion of workers [in the contemporary economy]
exchange against revenue (state employees, for example) [as opposed to
against capital].124
State workers and especially state dependents bear the main burden of
the fiscal crisis…In the absence of a political movement that transcends
particular interests, divisions between monopoly sector workers, state
workers, and the surplus population could very well deepen.125

Was the alliance between KRS and LaRock normal or exceptional? In this section I
explore their relationship in the context of labor politics with regard to the city’s welfare agency
in the 1980s. A primary contradiction of homeless shelters is that they are individualizing yet
appear as institutions that re-integrate those left out of a particular social formation. Here I look
at the historical role of homeless shelters in stabilizing social displacement by destabilizing
solidarity. The relationship between the two musicians described in the opening can thus
highlight an aspect of the class dimensions of the contemporary restructuring of the local state’s
welfare practices. It can also identify some of the lived contradictions produced and experienced
within the state as it takes on the role of managing displacement: it absorbs surplus labor at the
same time that it manages displacement. I take as a starting point James O’Connor’s prescient
observation that, given the historically “relatively close collaboration between state welfare
122
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clients and workers [in New York]…perhaps the only way for the state to contain such a
movement [of the alliance of radical state workers and the majority of the surplus population] is
to accelerate the growth of the social-industrial complex.”126 I propose that the construction of a
homeless shelter system in New York City can be seen in this way: to increase welfare labor’s
productivity as part of the state’s efforts to relieve fiscal crisis, by reconfiguring its role in social
reproduction to one of housing the homeless in shelters. Organized labor consented to this
arrangement in the early days of the shelter system, choosing to focus on shelter conditions and
salaries in the break.
New York City’s welfare workers have sometimes had a history of radicalism.127 One
year before New York City Mayor John Lindsay reformed the Department of Welfare into the
Human Resources Administration, 8,000 welfare workers went on strike. Municipal unionization
had increased dramatically nationwide over the previous decades. Less than one third of large
cities in the United States had unionized municipal workers in the 1930s, compared to 80% in
1969.128 In New York City, by the early 1960s, welfare rolls and the resulting caseloads had
expanded dramatically, and the intensification of work schedules radicalized some of the case
workers. The strike in 1965 forced the city to temporarily shutter a majority of its welfare centers.
After nearly a month, the city agreed to higher salaries, increased funding for further education,
more case workers, and smaller caseloads. 1970 was a peak year nationwide for strikes in
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general, the frequency of which remained high until 1975.129 The late 1960s and early 1970s thus
marked the apex of post-World War II economic growth as well as of organized labor’s
militancy and influence in New York.
By the beginning of the 1970s, New York offered a large number of jobs in the
government sector, which were more secure than employment in the private sector, especially for
people of color who faced racism and employment discrimination. According to Freeman, in
New York City, the public sector was the largest “by far…[and] in 1970 had more employees
than the garment, banking, and longshore industries put together.”130 While labor demands and
expenses in private industry may prompt a company to relocate, this option is unavailable to the
state, which is immobile. Thus, New York restructured a portion of its welfare by devising what
became a permanent system of homeless shelters. In the process, SSEU Local 371, the union
representing the city’s social workers, had an ambivalent relationship with these shelters, and
cultivated no relationship with those living in them.
As noted, LaRock and KRS occupied different positions in the state’s hierarchy. While
KRS had been living on the street for a year, and had been in and out of group homes and
homeless shelters, LaRock was recently a college graduate. His professional activities in the
shelter, after earning a Bachelor’s Degree in Business, were described by the New York Times
after he was shot and killed outside a Bronx housing project in 1987:
Former residents of the shelter remember when he first arrived, a broad
shouldered young man, fresh out of college, 6 feet 2 inches tall, wearing
a tie and carrying a briefcase. There he set up group counseling sessions
for young homeless men before taking an extended leave of absence in
April to go on a musical tour.

129
130

Joshua Freeman, Working Class New York: Life and Labor Since WWII (New York: New Press, 2000), 206–11.
Freeman, 201.
50

LaRock was already a fixture in the hip-hop clubs, working as a DJ at night and on
weekends. According to the Times article, this was part of his identity at his day job in the shelter
as well, noting that “He had a tremendous impact. Some residents actually went into the rap
business themselves, got their own apartments, or had other success due to Mr. Sterling.”131 Yet,
according to KRS, LaRock was initially seen as an outsider. Highlighting the hierarchy within
the shelter, KRS later described how he initially imagined the difference between them. “I was in
this shelter, and about two months after that walks in this new social worker, with a briefcase and
everything. And we knew that he was a nerd; he was not part of the cool clique.”132
Contrary to LaRock’s activities in the shelter, the institutionalized labor movement was
focused on other things. Through the early 1980s, the union was primarily motivated by securing
higher wages and alleviating deteriorating working conditions, two issues that were interrelated.
While the State Supreme Court consent decree establishing the right to shelter for homeless
people was written in 1979, it wasn’t “settled” in the courts until late 1981.133 Simultaneously,
the union had been in discussions with the city for a new contract since mid-1980. Immediately
the question of the relationship between labor and the administration was dramatized as the
overcrowding of existing homeless facilities increased significantly. The city was so pressed for
space that it immediately began using the offices at the East Third Street homeless shelter as
sleeping quarters.134 Temporary shelters even opened up in other offices under HRA’s
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jurisdiction, such as General Support Services, an action that provoked intense reaction from the
union.135
The result was that the City’s emergency practices brought the working conditions of city
welfare workers, long a factor in their daily jobs, to the attention of the administration, because
the union was able to push an issue that it had trying to expose even before Callahan. These
issues did not just arise with the Consent Decree, but were exacerbated by overcrowding and
limited space. In codifying Callahan, basic “minimums” of shelter conditions were written in—a
future point of reference for the Coalition for the Homeless and other advocates.136 As one article
put it, “Management was reminded that meetings are long overdue on Camp LaGuardia, Battered
Women, Group Homes and the Women's Shelter.”137 Therefore, the union drew on the city’s
strategy for addressing crisis to give its ongoing concerns attention and legitimacy.
By the end of 1980 the union had negotiated a pay raise with the Koch administration’s
HRA. When the City hedged on implementing the first stage of the raise as a result of a dispute
over transfer clauses (transfers were very important in the city’s ability to open up provisional
shelters), the union promised that “the Mobilization Committee would probably be reactivated.
[Organization Vice President Nat Williams said,] ‘We have not had work actions for a long
time...It’s time to stop being fat cats and take to the streets.’” The troops were being rallied for a
strike via a campaign focused on the Men’s Shelter. The issues at hand were work conditions (to
the exclusion of living conditions) found in the shelter, which were deteriorating because of the
presence of homeless people themselves, and the termination of David Waite, a per diem
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Institutional Aide who had been fired for his role in protesting them.138 Victor Gotbaum,
Executive Officer of District Council 37, Joe Sperling, President of SSEU Local 371, and
Manfred Ohrenstein, State Senator, held a press conference at the Third Street Men’s Shelter and
workers testified to the City Council in February 1981 to continue the pressure.139 Even though
conditions did not improve, the union marked a victory. That October, the Supreme Court forced
the city to find alternate accommodation for the men sleeping at East Third Street.
A Manhattan Supreme Court judge issued an emergency order October
20 barring the City from sleeping men in the dining areas of the Men’s
Shelter and other facilities for the homeless. The emergency order also
required the City to open an armory within 24 hours and to submit to the
court by November 2 a detailed plan to meet the needs of the homeless
this winter.140

The union ceased making conditions in the shelter an issue, especially since the pay
raises had gone into effect that summer.141 The union and the city were in détente, and the tradeoff appeared to be the annualization of some Institutional Aides for the disciplining of the
workers who had protested.
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The hiring of additional security forces and the annualization of the per
diem Institutional Aides were encouraging victories, but workers report
health and safety conditions are as bad as ever. After a conversation in
early September with HRA Deputy Commissioner Robert Trobe, Union
President Joe Sperling was impressed by efforts the City was making to
expand shelter services. “At that time, Trobe said he would like to avoid
having to sleep clients in the Men’s Shelter at all. I appreciated the fact
that the City was making concrete moves to find other facilities as a
result of the pressure exerted last winter by shelter staff,” Sperling
said.142

Coverage of the conditions in the shelter ceased until the following year, when the union
was backing Mario Cuomo for Governor and shelter conditions were back on its agenda. 143
While this may have been a good strategy in its political alliance with Mario Cuomo, it required
an erasure of the people living in those shelters. Indeed, those people are only mentioned in the
paper’s articles as a work hazard for city workers.144
The subsequent two years, immediately preceding when LaRock met KRS at the armory,
were periods of intense focus by the union. Of the 77 articles in their newspaper, The Unionist,
about homeless shelters between 1980 and 1987, nearly 50% were published in 1983 and 1984.
Remaining focused on salaries and conditions, their strategy was to align with Mario Cuomo, by
linking their reformist program to his gubernatorial bid in 1983. While, like BDP, they focused
on some of the objective conditions of crisis, their position seemed to be, since working spaces
are so bad, workers should get paid more. The union used a realist approach to exposing material
conditions in the shelters to appropriate power. Usually, however, this was used to put pressure
on the administration as a tool during contract negotiations. The homeless shelter system was
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used politically in this process precisely because it had some of the worst working conditions of
any city agency.
Coverage in the paper therefore consistently paired stories about labor’s relationship with
Cuomo with its campaign to rectify conditions for workers in the shelters. The day after the
election, November 8, 1982, The Unionist ran a story attributing Cuomo’s victory to union
support in New York City, next to a headline that read “Demonstrators Protest City’s Attempt to
Lower Shelter Sanitary Standards.”145 The union’s most comprehensive statement of its position
was published in a special issue of The Unionist, in March 1983, titled “Working With The
Homeless: Special Shelter Supplement.” This passage attests to the way the city disciplined HRA
workers into their roles as workers in an expanding shelter system, including its use of temporary
workers to undermine solidarity in their workplaces.
Expansion of the shelter system has been carried out without regard to
the rights and needs of shelter workers. Secret openings of new facilities,
designed to thwart community protests, have meant instant involuntary
transfers for existing staff, hiring of new workers without processing
papers to get them paid, and giving workers and directors only a few
hours notice before moving in beds and people. But the problems go
even deeper. To staff the new facilities, the City has expanded a policy of
hiring ‘per diem’ Institutional Aides. ‘Per diem’ is a designation for
workers called in on a daily basis to supplement a permanent workforce.
Per diems are not considered permanent employees and as such do not
‘count’ towards an agency’s budget allotment of workers.146

Conclusion
The following chapters describe the rise and fall of an earlier shelter model, which
eventually was replaced by the one described in this chapter. Camp LaGuardia, a rural
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reformatory/workhouse, implemented during the Great Depression, was produced by a different
reorganization of social relations in space. It extracted single men from urban space and sent
them upstate to learn how to farm. The institution, located seventy miles north of New York City
in Orange County, is important because over its history it occupied a flexible “middle ground”
between a punitive and rehabilitative local state. A sometime prison, sometime work camp,
sometime homeless shelter, it always was used as a tool for the management of a section of New
York’s regional surplus population. Yet, over the course of these changes, the model
institutionalized ideas that continue to structure the state’s methods of managing displacement
within its general administration of welfare, and the political relationships between
administrators, workers, and shelter residents.
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Chapter 3
Progressives and Prisons

Figure 3.1 The “ruins” of Camp LaGuardia, pictured after its closing in 2007.
Photo: Nik Piatek, YouTube
Here then to-day in the bosom of mother earth we lay this granite block,
a silent witness perhaps to future ages of the humanity of our times and
the progress of Christian civilization. And when the stately edifice which
this granite block is intended to support shall have fulfilled the object of
this dedication, and when its stately columns shall have yielded to decay,
who shall say that this same stone may not by chance be from its silent
bed exhumed and other men of other times read upon its rugged face the
story of its origin. 147

Introduction
This chapter examines the origin of New York City’s Greycourt Reformatory Prison,
known as the Women’s Farm Colony, in order to describe the institutional starting point of Camp
LaGuardia in Orange County, New York. It is a study of infrastructural change that is intended,
as the Judge said, to “read upon its rugged face the story of its origin.”148 It specifically
investigates the role of gender in this institutional transformation. The prison’s history is part of
the reorganization and modernization of New York City’s Department of Corrections in sync
147
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with the designs of the Regional Plan Association, which laid out a long-term regional economic
and geographic development plan for the New York City metropolitan area. A portion of their
plan engaged the geographic reconfiguration of New York City’s carceral institutions, ongoing
since the early 20th century, which gave way to the original buildings of the facility pictured
here. Constructed as a women’s prison, it subsequently became a work camp for homeless men
during the Depression. It remained a homeless shelter until it closed in 2007. In its origins,
therefore, the institution was part of the Progressive movement’s active reconfiguration of the
state in order to produce and extract value from labor and land.149
The Regional Plan Association and the Geography of Reform
In 1924, George Wickersham, former Attorney General and later Chairman of the
Wickersham Commission, formed to study the enforcement of prohibition,150 requested the help
of the Russell Sage Foundation’s Hastings H. Hart, corrections consultant for the Regional Plan
Association, to study administrative and infrastructural recommendations given to the Board of
Estimate by New York City’s Commissioner of Corrections. In his report one year later, Hart
agreed with the Commissioner: the city should discontinue the use of Welfare Island for prisons,
construct three new prisons on Riker’s Island, most of which was created out of landfill, and use
prison labor for construction and waste management, including “unloading scows and leveling
waste material in Riker’s Island and for salvaging useful material therefrom.”151 The newly
opened Greycourt institution, as well as the planned House of Detention for Women, was
believed to be crucial for the city’s ability to remove the penal institutions from Welfare Island.
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The women at the Corrections Hospital and Workhouse, together the women’s penitentiary on
Welfare Island, could be sent to these institutions, and that wing could be demolished. The
House of Detention, to be built on Greenwich Avenue, would be used to classify prisoners as
well as to house women awaiting trial.152 The detention center was built in the city so that it
could be close to the Ninth District Women’s Court, a “specialized [magistrate’s] court” that was
de-linked from the district system in that all women arrested in Manhattan or the Bronx for
prostitution were tried there. After the penal institutions were removed from Welfare Island,
Greycourt was supposed to be the only convict prison for women under the auspices of New
York City’s Department of Correction. The reports were therefore preoccupied with capacity:
how many women would the institutions need to handle? The Farm Colony should have been
more than big enough for its planned purpose. According to Hart, the largest number of women
who had been confined in the Corrections Hospital and Workhouse at once over the previous
eight years was 694,153 and it was anticipated that the buildings at Greycourt after a second
period of expansion would eventually hold 700.154

Figure 3.2 “The Correction Hospital for Females on Welfare Island.”155
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Concurrently, the ambitious Regional Plan Association was drawing together experts
from a multitude of fields to design and implement wide ranging structural and geographic
adjustments to the metropolitan urban economy. The effort was conceived by the Russell Sage
Foundation’s Charles D. Norton in 1921 “to visualize the commercial, the industrial, the social,
and the artistic values and possibilities of our glorious harbor and all of its broad and varied
environs” and to “direct public expenditure into projects of permanent value.”156 To these ends,
he gathered colleagues, including Frederick Keppel and Lawrence Veiller, for an initial meetings
in 1921. Keppel eventually left the Foundation to become the president of the Carnegie
Corporation, where he commissioned the famous “Poor White Study” of South Africa, but
maintained a consulting role in the RPA.157 Veiller was an eminent member of the Committee of
Fourteen, a middle-class reform organization originally established to combat the so-called
Raines Law hotels in the early 20th century. The Regional Plan Association maintained an
“organic relation” to the Russell Sage Foundation, which funded it in its entirety, even as the
Foundation sought to downplay the relationship for the purposes of public relations. The
relationship was important because the plan solidified “the need for greater knowledge of social
science as a foundation for physical planning.”158
In his history of the Regional Plan of 1929, David Johnson writes, “Metropolitan regional
planning in this period linked Progressive era planning and reform movements to the thrust
towards administrative efficiency and to the responses evoked by the beginning of mass
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ownership of the automobile.”159 Hence, the main economic and geographic goals of the original
Regional Plan were conceived as sweeping infrastructural projects. Some of the most ambitions
of these were the George Washington and Triborough Bridges, the transferal of the Port of New
York to Newark, and strategies to alleviate overcrowding in the burgeoning city.160 These
infrastructural, land-use, and efficiency concerns overlapped in its prison reform designs.
Welfare Island was central geographically to an expanding New York City, and therefore
vital to the RPA’s general plan. The consolidation of New York had prompted city leaders to
consider the future of its institutions with regard to the management of prisoners and charitable
cases. The city’s 1898 charter anticipated infrastructural changes that would be coordinated by
the newly disjointed agencies of Public Charities and Corrections, the duties of which a single
agency, the Department of Public Charities and Correction, had previously maintained.161
Providing specifically for the case of removing penal institutions from Welfare Island (then
called Blackwell’s Island) Section 696 of Chapter XIV of the charter read, in part: “Whenever in
consequence of such removals or otherwise any of the buildings theretofore occupied or used for
said Workhouse or Penitentiary shall have become vacant, such building or buildings, with the
grounds thereto appertaining, shall be transferred to the Department of Public Charities.”162
The Regional Plan Association gave specific recommendations for developing Welfare
Island in 1929, while bluntly considering the island’s long-term association with the indigent
from its perspective of economic development:
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People have so long thought of the islands as outlying spots to which
criminals, paupers, and persons of broken health can be dismissed—
much as a farmer’s broken machinery and rubbish are consigned to some
inconspicuous and worthless corner of his farm. And it has a sanction
from common sense too. For if the municipal machinery requires certain
unpleasant parts for its healthy operation, such as penitentiaries and
sewage treatment plants—and these cannot be placed on the mainland
without greater expense and more annoyance than would result from
their being placed on the islands—then, clearly, the islands are
appropriate places for these parts. But to arrive at a satisfactory
conclusion, it is necessary to ask whether the other rôle which the islands
might play in the city’s economy is or is not more important than the rôle
of abiding places for prisons and nuisances. Without attempting to
prejudice the decision, an attempt will be made in this memorandum to
indicate what might be done if the islands were used as they never have
been. It will be assumed that there is no need of explaining how they can
be used for prisons and asylums because that has been demonstrated;
what new function might be assigned to them does require
explanation.163

The Russell Sage Foundation’s twin objectives of prison reform and regional
reconfiguration were telescoped geographically onto Welfare Island. With this focus it was able
to forward a plan not just a plan of destruction, but of construction. The “broken machinery” of
surplus labor would give way to healthy, productive workers, regenerated in parks. Thus, the
concept of open spaces became a touchstone of the Regional Plan Association, ingrained in its
vision of New York’s “total economy.” The plan for Welfare Island therefore was to hollow out
the center by removing prisons and to use the resulting space for recreational facilities and parks.
It is reasonable to say, looking at the East River Islands as a whole and in
relation to the city’s total economy, first, that, with the exception of the
Metropolitan Hospital and the City Hospital, the institutions which now
occupy them had better be removed or must be largely rebuilt
somewhere; and, second, that as an alternative to refilling vacated space
with new asylums, hospitals and penal institutions, there will be an
opportunity for much needed recreational facilities, and that for such the
islands possess a quite special fitness.164
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Figure 3.3 Corrections and Welfare Institutions on the Former Blackwell’s Island.165

While the Regional Plan Association focused on parks and recreation areas to alleviate
overcrowding within the city's limits, by contrast it viewed the hinterlands as ample.166 In a map
reminiscent of the Chicago School of planning, concentric circles demonstrated their vision of a
central city surrounded by areas of decreasing value expanding outward. Orange County is
located in the farthest ring of concentric circles outside of the developed area of Metropolitan
New York, “40 miles from New York City Hall.” The sub-region on the map described as “New
York State Outside N.Y. City” had an area of 2,597 square miles, 47% of the regional total, and
only 721,449 people, 8% of the regional total. The RPA used this center/periphery model in its
justifications, the geographic materiality of the perspective that likened idled laborers in prisons
to “broken machinery and rubbish,” and viewed prisons as “sewage treatment plants.” The idea
was to make some labor more productive, through the provision of open spaces that would give

165

A Special Committee of the Regular Grand Jury August Term, A Study of the Conditions Which Have
Accumulated Under Many Administrations and Now Exist in the Prisons on Welfare Island New York City, 13.
166
Regional Plan Association, Regional Plan of New York and Its Enviorns, Volume 2: The Building of the City, 128.
The introductory to this volume read: "Open Spaces.--The total area of public parks, cemeteries, municipal
watersheds and the like in 1927 was 159,097 acres, of which 14,993 acres were within New York City. There was
one acre of parks to every 601 persons within the city, and one acre to every 1,245 persons in Manhattan. Within
approximately 200 miles of the city there were in 1924 about 656,000 acres of forest reserves and public
reservations of 1,000 acres more in size."
63

respite to the overcrowding of the industrial city, while at the same time managing “broken”
labor, both of which activities were activated through the reform of the state and its infrastructure.
This program had an implicit geography that extracted a suitable portion of prisoners in a reform
program to clean up the “sewage treatment plants.” The plan provided places for working labor
to replenish itself, in public spaces on the former site of those institutions, as well as places for
idled labor to pay for its own upkeep (see below.)

Figure 3.4 “Map of New York and Its Environs.”167

Part of this institutional reconfiguration entailed administrative re-scaling. The other two
City reformatories in Orange County were eventually turned over to the State. New York City
exchanged the plot of its Dairy Farm in Warwick for Randall’s Island, in order to build the
Triborough Bridge. The State used the site for its Training School for Boys, which opened in
167
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1932. It was later converted into a men’s medium security prison, and it closed in 2011. New
Hampton remained the city’s reformatory until 1958, when it too was transferred to the State.168
Greycourt remained under the city’s control.169

Figure 3.5 “The Triborough Bridge to Connect Queens with the Bronx and Manhattan”170
Randall’s Island (top left) and Ward’s Island (center) are still separate in this image.

Welfare Island was seen as a particularly desirable place for parks, as demonstrated by
the RPA photograph in figure 3.7, which a Grand Jury reproduced in a 1924 report. Rather than
being on Manhattan's edge, the island was now easily accessible to the residents of all boroughs
in a consolidated New York City. It was “more central than Central Park,” as RPA documents
put it,171 a phrase that became a mantra in its repetition in the New York Times, the “position [of
the islands] is very central—more central than that of central park.” Welfare Island, once seen as
a good place to put New York’s prisons because it was on the fringe, was now at its epicenter.
Their removal from the middle section of Welfare Island would create the space for:
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Twenty baseball diamonds, forty tennis courts, fifty handball courts, two
outdoor swimming pools, a gymnasium, two indoor swimming pools, a
small grand stand, a large field for athletic and pageantry, a one-acre
children’s playground, a field 70 by 100 feet for volley ball, bowling and
other field sports and a large dance pavilion.172

Figure 3.6 “A Study of the Recreational Possibilities of Welfare Island.”173

Because of this relational centrality, Welfare and Randalls were the most important East
River islands. The photograph demonstrates well that understanding of geography, with Welfare
Island positioned at the center and Central Park on the edge. Harts and Rikers, at the top of the
picture, were isolated and peripheral, and therefore targeted as locations for new penal
institutions.174
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Figure 3.7 “An Airplane View of Welfare, Riker’s and Hart’s Islands. Reproduced by permission
of the Committee on a Regional Plan for New York and its Environs, owners of this plate.”175

To enable the dislocation of the city’s institutions from the island, deteriorating
conditions, long present in them, came to the forefront. Working in conjunction with Hart was a
“special committee” of the New York County Grand Jury, charged by Magistrate William Allen
of the Court of General Sessions to produce a report on two prisons on Welfare Island. Their
report, published in 1924, came to the same recommendations as Hart, an “expert in penology”
who was conducting a “complete survey of the prisons.”176 The Grand Jury saw as its mandate to
provide advice to the city “to modernize [its penal institutions]…and to adapt them to the
increasing demands of the City, due to its growth and improvements in methods of the custodial
175
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treatment of prisoners for their moral welfare and social, intellectual and industrial
improvement.”177 Insofar as the special committee was concerned with conditions in the prisons,
it was only to the extent that they were impeding the proper “scientific management” of the
prison population. Part of the furor over conditions was animated by the facilities’ inability to
effect the proper “segregation” and “classification” of inmates. This was especially imperative in
order to prevent prisons from continuing to be “school[s] of crime.” Existing conditions
permitted prisoners with “Opportunities … for retailing to each other the details of their exploits,
enlarging upon their experiences, which glorify some as heroes in the eyes of others and tend to
form associations which are maintained after release. There can be little doubt that many of the
hold-ups and robberies now constituting a veritable crime carnival in this city were planned in
the laboratories of this institution.”178 This view dovetailed with an understanding emerging from
the experience of the administration of New York City’s Department of Corrections, in which
overcrowding substantially prevented solitary confinement. The Department’s position was that
“the completion of the South Wing and the opening of the institution at Greycourt will obviate
doubling up in cells at the Correction Hospital.”179 Hart’s and other reformers’ collaboration
within the RPA therefore demonstrates the geographical elements of the emergent system of
classification and segregation within the City’s Department of Correction. Infrastructural
differentiation and decentralization, politically justified through a public focus on fixing an
ageing infrastructure’s deteriorating conditions, was the basis for this system. Hart and the Grand
Jury, while emphasizing cost-efficiency (figure 3.8), presented specific recommendations to
Commissioner of Corrections Frederick Wallis, which included discontinuing prisons on Welfare
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Island and constructing three new prisons on Riker’s Island, using prison labor for their
construction.

Figure 3.8 “Our Biggest Tax—The Cost of Crime”180

Thus, the major ideological basis and political motivation became conditions in the
prison. The penitentiary on Welfare Island was an easy target for reformers because of the
scandalously poor conditions there, conditions that had persisted since it was built, including a
lack of plumbing that necessitated the famous “bucket system” for latrines in the cells. In 1914,
Frank Tannenbaum, a young member of the IWW was sentenced to one year on the island for
leading homeless men into churches to demand food and money. He wrote a series of articles for
The Masses about his prison experience there, exposing conditions and corruption.181 A moral
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panic surrounding prison escapes, gang activity, and “race riots” were covered regularly in the
papers.182 Middle-class reformers convincingly argued that the buildings were obsolete. For them
the workhouse was untenable, because, as Katherine B. Davis, committed eugenicist and New
York City’s first female Commissioner of Correction, put it: “the women in the workhouse are
not well taken care of.”183 As the RPA explained, “The greater proportion of the buildings now
in use on the islands are so shockingly below modern standards that they ought to be pulled
down anyway.”184
These were the processes and interests that contributed to the expansion of the carceral
state under the ideology of Progressivism, which can be seen in the chart in figure 3.9. Part of the
expansion was necessary because of lengthening sentences, which were themselves necessary
given the goals of rehabilitating “fallen women,”185 and activated through indeterminate
sentencing. The goal of this carceral system was centralization and differentiation in
consolidated New York, and an increased ability to manage, segregate, and classify prisoners.
The three Orange County reformatories, which at the time of this report were still under
construction, were fundamental to this program.
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Figure 3.9 Segregation and Classification within the New York City Department of
Corrections.186

The Committee of Fourteen
Lawrence Veiller worked with Charles Norton and Robert De Forest at the RPA. He was
also a central member of the law division of the Committee of Fourteen, a private reform
organization described by one scholar as “New York City’s most influential anti-vice
organization.”187 The Committee of Fourteen was founded in 1905 by upper-middle class
reformers of the City Club in response to the Raines Law Hotels. The Raines law of the late
nineteenth century made it legal for hotels to sell alcohol on Sundays, while Saloons could not.
Saloon proprietors therefore renovated their upper floors to accommodate at least ten hotel
rooms and obtained liquor licenses for Sundays. They then rented the rooms on the upper floors
for prostitution. The Committee cracked down on these practices by focusing on working women.
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The Committee was intimately involved in expanding legislation to attack what they
called the “social evil,” prostitution. One of their main legislative accomplishments was in 1915,
when they re-wrote the state’s vagrancy laws, in particular Subdivision 4, Section 887 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, in order to more easily capture women for solicitation. The most
frequently used sections redefined vagrancy as: “A person (a) who offers to commit
prostitution … or (c) who loiters in or near any thoroughfare or public or private place for the
purpose of inducing, enticing, or procuring another to commit lewdness, fornication, unlawful
sexual intercourse or any other indecent act.”188 This statute was expanded again in 1919. Veiller,
an attorney, was a moving force in this re-write, and had legislative experience. He also was
closely associated with the emergent field of urban planning, having written a book on Tenement
House Law of 1901 for Russell Sage, as well as the nation’s first zoning law in 1916. He later
wrote similar legislation that became the state’s wayward minor laws in 1923, which remained
on the books until 1967.189 Historian Ruth Alexander summarized the Committee’s legislative
successes:
The committee…obtained legal reforms that expanded the definition of
prostitution and dramatically enhanced the state’s power of surveillance,
allowing under-cover police to entrap and arrest disorderly young
women who lived apart from and beyond the oversight of kin.190

By their own measure the Committee’s legislation was successful, based on calculations
published in their 1919 Annual Report (figure 3.10). Through that year there was a steady
increase in the number of arrests under the expanded vagrancy statute, which “would have been
impossible prior to the 1915 amendment of the section.” Arrests under this statute went from 14%
188
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to 40% of the arraignments in women’s court for prostitution between 1915 and 1919, the period
during which Greycourt was constructed. In absolute numbers it was an increase of
approximately 700—the anticipated capacity of Greycourt when completed. While clearly there
was not a one-to-one relationship, it is notable that a majority of the women sent to Greycourt
were arrested under this statute.

Figure 3.10 Women’s Court Arraignments for Prostitution, 1915-1919.191

While initially the Committee tried to work solely through the courts and with the police,
it also drew on expanded tactics. Mara Keire detailed the complicated system that was the source
of the Committee’s power in pre-prohibition New York City. Saloon keepers paid a steep price
for liquor licenses and insurance, costs meant to be prohibitive in efforts to limit the number of
saloons. To mitigate these expenses, proprietors entered relationships with brewers, who paid the
fees in exchange for exclusive rights to sell their brand at that establishment. Yet brewers also
worried about their public image in an increasingly hostile environment regarding the
consumption of alcohol. Exploiting this vulnerability, the Committee drew up a blacklist of
“disorderly” establishments--a list which they controlled and based on definitions of vice which
they composed. If an establishment was on the blacklist, they were put on probation, and forced
to sign an agreement that they would put their house in order according to the dictates of the
191
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Committee. The brewers, fearing they would be viewed as promoting disorderly saloons, went
along with the plan and owner after owner was forced to sign agreements with the committee.
The relatively small Committee of Fourteen’s was therefore able to wield great social
influence.192
A major criteria used by the Committee in this scheme was what they called “racemixing.” If a saloon served black and white patrons together it was marked as “disorderly.” This
practice imposed separate-but-equal conditions on saloon owners. Often the agreement that the
proprietors signed mandated separate rooms for patrons based on race. This prompted outrage
from many, including W.E.B. DuBois, who wrote the Executive Secretary Whiten that the
Committee was breaking the laws of New York State. In a series of letters between the two men,
Whiten clarified that the Committee's position was one of anti-vice over anti-discrimination. The
Committee's belief that “race-mixing” was the source of amorality and disorder, combined with
the power it had amassed through the licensing scheme, led to increased segregation of these
working-class places of leisure in New York.193 Their strategy sometimes worked too well. At
black establishments, the Committee of Fourteen’s white investigators were often refused access
and could no longer report on conditions.194 These methods, as well as their membership,
overlapped easily with the eugenics and social hygiene movements. Katherine B. Davis, a
Director of the Committee, also “conceived and advocated” for the Greycourt project as
Commissioner of Correction.195 In initiating the Farm Colony plans, she drew on her past
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experience, from 1901 until 1914, as Superintendent of the New York State Reformatory for
women at Bedford, which ran a Social Hygiene Institute funded by the Rockefeller family.
The Committee's racial vision for “anti-vice,” written into law and put into practice at the
Women's Court, was institutionalized at Greycourt, and was part and parcel of the new ideology
of Progressive prison reform. The scientific management of prisons was specifically oriented to
determine which prisoners were reformable, and how. A sampling of women sent to Greycourt
shows that they were arrested exclusively under the section 887 subdivision. And in fact, arrested
under it multiple times. They were given indeterminate sentences of up to three years, and were
exclusively white with an average age of 37. In 1930, 41% were immigrants or children of
immigrants. Describing its procedures at the Correction Hospital as it awaited completion of the
Orange County institution that would help to facilitate modern methods, the Department of
Corrections wrote: “Embarrassed by lack of funds, prohibitive building costs and building delays,
the Department has sought to make the best segregation possible. The healthy and diseased are
separated, colored prisoners are placed together on one tier, and self-committed drug addicts
have a tier to themselves.”196
Thus, the structural reformation of the prison system in New York City after
consolidation was specifically a political project, grounded in the practices of racism, segregation,
and classification.197 In considering the debate over conditions of the penitentiaries on Welfare
Island, there was no discussion about changes in the law, which had expanded the ambit of
police, magistrates, and what the institutions of prisons were meant to do. The state’s legal and
institutional changes appeared as a question of morality, and the reformatories similarly were
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based on a program of behavioral reform. These politics amounted to the deliberate expansion of
the prison infrastructure expressed in the language of Progressivism and using tactics of racial
segregation. Hastings Hart projected the number of prisoners well into the future. Indeed,
reformers constantly thought in terms of “capacity,” both for present and future needs. In the
words of reformers, they wanted to avoid the mistakes of their “City Fathers,” who “framed the
Penitentiary [on Welfare Island] to meet the needs of the then young City of New York of only
200,000 people, and made it so rigid that it could never be altered to meet future advances in
civilization.”198
The Farm Colony at Greycourt
This institution when completed will mark a most important event in the
plans for modernization of New York City’s correctional
institutions…The modern correctional institution is now conceived upon
the theory of reformation, and is no longer planned or developed with a
view to its punitive effect, the accomplishment of reformation serving in
itself as a deterrent for future offenders.199

Construction of Greycourt Prison, which lasted five years, began in 1918 as part of this
Progressive movement, which in its public face was to reform prison conditions, especially for
the segregation of women.200 Greycourt, the city’s version of the State Reformatory at Bedford,
was the women’s branch of New York City’s reformatory system. The other institutions in the
new system, also in Orange County, were for youth: the New Hampton Reformatory for young
men, aged sixteen to thirty, and the Warwick Dairy Farm, the honor camp for New Hampton.201
The Municipal Farm on Riker’s Island was a men’s facility for drug users, and the Hart Island
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Reformatory was not being operated as a reformatory due to the overcrowding of the men’s
penitentiary on Welfare Island. These institutions were showpieces for the Department of
Correction and exemplary of modern, scientific methods for the administration of carceral
institutions.
The ideological foundations of reformatory science were discernible spatially and
architecturally. While Greycourt was under construction, the Department of Corrections linked
its necessity to its distinct design and its unique location. “The general style of architecture is
English Gothic, treated in such manner as to avoid the conventional appearance of prison
buildings. The walls are of variegated red and dark brick and selected to give a pleasing tone.”
The report further described why these geographic and institutional elements were so important.
The modernization of the Department in the light of knowledge gained
from those who have made the subject a study, first and primarily
demands means for obtaining a definite basis of classification, the
accomplishment is only possible by the establishment of buildings
arranged for the separation of the hardened from the less hardened, and
the segregation of inmates upon the basis of physical and mental
condition, character and conduct and the cause and nature of the
delinquency.202

A type of institution with a founding ideology, program, and architecture strikingly
similar to progressive era reformatory prisons (as well as today’s most progressive homeless
shelters) emerged in the early mercantile period across Europe. Workhouses such as England’s
Bridewell’s and Holland’s Rasp-huis collected dislocated agricultural workers for their
integration to a system of wage labor in urban centers at a time when a shortage of labor
threatened to escalate its cost and political power. These were the first modern houses of
correction, which practiced “more than mere custody.” Inmates received a wage for basic,
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manual labor, vaguely productive, and done without machines to avoid competition with free
labor. This payment was given in exchange for the provision that the inmates would pay their
own way. Dormitories were congregate and prisoners had relative freedom within the institution
itself; the retributive formula of solitary confinement in a penitentiary had not yet been
institutionalized. The program emphasized communal work, which would ingrain discipline and
contribute to the state’s saving some of the cost of regulating this mobile surplus population.203
Workhouses resolved a contradiction at their heart, because they encompassed a program for the
poor, both the “good,” who were trained in work discipline, and the “evil,” who were deprived of
liberty. Work was the crux of this resolution, which could take on both rehabilitative and
punitive ideological aspects. State discipline had temporal and spatial components and
constraints. Time was broken up into abstract and measurable parts and workers who had
migrated from the countryside to cities were supposed to internalize these new conditions,
trained in the workhouses. Melossi and Pavarini thus conclude, “the workhouse was not a true
and proper place of production, it was a place for teaching the discipline of production.”204
Yet there were further contradictions in the workhouses. Political opposition to prison
labor rested on the argument that it would compete with outside labor. Introducing machinery
would reduce labor costs as well as speed up and boost production, an argument that prevented
these institutions’ transformation into fully productive, self-supporting enterprises. Neither
wages nor production in the workhouse could be allowed to compete with private industry,
according to the Poor Law’s “principle of less eligibility.” At the same time, that meant that
workers could not be sufficiently trained for work outside, which was the ideological basis for
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their sequestration. Various attempts subsequently were made to deal with this contradiction,
most notably in the famous debates on the relative merits between the Auburn and Pennsylvania
systems in the United States. It was toward this conflict that the Auburn system in upstate New
York was directed, and contract work with private companies was instituted.205 In Progressive
Era New York City, these institutional contradictions appear to have been resolved through
gender and articulated through race, as more women entered the prison system through the types
of legislation described above. Isolation and hard labor were the mechanisms to effect penitence
among men in penitentiaries. Communal work in domestic labors was deemed the appropriate
form to rehabilitate women and youth in reformatories. As Davis explains, “since women were
not acknowledged to be securely in possession of [individual liberties] they were not eligible to
participate in this process of redemption [in a penitentiary].”206
Originally, as a result of an 1828 law, segregation by sex was done in the same building.
But this posed problems for reform, since sexual relationships continued inside the prison. Male
prisoners and guards continued to exploit women prisoners, and some women sustained work as
prostitutes while imprisoned.207 Separate facilities for women, often based on the cottage model,
developed into a program that “infused domesticity into prison life” in the various types of work
done there, a process in which the invisibility of domestic labor conformed to the institutional
invisibility of reformatories for women in this period.208 In New York, suitable women and youth
were separated out from the workhouse and penitentiary into institutions in Orange County. The
planned cottage system was never implemented at Greycourt,209 but the Women’s Farm Colony

205

Melossi and Pavarini, 128–29.
Angela Y. Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete? (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003), 69–70.
207
Zedner, “Wayward Sisters: The Prison for Women.”
208
Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete?, 69–70.
209
“Annual Report,” 1920, 91.
206

79

was New York City’s first geographically separate women’s prison. These aspects of
reformatory and penitentiary practice were in dialectical relationship, relying on each other in
order to define their particular ideological bases. While conditions in reformatories were more
lenient, the “controlling” institution remained the penitentiary prison, the stick that made the
carrot of the reformatories have power.
In these late 19th and early 20th century transitions, prisons demonstrate the intersection of
race and sexuality, because femininity was relegated to white women.210 Davis explains this
development: “As the US prison system evolved during the twentieth century, demonized modes
of punishment--the cottage system, domestic training, and so on--were designed ideologically to
reform white women, relegating women of color in large part to realms of public punishment that
made no pretense of offering them femininity.”211 Women sent to reformatories served longer
sentences for similar crimes than men did, because their moral rehabilitation was understood to
take time. This aspect corresponded with ideals of eugenicists because they wanted women out
of society for as many of their child-bearing years as possible. Although it was never full,212
early on the Women’s Prison Association expressed hope that through the new Women’s Farm
Colony at Greycourt it would be possible to extend sentences considerably, demonstrating the
reform movement’s expansion of the prison system through progressivism. “It is to be hoped that
the magistrates will make longer commitments, and that Greycourt will care for and help the
women who go and come repeatedly from the Correctional Hospital at Welfare Island.”213 Mary
Harris, Superintendent of the Women’s Workhouse on Welfare Island, reflected this sentiment in
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her comment that “nothing more futile can be imagined than these short-term sentences.”214 Ideal
femininity had an impact on the broader reform movement, because while rigid discipline
continued to dominate the regime for male prisoners in the penitentiary, the emergent women’s
prisons moved toward a program of “individual redemption and moral reform” that encouraged
inmates to “cooperate willingly” in this process.215
In this rearrangement, Greycourt embodied the changing ideological functions of prisons.
The Department of Corrections’ organizational chart in 1930 listed the Women’s Farm Colony
as “for white felony cases.”216 According to the logic, progress toward reforming working class
white women was impeded by the presence of black women in their midst. Evidence given for
this degenerative effect was usually amorous relationships between black and white women.217
Interracial relationships were the biggest problem for investigators of New York State’s Bedford
Reformatory, as reported in an official document of the State Board of Charities in 1914.
Disciplinary problems stemming from “harmful intimacy” between black and white prisoners
were more important than obstacles of its rural location and its inability to become “selfsustaining” using the labor of its inmates. As a result, Bedford established separate cottages for
black and white women in 1917. Yet prison officials acknowledged that this did not solve the
problem that they sought to address, because the relationships continued. Officials refused to
acknowledge genuine feelings and “explained” white women’s participation in them as a
“longing for masculinity” they were denied by their confinement in an all-female institution.
Black women’s “innate promiscuity and sexual deviancy” were “confirmed” by these
214
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relationships as they were attributed a “masculine” role that distracted white women from the
institution’s rehabilitative goals. In this way, officials attributed failure of the prison’s program
to racial difference. Greycourt represented innovation to reformers because it segregated
geographically by race and gender in a renovated reform program based on training white
women for domestic labor. Sexuality and race were central in the carceral institution’s project of
policing working class women’s behavior and criminalizing their subsistence practices.218
Most of the women sent to Greycourt were arrested multiple times under section 887
subdivision for of the revised code of criminal proceedings.219 All of the women with this
disposition were arrested under the 1915 Laws Relating to Sex Morality in New York City,
sections 4a and 4c under “Vagrancy,” which had been written by Veiller and the Committee of
Fourteen. These women were sentenced at the Ninth District Magistrate’s Court, the Women’s
Night Court in Manhattan. Docket books from the late 1920’s show that sentences for women at
the court generally took four primary forms: probation, the workhouse/penitentiary on Welfare
Island (known as the Corrections Hospital), the Bedford Reformatory, and the Church of the
Good Shephard in Northern Manhattan.220 While a sampling of women from 1929 docket books
from the Court of Special Sessions between November 1929 and July 1930, the period in which
the women would have been sent there to show up on the 1930 census, shows an even
distribution between white and black women with indeterminate sentences of up to three years,
only the white women were sent to Greycourt to serve their sentences.
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Grace Campbell, the “most prominent woman in the Harlem Left” between World War I
and the depression,221 and a Court Attendant at the Court of Special Sessions and Officer with
the Municipal Parole Commission, described this segregation, one of the few places where it is
acknowledged:
Even in the workhouse segregation is rife, and that institution known as
Grey Court, [sic.] which is a women’s farm colony, is used for white
women only, while the colored women are kept in the old fashioned
workhouse prison.222

One segment of the women sentenced in the docket books had a unique disposition:
“workhouse indeterminate period, not exceeding two years.” Comparing the docket books to the
census for 1930 reveals that it is from the group with the latter disposition that the women sent to
Greycourt were selected. Greycourt was thus used for the purpose advocated by the Women’s
Prison Association: “to send women for an indefinite period, who are over thirty years of age and
are convicted of misdemeanors a number of times in a short period.”223 The women sent to
Greycourt appear to be the most recalcitrant of the reformables in the eyes of the reformers. As
opposed to the women who were sent to Bedford, many of whom had zero or just one prior arrest
for prostitution, the Greycourt referrals had many, often up to ten. They were also older;
“wayward minors” were sent to Bedford or Hudson. The Women’s Farm Colony was a prison
for white women who had been sentenced to indeterminate sentences of three years or less.224
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Drug users were sent there after they had completed a treatment program at the Corrections
Hospital.
Indeterminate sentencing was supposed to provide incentive for inmates to internalize
their own reform, used in conjunction with parole, a program which informed the development
of Camp LaGuardia. The average age of the women at the colony was 37 in both 1925 and 1930.
Thus, while the designers of the system placed the functional requirements of capacity at the
forefront, only certain women were selected to live at the facility. This segregation had the
overarching programmatic goal of separating the “hardened” from the “less-hardened,” or, as the
Grand Jury put it in the context of reform of the men’s penitentiary, preventing the “development
of amateur into professional criminals.”225 Reports by the various organizations thus contrasted
the openness of Greycourt with the claustrophobic environment associated with the institutions
on Welfare Island. In pictures, as the one shown in figure 3.11, the expansiveness of the grounds
is equated with healthy reform. The underlying draw of Greycourt, the unifying cultural trope
that made it seem functional and logical, is that women would be extracted from an unhealthy
environment and immersed in a healthy one.
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Figure 3.11 “Women’s Farm Colony—Greycourt, New York.”226

Greycourt was also designed to activate a wider array of work assignments. At the time,
all inmates under the control of the New York City Department of Corrections were required to
work.227 In 1920, the Department’s annual report listed “Net Sales” to other city agencies of
$155,405, from bed, broom, knitting, and clothing industries at the Correction Hospital, the
women’s section of the workhouse.228 But according to Hart’s report, the training industries for
prisoners at the workhouse was insufficient to requirements for their moral regeneration.229 The
design of Greycourt took this into consideration, providing for “spaces available for
contemplated shops…to manufacture articles that could be used in institutions of other city
departments.”230 Farm work was reserved for men. Before the Women’s Farm Colony had even
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opened, the men from New Hampton had already put all of its 288 available acres into
cultivation.231
By 1930 there were only 81 women serving time in the Women’s Farm Colony at
Greycourt. In addition, there were 30 men, the young men who demonstrated good behavior at
New Hampton and were moved to the “honor camp” at Greycourt.232 This means that the facility
was well under its envisioned capacity of 700 seven years after it opened, including the men
living there from New Hampton. This work component of rehabilitation would be transferred
over to the Department of Public Welfare along with the rural infrastructure of the former prison.
Work remains part of the ideological underpinning of reform in New York City’s homeless
shelters, and was a main aspect of national welfare reform in its “welfare-to work” format. This
function of work, which stemmed from the tension between punishment and reform, was severed
from the penitentiary component, and visible explicitly in the transition of this institution from a
prison to a homeless shelter.
Conclusion
Like much of the RPA’s ambitious agenda, the clearing of Welfare Island was not
immediately accomplished. Its official plan, published just months before the October crash of
1929, was never fully implemented.233 The Women’s House of Detention in Greenwich Village
opened in 1932.234 Riker’s Island Prison was completed in 1935 and its first prisoners were
transferred in December of that year.235 This was the year after the Women’s Farm Colony was
converted into a men’s work camp in conjunction with the New Deal’s Works Progress
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Administration. The penitentiary on Welfare Island was closed in 1935, and demolition began
immediately with WPA labor.236 The Committee of Fourteen, running into financial difficulties
and without the pre-Prohibition leverage it had maintained in the magistrate’s courts and through
an alliance with the brewers' association and insurance companies, collapsed in 1932.237
The Greycourt institution’s specific program switched, even if its guiding principles
remained. With New Deal money available for the upkeep of the property and the space problem
in women’s prisons “solved,”238 Greycourt Prison was converted into a work camp for homeless
men by New York City’s Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia. The mayor maintained the function of
Camp LaGuardia, an institution that criminalized people in neighborhoods of the transient poor,
while changing its focus of who was vagrant and in need of reform: incorrigible prostitutes
versus single men failing in their duty as breadwinners. The program that had been designed for
the Women's Reformatory at Greycourt became gendered male when it was changed into a
homeless camp, and an exaggerated hyper-masculinity became the buttress to support consent
among men in the program, the design of which had previously been understood as female. A
name change from Greycourt to “Camp LaGuardia” indicated the desirability of “ridding the
camp of a name still associated with the women’s prison.”239
During the depression, Farm Colonies and similar camps became widely cited as
solutions to the related problems of unemployment and political radicalism. Some even argued
that widespread use of farm colonies would eliminate altogether the need for the new Riker’s
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prison.240 Camp LaGuardia became a material example of a belief, which had long been a part of
the Department of Correction’s philosophy, expressed in its 1920 Annual Report, that “The
greatest safeguard against un-American propaganda is the home. A man who owns his home and
is able to make a comfortable living for his family and himself will never listen to un-American
propaganda.” Thus, the Progressive Era focus on an individualized morality, coupled with
scientific methods of behavior modification, remained focused on training for industry even in
the midst of state institutional and ideological change. The precedent had been set, given the
wording in the 1898 charter, for transferring vacant Department of Corrections infrastructure to
the Department of Welfare. The next chapter focuses on the period of Camp LaGuardia’s history
during the depression.
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Chapter 4
Genealogy of a “Human Repair Shop”

Figure 4.1 “The farm at Camp LaGuardia”
exhibits the pastoral labor idyll that the camp represented.241
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Every young man reformed before the wanderlust habit is firmly
fastened upon him will add many dollars by his labor to the wealth
of the State, in addition to saving the expense of maintaining him
for many years in a correctional institution.242
In America, land is cheap and labor is dear; and labor is the factor
of production which the prison has in abundance.243
What a mess [Tammany] made out of it! I’d like to invite every
citizen of New York to inspect our Municipal Lodging Houses and
Camp LaGuardia ... We have erased the poor law concept of relief.
The word “charity” has absolutely no place in modern
government!244
Introduction
Soon after Camp LaGuardia became a work camp for men under the auspices of the New
York City Department of Welfare, Claude McKay wrote of it “The railroad, freight boats, and
Marseille were heavens in comparison.” McKay had fallen on hard times and was living at the
Camp, then called Greycourt, in the final months of 1934. He had already published some of his
most famous works—including “If We Must Die,” the acclaimed protest poem of the Harlem
Renaissance, and Banjo, a blues novel based on his personal experiences living with black
international proletarians, living homeless on the beach near the Marseilles docks245—as well as
represented the African Blood Brotherhood at the Communist International in Moscow in
1922.246 Yet despite the staunch anti-communism of Captain George L. Clark, the director of the
camp, McKay, experienced revolutionary and sensitive observer, could find no evidence of a
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revolutionary consciousness among its residents. On the contrary, it was hopeless: “Now I can
understand why people commit suicide rather than become paupers…They are prisoners. They
hate each other.”247 Presumably, McKay, writing from a left-opposition perspective, was
referring to the similarities between distinctive forms of managed capitalism emerging in the
United States and the Soviet Union when he wrote, “I guess it was like this in Russia when the
Revolution came. Strangely this place does bring back to me something of the feeling I had in
Russia of people working to clear away a wreck.”248 But surely, conditions there must have
partly resulted from the haste with which the institution was transformed from a prison into a
relief site. While the camp opened its doors on May 1, 1934, as late as mid-April, there was still
(at least public) confusion as to what it would be used for.249
This chapter examines the material conditions that contributed to the mutating ideology
of “work” in a work camp model of rehabilitation. Chief among these ideological shifts was the
transformation of work in its function of legitimating the state’s management of displacement.
While punitive labor guided the prison reformatory system, rehabilitative labor guided an
emergent anti-charity welfare policy. New York City institutionalized its welfare program as it
stabilized the social and economic crises set in motion by the Great Depression and anticipated
future crises. It did so in a way that deliberately attempted to short-circuit more radical political
programs. In the 1930s, the Department was under consistent pressure from the left as it
contemplated and struggled to implement a reconfiguration and merger with the Emergency
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Relief Bureau, the official organ for disbursing relief. William Hodson, Mayor Fiorello
LaGuardia’s Welfare Commissioner, was frequently a subject of stories in the Communist Daily
Worker as it scrutinized this process. Not surprisingly, political actions reported in this
publication circumscribed Hodson’s available options, and this had an effect on how he carried
out his long-term plan for the Welfare Department.250
In its efforts to keep idled labor occupied during the depression, the state ran into political
obstacles that were activated by relief politics. Correspondingly, the chapter argues, Camp
LaGuardia, the state's original programmatic response to the social problem defined as
homelessness, was deliberately designed to sever and isolate the consciousness of workers there
from the more radical elements then developing in and engaged with relief politics, however
vaguely Welfare Department administrators understood “radical” to be. (They often used terms
such as “radical,” “agitator,” or “communist” interchangeably.) From a social reproduction
standpoint, Camp LaGuardia evolved into an institution that could effectively keep labor
occupied until the crisis ended—which required reproducing labor power socially, physically,
and psychologically—even as it tried to depoliticize it. Complicating this volatile political mix
was the problem of actually administering relief on a daily basis. Administrative clerical workers
were on the front lines of determining the fates of families applying for relief, based on an
incessantly changing jumble of programs and laws designed to distinguish between workers and
forms of relief. Ideological transformations of the state’s rehabilitation program with respect to
work were a particular resolution of contradictions stemming from depressed conditions
themselves, as sections of the unemployed vied for insufficient resources, including official aid
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and government employment, to survive. In this way, Camp LaGuardia highlights overlooked
aspects of the general relief program.
It is in this context that administrators understood the function of work at the camp. For
work to do its job of rehabilitation it had to be “pure,” that is, untainted by social relations or
consciousness. In other words, Camp LaGuardia fetishized work as it institutionalized its
rehabilitation program. A rural workhouse that attempted to reverse the rural to urban migration
patterns that characterized displacement in this period, it was a short-lived attempt to make
productive the rehabilitative labor programs that had developed historically out of the prison
form. Simultaneously, in the increasing class diversity of joblessness during the Depression,
Camp LaGuardia achieved cohesiveness among workers through specific appeals to race and
nation. In the absence of an alternative ideology, racism and nationalism buttressed the emergent
cohesiveness among workers at the camp as they moved from “hating each other” to being
represented as the jewel in the crown of a modernized and flexible program to address
homelessness. Camp LaGuardia, like contemporary homeless shelters, was a political project,
rather than a merely rehabilitative project, as was the claim of its architects.
Hodson, previously the founding Executive Director of the Welfare Council of New York
City, the umbrella agency that had coordinated a complicated public-private network of charity
since 1925,251 oversaw these institutional re-alignments, after he became the Commissioner of
Public Welfare in the LaGuardia administration, in January 1934. He faced a difficult task,
because the inherited relief program was already strenuously contested. As Piven and Cloward
describe, “the depression saw the rise and fall of the largest movement of unemployed this
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country has known, and the institution against which the movement was inevitably pitted was the
relief system.”252 At a time when the lines between staff administering relief and those receiving
it were being drawn—not as clear as we imagine them today—these politics were intimidating to
an unstable and incipient Welfare program. Relief efforts dramatically expanded the ranks of
public workers as they were absorbed as staff into the Emergency Relief Bureau and the Works
Progress Administration. These agencies were in constant flux, at one moment ballooning and at
the next needing to be significantly downsized so that relief would not “compete” with private
industry. This caused serious uncertainty and upheaval for relief workers, who continually
evaluated their political affiliations. According to the final report of the Emergency Relief
Bureau of New York City to Mayor LaGuardia in 1938, it paid $70 million dollars in relief funds
over the course of its existence as wages to administrative employees, “almost half of whom
would have been on relief if it were not for ERB employment.”253 As Hodson repeatedly ran up
against these contradictions in the administration of relief, he designed his institutions
accordingly.
Camp LaGuardia, developing from the influence of members of the Russell Sage
Foundation, was a relief valve in this process. Hodson specifically wanted a flexible system of
relief, which would expand and contract with “business cycles,” measured by the increase and
decrease of factory employment. Accordingly, he needed projects that could move with those
cycles but not disturb them, and Camp LaGuardia suited this intent. Yet it did not arise fully
formed out of the Depression. It relied on a philosophy developed since the early 20th century
based in “curing,” through hard labor, those displaced by economic change. The Great
252

Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New
York: Vintage Books, 1979), 41.
253
“Unemployment Relief in New York City: Final Report of the Emergency Relief Bureau of the City of New
York to the Honorable F.H. LaGuardia,” 1938, 21.
94

Depression allowed a contingent of powerful professional reformers to put into practice a
method of labor control that had been long present in their agenda. The history of the institution
that became Camp LaGuardia therefore encapsulates ideological shifts in notions of “work.”
Originally, work was to save vagrants and “cure” them of their “disease” while segregating them
from “genuine” workers. Subsequently, work intended to keep men healthy and optimistic during
the depression by giving them a temporary place until they could secure employment in private
industry. These transformations had a concrete impact on the city’s shelter policy. Whereas in
the lodging houses only 5 nights of shelter per person were permitted monthly, at Camp
LaGuardia long-term stays were necessary so that labor efficiency could be maintained
seasonally.254 The depression justified putting this program into action with federal funding
while adapting it to new conditions. In the Progressive Era, reformers worked their politics
through influence in the courts (see chapter two). Later reformers increasingly worked through
the expanding capacity of a bureaucratic state, developed in New Deal legislation.255
Further, Camp Greycourt, as Camp LaGuardia was known before its name change, was
both the institutional and ideological model for Franklin Roosevelt's Civilian Conservation Corps
(CCC), giving it both local and national significance. The homeless and men over 25 could not
enroll in the CCC, but Camp LaGuardia was designed for just those people. A gendered response
to the depression, it was imagined to be “self-sustaining” by providing men a rehabilitative work
environment in a congregate setting.256 Work camps, in their numerous forms, helped to alleviate
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geographic confusion, inherited from diverse state poor laws, in the general relief program.
While “transients” were displaced industrial workers moving between states in search of work,
“local homeless” were those with legal settlement in the locality where they received aid. With
important distinctions, work camps stalled both of these categories of displacement, while
simultaneously maintaining inherited hierarchies. The changing work camp model of
rehabilitation eased the transition from poor law to modern welfare, and from the administration
of direct relief to work relief. Displacement, stretched over space and time, was suspended until
the depression passed.
A geographic perspective also demonstrates Camp LaGuardia’s regional importance. The
camp occupied a position in the structure of New York City’s Welfare program other than its
flexibility, because the camp’s designers imagined it to be a vehicle for repopulating the
countryside. A report by the Welfare Council Research Bureau in 1933 catalogued a blueprint
for the ideology of the self-sustaining work camp model in a New York regional context during
the depression. It specified its “plan of development” for an experimental “self-help” program.
The first “assumption” on which the proposal was based was: “It is desirable to decentralize
population. It is well to assist in the movement of breaking down the congested urban centers
and building up small communities.”257 In this way, it was a northeastern version of the
subsistence homelands of the Farm Security Administration, tailored to an urbanized proletariat,
with one crucial difference. While it resembled the same anti-communist, decentralist politics
that lent tentative support for early New Deal policy, its solution was to turn the homeless into
farm workers, not farm owners.
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The ideology surrounding labor, worked out in the lineage of Camp LaGuardia’s
rehabilitation program, therefore bridged some of the problems regarding relief that plagued
New Dealers. It did not compete with “free labor.” It did not duplicate already-existing services
or production. It was a “self-help” program. It seemingly helped to relieve the congestion of
industrial cities and extinguished the embers of urban political contestation. Local relief was
supposed to be free of politics, but this was a foil for undercutting the political positions and
solidarities of an emergent critique of relief by the political left.
Antecedents: “The Emergent Resolution”
The Charity Organization Society of the Russell Sage Foundation had been interested in a
Farm Colony for New York City’s surplus population since at least the early 1900s.258 In their
advocacy of this model, they drew on work by Edmund Kelly to designate farm colonies as a
central plank of prison reform policy. Kelly was the most stalwart American proponent of the
farm colony archetype, as well as its most consistent and thorough theorist, his simultaneous
commitments to utopian socialism and eugenics apparently resolved in his adherence to the
model. Kelly saw in the camp structure a way to protect employable workers displaced by
depression from the degenerative influence of “professional tramps”: permanent and
unemployable vagrants who could not be reformed. For the group of relief organizations
affiliated to the Russell Sage Foundation, this translated into the belief that “every prison from
the village lockup to the State Reformatory” should be designed toward “cur[ing] the inmates of
criminal inclinations rather than [acting] as a school for the perfecting of criminal education.”259
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This was why they counterpoised work camps against prisons, which were expensive and did not
offer sufficient opportunities for work. A main tenet of the farm colony system, based on
European industrial farms, was that they made homeless men “self-supporting.” Moreover, they
saved the state money, because the farms themselves would be “self-sustaining.” The men would
produce everything that they needed to live and thereby lend an “indirect saving [to the taxpayer]”
that would be “incalculable.”260
While originally conceived as a way to reduce rising costs associated with prisons, the
“Joint Application Bureau” working at the Municipal Lodging House began to see how they
could use work camps for those living in shelter, then still understood in poor law parlance as
“vagrants” or “tramps.” The Joint Application Bureau, dating back to 1888, was a collaboration
between the Charity Organization Society and the Association for Improving the Condition of
the Poor, private agencies that specifically coordinated their services “in aid of homeless men” to
prevent duplication. Homelessness was an area of experimentation for these groups, and their
reports were titled “the emergent resolution,” alluding to both uncertainty but also hope in their
development of modern methods toward its alleviation.261 Under the leadership of Johnston de
Forest, son of Robert de Forest, they began to interview men at the Municipal Lodging House to
determine their eligibility to perform manual work, and thereby to identify candidates for the
program of hard labor. They argued that the Municipal Lodging House, the city’s only public
shelter, continuously failed because it offered little in terms of employment opportunities. The
only work assignment which appeared on the Joint Application Bureau’s periodic reports was
260
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chopping wood in the Charity Organization Society’s woodyard, yet the overwhelming reason
that men gave when they applied for lodging at the lodging house was a loss of work.
Additionally, fewer than one-fifth of the men applying for aid had spent their entire lives in New
York, which was a problem given that poor laws regulated the disbursal of relief based on a
graded system of settlement and residency.
Clearly, to these men, vagrancy was a draw on the state during economic downturns. But
in this view, vagrancy also fed on periods of recovery. In the run up to the “hard winter” of
1908-1909, the tail end of the 1907-1908 depression, the “labor colony idea” was forefront in the
plan of “those interested in organized charity” “to alleviate [destitution] without attracting to the
city a large number of professional vagrants,” which would jeopardize relief efforts in total.262
Accordingly, the Joint Application Bureau envisioned the farm colony for the “arrest, detention,
reformation, and instruction of persons convicted of vagrancy, habitual drunkenness, and
disorderly conduct.”263 The Municipal Lodging House opened that year, and administrators were
anxious that “vagrants” would abuse its “generosity.”264 In 1911, they reiterated this worry: “the
general prosperity has apparently made it easier for vagrants to rove over large districts with the
assurance that they would find little difficulty in supporting an idle and aimless life by begging
or stealing supplies.”265 As poor law era relief addressed widespread homelessness, its tools of
surveillance became insufficient, since, it was held, people could move constantly between
localities collecting relief or panhandling. The situation was urgent that spring. Almost nine

262

“Hard Winter Feared by Charity Workers,” The New York Times, October 11, 1908.
“Draft of the ‘Grattan Bill.,’” no date, but late 1908 or early 1909, Box 141. Folder “Legislation, 1907-17, Farm
Colony, Vagrants.,” Columbia University Rare Book & Manuscript Library.
264
This reflects a wider pattern: when a service understood to be “generous” is introduced to the homeless poor a
surveillance or punitive measure is worked out simultaneously. This pattern continues to this day.
265
Joint Application Bureau, “A Brief for the Establishment of a State Farm Colony.”
99
263

thousand more men applied for lodgings in April 1911 than in the same month the previous year,
65% applying for the first time.266
Political-geographic scale was a major concern of farm colony proponents. In meetings,
the bureau expressed worry over the model’s violation of the “principle of local responsibility for
local burdens” because the institution would not be located in the county where its charges “had”
settlement. Added to this was a concern for “securing the support of the railroads” – an
inevitability that required state, rather than local, mobilization.267 Based on the Bureau’s work,
Senator William Grattan introduced a bill into the State Senate on March 9, 1909. It authorized
the institution of a “State Industrial Farm Colony,” and provided for the formation of a state
police for enforcement.268 The labor colony was to be run from the State Department of Prisons,
and the Trustees of the Labor Colony would report to both the State Board of Charities as well as
the State Board of Prisons. The general idea was in keeping with the Joint Application Bureau’s
philosophy: putting “vagrants” in prisons was too expensive. A farm colony could reform them
for a fraction of the cost. Johnston de Forest testified, “Without a labor colony where permanent
compulsory treatment of the vagrant may be held, practically all attempts to treat the vagrancy
question with the facilities now available in New York City, the workhouse among the number,
do not diminish vagrancy.”269 Switzerland was his outstanding example, where by use of farm
labor colonies, “not only [had] vagabondage disappeared, but it [had] been eliminated without
266

“Are Homeless Men Permanently Made Self Supporting?" Report of the Social Secretary to the Superintendant”
(Joint Application Bureau, April 1911), Box 141. Folder “Legislation, 1907-1917, Farm Colony, Vagrants.,”
Community Service Society Records, 1842-1995, Columbia University Rare Book & Manuscript Library.
267
Lawrence Veiller, “Notes on Proposed Bill Creating State Farm Colony,” February 1908, Box 141, Folder
“Legislation, 1907-17, Farm Colony, Vagrants,” Community Service Society Records, 1842-1995, Columbia
University Rare Book & Manuscript Library.
268
Orlando Lewis to W. Frank Persons, March 3, 1909, Box 141, Folder “Legislation, 1907-17, Farm Colony,
Vagrants,” Community Service Society Records, 1842-1995, Columbia University Rare Book & Manuscript Library.
The bill in the assembly introduced by Brooklyn Assemblyman C.F. Murphy left out this provision.
269
Johnston de Forest, “Testimony on Senate Bill #251,” n.d., Box 141, Folder “Legislation, 1907-17, Farm Colony,
Vagrants,” Community Service Society Records, 1842-1995, Columbia University Rare Book & Manuscript Library.
100

cost to the State.”270 In a circular sent by the National Vagrancy Committee, a lobbying group set
up to promote the bills, the Joint Application Bureau succinctly described the ideology and
function of a state labor colony.
The present correctional treatment of vagrancy is costly and inadequate.
Short, idle sentences in jails and penitentiaries, (with the expense of
maintaining the vagrants met by the local community or by the counties)
are not reducing vagrants or ensuring their imprisonment for any length
of time. The bill provides for a colony at which agriculture, horticulture,
and the industries shall be taught. The vagrant shall be committed under
indeterminate sentence, the maximum period of commitment to be two
years.271

The Farm Colony was to be used to keep people who they believed were actually
employable and temporarily out of work from debasement by “professional” tramps and vagrants.
The camp would “segregate all others, both criminals and inebriates, who are beyond the hope of
cure.”272 If they were reformed, all the better. But, more likely, at least they would pay their own
way, or be repelled altogether by the idea of “real work.”273 An editorial in the New York
Evening Post, in 1915, restated this idea: “It would be a much more simple matter to care for
those who are victims of depressed industrial conditions if the vagrant element were eliminated
and handled by other and more efficient methods.” The article quoted the Superintendant of the
Joint Application Bureau, Charles Blatchly, “The State is in a position to remove in large part the
menace of voluntary unemployment, to save a large proportion of the expense which it now
entails, and to simplify to a considerable degree the difficulty of meeting effectively the
270
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conditions created among genuine workers as a consequence of involuntary unemployment.”
This sentiment was reinforced by the Superintendent of the Bowery Mission, who complained to
Blatchly that the wording in the draft bill was too vague, because “bona fide workingmen,
temporarily out of work” might be scooped up by it. Given specificity on this point, he assured
Blatchly of his support. Blatchly agreed, and Section 218 of the bill read:
Board shall notify Governor of readiness to receive inmates, whereupon
he shall notify courts and magistrates, who may then, in lieu of other
commitment, commit to the colony, for indeterminate period, any male
over the age of sixteen (twenty-one) adjudged by them to be a vagrant or
tramp; but no person proving habitual self-support.274

Other benefits apparent to prison and charity reformers of a state industrial farm colony
were articulated by a Cornell Professor in an article describing Switzerland’s famous farm
colony, Witzwil. In this institution, the state kept labor in reserve without empowering it
politically. The gravitational draw of Witzwil was that its return on investment “has been done
without the lease or the contract systems of labor, and with no injurious competition with, or
protests from, free labor.” It was devised from the “ground up”: the laborers reproduced
themselves as well as the camp. The laborers consented to their “reform” in an institution such as
this, and were kept healthy—physically, psychologically, emotionally—rather than left to
become depressed themselves. It was also a place of congregation for seasonal workers, one subgroup of “vagrants,” in which their labor could be harnessed and regularized.275 In terms of land,
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the director of Witzwil counselled that the model would be even more appropriate to the United
States given his impression of its geography, “In America, land is cheap and labor is dear; and
labor is the factor of production which the prison has in abundance.”276 The labor colony, applied
to the U.S. situation, solved the problem of urbanization and the loss of agricultural knowledge
that it entailed. These tenets later became the dominant ideological arguments for Camp
LaGuardia, which would feed workers into jobs in the upstate economy.
Surplus value had a distinct place in making these institutions self-sustaining. For the
model to work the state did not appropriate surplus labor as profit, but did so “in kind.” As local
fiscal crisis intensified during recurring depressions, New York City ran up against limits on the
amount of money it could spend on relief.277 These material limits were also of political and
ideological importance, expressed by critiques from the conservative law-and-order position.
One way the farm colony idea, later embodied and expanded in Camp LaGuardia, resolved these
limits is that it was to be self-sustaining. In the view of some antagonistic to public relief in
general, Camp LaGuardia actually made a “profit” for the city at the expense of the federal
government. It therefore became a target of Congressmen opposed to and investigating the New
Deal.278 The self-sustaining aspect was achievable by appropriating a portion of the surplus value
produced there as a “cost” of the men’s rehabilitation—50% of their wages were held for their
upkeep. As a result the city paid the workers far lower than the prevailing wage rate—$15 per
month. Thus, the more opportunities to work the better, to achieve “union of agricultural and
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manufacturing industry” and the bigger the camp the better, to make it more productive and
“more economically managed.”279 These methods, all together, resolved major points of dissent
among actors designing a state reform program structured to control resistance to economic crisis.
The overlap between prison reform and welfare modernization was apparent in the literal
overlap of other parcels of land, not just at the Women’s Farm Colony/Camp LaGuardia site.
While the Grattan Bill failed to pass, in 1911 a similar bill authorized the Board of Managers of a
State Industrial Farm Colony to acquire land. They managed to purchase an 826 acre parcel in
Beekman, New York, in Dutchess County, but could not begin construction because of a
controversy within the Department of Prisons over whether to build the farm colony or “new
Sing Sing.”280 The dispute delayed the Board of Managers putting the Farm Colony into use. By
the time it was agreed that Sing Sing would be built in Wingdale, NY, the Beekman land had
been turned over to the state Board of Armories for military training exercises in preparation for
World War I. Johnston de Forest was resigned: “the chances this year [1917] in view of the
military situation are poor for getting results.”281 The Beekman property was later a camp in the
Federal Transient Program, and then the location for Greenhaven Correctional Facility. While
success was achieved in pressing legislation through and actually acquiring a site, the project of
implementing a farm colony was delayed for another few years. Energy for the program in the
city was channeled into the women’s prison, described in chapter two, which was the cutting
edge of a modern social service program in the wartime moral crusade against prostitution, and
located on 326 acres near Chester, NY.
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Subsequent reformers revived these evolving ideas and reconfigured them to smooth over
contradictions in welfare and relief programs. In the late 1920’s, the Welfare Council drew on
the Joint Application Bureau’s legacy, but changed its political tactics to suit the circumstances
which shaped the new depression. For its vagrancy work the Council wanted to create farm
colonies that would not accept “chronic alcoholics, drug addicts, or homo sexuals [sic.].”282 The
conservative Welfare Council was a private umbrella organization that coordinated the various
aspects of the City's welfare programs and William Hodson was its Executive Director. It was
funded by the Russell Sage Foundation, and conceived in the early 1920s to coordinate the over
2,000 separate private charities in New York City. According to their contemporary study,
private charity accounted for over 60% of all welfare in the city, public welfare nearly 40%. 283
Hodson came directly from a position at the Russell Sage Foundation, which had initially
supported Herbert Hoover's President's Organization on Unemployment Relief, based in a
philosophy of private philanthropy and self-help.284
In the farm colony model the Welfare Council found political coalition with those further
to the left. Originally meant to keep “professional tramps and vagrants” from corrupting
“genuine workingmen” the industrial farm was now marketed as a progressive measure to help
those thrown out of work in the normal business cycle. Nels Anderson, of the Chicago school of
sociology, was involved in devising programmatic responses to “the hobo” nationwide as well as
in the New York City area. Having written a dissertation on “the sociology of the homeless man,”
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in 1925,285 he worked at the Whittier Settlement in New Jersey, authored a report for the Welfare
Council of New York on the region's homeless, and administered programs of the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration. In 1927, while at Whittier, Anderson wrote to Hodson about
the intriguing possibility of a work camp as a rehabilitation program for idled workers: “I am
quite taken with the idea of turning that farm into a rest camp for homeless convalescents.”286
Combining Anderson’s support for convalescent camps with the rehabilitative aspect of a work
regime, in 1931, the Council, in collaboration with the City's Department of Correction,
instituted a work-training program for men within the Women's Farm Colony at Greycourt.
As the depression deepened, Hodson, well connected politically, continued to promote
this composite idea in the Senate. Soon after Roosevelt was inaugurated in March 1933, and days
before he signed the bill that activated the CCC, Hodson wrote to Senator Robert LaFollette
about the success of Camp Bluefield, in Blauvelt Park along the Hudson River, and the second
experimental camp opened through the Welfare Council’s initiative. Progressives touted Blauvelt
as “the ideal in the care of homeless unemployed men, a project which might be offered as a
model for other communities to emulate...a dream come true.”287 It was housed within a summer
camp for children formerly owned by the New York Tribune. Hodson wrote to LaFollette: “I
enclose a statement prepared by one of our committees in connection with a work relief camp
experiment which has proved unusually successful.” In his view the camp presented a way to
coordinate the different scales of relief: “I still believe that the best way to administer relief for
all classes of society is through local machinery. Perhaps the President's program for
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conservation camps can be tied in with local effort along these lines.”288 The camp, instituted in
December 1932, was “a cooperative enterprise of the State Temporary Relief Administration, the
Interstate Palisades Commission and the Work Colony Committee of the Welfare Council” and
was modeled on the program that had been unrolled at Greycourt two years earlier. The
difference was that men were referred from the Municipal Lodging House rather than from the
Department of Correction and the courts.289 Demonstrating the overlap, Bluefield was turned into
a CCC camp in October 1933. By January 1934, Hodson could assert “I’d like to see every
homeless man and woman in a camp of this sort.”290 When Edwin Cunningham was tapped to
become Camp LaGuardia’s Director in December 1935, he had already run both Camp Bluefield
as well as Camp Roosevelt at Bear Mountain, the first CCC camp in the state.291 He was
experienced with the model, hired to get the program in shape to counter the disorder that
McKay had described the previous winter.
Anxiety that rural displacement was feeding urbanization was at the forefront of the
Welfare Council's concerns. A 1932 confidential study of the men in the municipal lodging
house by Nels Anderson “[revealed] an increasing drift of the adults into the city.”292 Thus, the
Welfare Council's Farm Colony Committee proposed that a primary purpose of a “work relief
project for the homeless” during the depression in the form of a reinvigorated farm colony based
on the experience at Beekman, was that “mendicants will be discouraged from coming to New
288
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York and professional vagrants will leave New York.”293 This was an integral part of how its
designers described the camp to the public. In its first year of operation, Stanley Howe, First
Deputy Commissioner of Welfare who was instrumental in Camp LaGuardia’s setup and
ongoing administration, said: “Most of the men have no desire to return to New York. The city
spells defeat to them.”294 As a result, the program was designed so that the men would learn rural
occupations, like farming. All men worked the soil during harvests. In the fall of its first year,
Howe commented, “[the] most remarkable thing of all is that the men from the city, who have
never been in the country before, are showing a great interest in all forms of farming. Some of
our best men had never seen a farm before May 1 [1934].” While the country supported a healthy
work ethic, the city enabled apathy. As Hodson put it, “The men should be removed from the
idleness of the city as fast as possible and given self-respecting work to do.”295 The camp was
beginning to fill a gap: it was increasingly “impossible to get a competent hired man [for farm
work].”296 Yet it was the productive capacity harnessed by the model that was its biggest benefit
to the city. Camp LaGuardia produced all of the food for the Municipal Lodging House that
autumn.297 This aspect of a work regime was so successful that administrators continually
expanded the types of work offered, and even considered putting a factory there. Each year there
was a push to extend farm productivity. In its second year, the camp added the “cultivation of
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additional land, tree surgery and the erection of additional stables, also the making of pillows,
sheets and night clothing for the camp’s population.”298
While Hodson said his relief effort was apolitical, in reality it was honed over many
rounds of Progressive Era depressions. Downturns of 1907-08, 1914-15, and 1920-22
demonstrated to reformers the imperatives of revising the existing poor laws in New York State
for the administration of relief. As industrial and factory employment went into freefall after
1929, and county lodging houses across the state became overcrowded, penitentiaries captured
much of the overflow. In the early 1930s, New York City constructed two annexes on its
Municipal Lodging House as a result of the increase in those seeking shelter.299 The massive
displacement was managed by use of the State's new 1929 Public Welfare Law, which was a
revision of the patchwork of complicated poor laws, the most recent of which was from 1896.300
One of the central theoretical considerations in these changing laws concerned settlement: in
order to receive state aid, applicants had to demonstrate residency within the state for two years.
If people applied for aid but could not sufficiently prove their legal settlement they would be
placed for a night in a lodging house, or in jail, then “passed-on” to the next locality. They would
be removed from the state altogether if New York could establish their settlement elsewhere.
(According to its charter New York City was forbidden to give outdoor—non-institutionalized—
relief prior to TERA.) The 1929 law gestured to reform but kept intact these aspects of
settlement and removal. Crouse notes, “in dealing with removal the new law actually was a step
298

“City’s Camp Opened for 800: Greycourt to Till More Land and Undertake Several New Activities This Season,”
The New York Times, April 14, 1935.
299
Crouse, The Homeless Transient in the Great Depression: New York State, 1929-1941, 53 and 70.
300
The law was enacted before the stock market crashed in October 1929. These legislative changes were years in
the making and not simply the result of the Great Depression. According to Crouse—as well as to Schneider and
Deutsch, writing at the time—the law would have been effective were it not interrupted by the depression. Page 40.
Schneider and Deutsch, who Crouse relies on for much of her history of welfare law in the state, were allies of
Hodson. They asked him for comments on their book before its publication. Notes to David Schneider in William
Hodson papers Box 7, folder "Misc. M to Z, Jan. 1, 1941."
109

back from 1896” because under the old law, “persons were to be cared for in the locality where
they became disabled [i.e. the county]” but now, removal was “sanctioned even if force were
necessary” and “intrastate removal was one again acceptable.”301
Work camps—whether for youth enrolled in the Civilian Conservation Corps, people
moving across state lines in search of work in the Federal Transient Program, or the local
homeless—were situated within this changing same. The Federal Emergency Relief
Administration (FERA), beginning in 1933, provided the first nationwide standards to manage
“transiency.”302 The Federal Transient Program (FTP), embedded in FERA, defined transiency
geographically as a subset of homelessness. Transients were those moving across state lines in
search of work, without legal settlement or with legal settlement elsewhere.303 Local homeless
were those without a place to live but with legal settlement in the locality in which they applied
for relief. The distinction between different forms of displacement were therefore legalgeographic rather than social, and appeared at the moment that people applied for relief. This
fact filtered into different camps’ identities. Camp LaGuardia, for example, was a camp for the
“local homeless,” rather than a transient camp, and its residents wanted to maintain this
hierarchical distinction.
The FTP temporarily halted poor law removal in the 48 participating states, and
simultaneously standardized definitions of settlement for the purposes of defining responsibility
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for various segments of displaced workers. Amid historic dislocations of people moving across
state boundaries in search of work, and a patchwork of state laws governing the administration of
relief, the FERA provided uniform definitions of transiency—an unemployed person “in the state
for less than 12 months”—and settlement—“residence within the state for a period of one year or
longer.” On the one hand, this bolstered the previous poor law definitions at a time when states
were attempting to attenuate their responsibility for welfare by writing legislation that would
revoke settlement privileges. On the other, however, it began a process that would eventually
make those same laws obsolete.304 In any case, it was a major transformation based on the
ideological principles already outlined by the Joint Application Bureau. The National Committee
on Care of Transient and Homeless hired Ellery Reed to assess the FTP in 1934. Reed’s
dissertation explored institutional ways to combat revolution by working classes dislocated by
economic downturns, arguing that “sound social progress is impeded and threatened by the
increase of social unrest and radicalism…Radicalism is…symptomatic of a diseased condition of
the social body.” These were ideas consistent with the Joint Application Bureau’s philosophy
with regard to “vagrancy” and economic stagnation. In his final report, he outlined the FTP’s
various functions, which included: “The protection of society from vagrancy and crime, incident
to the old policies of neglect and punitive treatment of transients” and “relieving the labor market
of the competition” of younger men. 305 The laws of settlement had previously prevented
sufficient solutions to transiency, and by extension, to preventing the development of radicalism.
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The federal government’s official final report described these same ideological underpinnings for
segregative methods in its transient program.
Poor relief procedure based upon [the principle of local responsibility for
relief] makes no attempt to distinguish the temporary unemployed who
have set out to find work, from the chronic wanderer—the hobo, the
tramp, and the bum. By excluding all needy non-residents, the poor laws
force the former to adopt the means of livelihood employed by the latter,
with the result that some of the temporarily unemployed never resume a
sedentary life.306

New York State’s transient division, administered by the Temporary Emergency Relief
Administration, began in November 1933 and lasted for two years. Overlaid over the 1929 Poor
Law as well as the Wicks Act, which established statewide relief efforts, it was a confused
amalgam that required detailed instructions to sort out who was “eligible” for transient aid.
Moreover, since the money spent for transient rehabilitation was 100% refundable by the federal
government, the state had incentive to classify more people as transient. This meant that there
were four categories of displacement: federal transient, unattached state transient, family state
transient, and local homeless. The program’s core policy was its transient camps. At its peak in
September 1935 there were 3,216 “cases” in the state’s transient camps, in which they received
$1 to $3 per week to operate the camps. The camps were not as robust programmatically as
Camp LaGuardia, and did not serve its productive function. They did not farm. Laborers in New
York’s transient division worked on short-term projects, such as upstate flood relief efforts in the
summer of 1935. (Prior to this emergency work they were not readily accepted by the rural
communities in which they were located—foreshadowing the experience of Camp LaGuardia.307)
But while FTP camps were not as fully integrated, nevertheless they reflected the shifting
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ideological character of work as relief. Crouse alludes to this with respect to how services were
encoded in the law: “This talk of service, prevention, and implied rehabilitation was dramatically
opposed to the earlier emphasis on poorhouse confinement as a form of punishment meant to
deter applicants rather than to serve them.”308 The labor done by the homeless in the camps
sustained the camps themselves, and lowered costs.
These legal changes point to the encoding of an emergent structure of feeling with respect
to the governing of the relative surplus populations in this period. The first poor laws sought to
prevent transients from entering localities. The 1929 revision, while “only a symbolic break from
the past,” was nevertheless different in its function, because it sought to extract transients from
localities. The relief effort took for granted that displaced people would be coming into the city,
and therefore sought to re-place them in country settings and occupations.309 Progressive Era
segregation methods, which attempted to define who was an able worker, and, therefore, who
was a target for relief, both carried over and were in flux during the Great Depression. Removal
continued to be the prevailing policy, even during the short-lived FTP.310 Through 1934, the vast
majority of those applying for relief were either sent out of the state or discharged from
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consideration, and there were more people removed than accessed aid. At the same time, the
number remaining “in state care” steadily increased through 1933 and 1934.
“It will be a long, slow process and there will be no revolution”311
Before LaGuardia appointed Hodson as Commissioner of Welfare, they met to discuss
the relief effort and the future of department policy. The winter of 1933-1934 was the winter of
the CWA, and there was an increase in the number of applicants for a limited number of jobs.
Hodson's duty to create a flexible system of relief was mandated by Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia
during this meeting. Hodson wrote, “Major LaGuardia … had in mind some kind of a reservoir
of projects which would take up this surplus of registrants.” Yet LaGuardia was also worried that
CWA wages were too high, and that “the effect…would be to pull men from regular industry
where they were receiving a lower hourly wage into civil works.” Hodson quoted the CWA wage
rates to the mayor-elect: 50 cents an hour for unskilled labor and $1.20 for skilled labor. Workers
at Camp LaGuardia eventually made 15 dollars a week for 40 hours of work, or 38 cents an
hour.312 The industrial farm colony model offered a flexible program that would provide a large
number of jobs but also contain wages. At the same time, Hodson was tasked with “reorganizing
the department” by creating a model of Welfare that would subsequently take on functions of the
Emergency Relief Bureau. For the first few years of Hodson’s tenure, the Department coexisted
with the ERB. They merged at the end of 1937, and the ERB was officially disbanded on the
final day of that year.313
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Like the relief program broadly, Hodson’s job and approach were never secure. In early
1935, he appeared before the “Aldermanic Committee Investigating Relief” and gave testimony
defending accusations of relief fraud.314 This was only one investigation among many which
caused him great stress, necessitating stays in the hospital and convalescent periods out of the
country.315 He was consistently on the offensive as well as the defensive, and gave radio
interviews, addresses, and statements about the role of the reconfigured Welfare Department in
administering what came to be a permanent relief effort. These radio addresses had as part of
their audience the staff of the Welfare Department.316
In Hodson’s ideal political economy, relief efforts were the negative image of industrial
production. As the “business index” improved, less relief was necessary. Soon after he addressed
the New York State Constitutional Convention’s Welfare Committee in 1938, Hodson advocated
for a permanent relief program on these specific grounds, and reiterated the temporal feeling that
he had expressed in describing his colossal task of institutionalizing welfare: a long, slow
process.
There will always be a considerable number willing to work and able to
work who will never be employed again. In a rapidly mechanizing
industry, many hand skills are no longer needed, and many of the older
workers cannot meet the demands of a highly competitive labor market.
When skills are no longer marketable, it is a long, slow process to
acquire new ones. The machine is likely to throw people out of work
faster than the new industries can absorb them, even in times when new
industries are being established…Under these conditions the necessity
for a permanent public assistance program is inevitable, and for a long
314
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time to come we shall have to face the fact that large numbers of persons
must be cared for at public expense, the number decreasing in good times
and increasing in bad times.317

The work camp model was meant to achieve a reduction in home relief costs, a fact that
sheds light on Hodson’s gendered program of relief during this period. When he came to the
Department Hodson expanded the shelter program based on gender segregation. According to
contemporary ideology, women needed individualized care, which was usually provided through
private charities. Men lived in the barracks-style shelters associated with the city’s municipal
lodging houses and annexes.318 This was the basis for the operation of women-only shelters. As
Hodson put it, “They used to care for the women and men together, as you know. I’ve changed
all that. And women now have their own shelter with a medical clinic.” This view informed the
program at Camp LaGuardia in important ways. Women and children entering the labor market
during depression prevented the state from being able to effectively end the crisis. In a radio
interview with a Times reporter in Spring 1940, Hodson offered this gendered explanation of the
Welfare Department’s emerging ideology.
If the usual breadwinner in the family is employed at steady work and
decent wages his wife will not be looking for work, and the older
children will stay on in school and not try to find jobs as soon as they are
of working age. A recent study of the Committee on Social Security
shows that very clearly. Insecurity…starts a chain of events that
increases the labor supply. These persons, temporarily looking for work
because of hard times, are sometimes called “additional workers,” over
and above the so-called usual workers, who are the regular breadwinners.
Now these additional workers greatly increase the competition for jobs at
the very time when jobs are scarce. The result is that in times of
Depression, there are many more persons seeking jobs than there are
workers who have lost their jobs. In other words, if 1,000 regular
workers are laid off, perhaps 1,100 or 1,250 people will then be seeking
317
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work. Once jobs and incomes are stabilized, mother and the older
children may withdraw from the labor market entirely and the number of
those looking for work drops automatically.319

It may not be a coincidence that the numbers he cited—1,000 workers—was the exact
number that Camp LaGuardia was supposed to be able to rehabilitate at any time. In any case, he
gives a brief political-economic outline of the local state’s plan in managing a crisis in
reproduction, and its view of how an industrial reserve army would be reabsorbed “automatically”
by industry. Hodson was motivated by the fact that WPA appropriations were in danger of being
cut again, arguing that, if the proposal went through, it would increase competition in the labor
market and intensify the state’s ability to end the depression. The WPA had already pulled out of
the Camp LaGuardia project three years earlier. It is in this way that he positioned the WPA, as
he consistently did in these addresses, as a temporary fix until jobs could be created. His ultimate
concern was that industry produce more and more jobs as quickly as possible. In other words,
relief labor in this scenario, paid for by the state, was short term, until the “business cycle,”
measured by factory employment, picked up again.320
Relief agitation was already turning into an organized political movement by the early
1930s. On March 6, 1930, a nationwide proclamation of “International Unemployment Day” by
Communists was accompanied by protests around the country, including demonstrations in New
York City. 35,000 people marched on Union Square, and Police Commissioner Grover Whalen
sent “hundreds of policemen and detectives, swinging night sticks, blackjacks, and bare fists”
into the crowd.321 The brawl with police prompted New York City Mayor Jimmy Walker, in
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accordance with the city charter’s prohibition of outdoor relief, to initiate a committee to collect
and distribute private funds for the unemployed. William Hodson defended Whalen's actions to
John Fitch of the New School for Social Research, writing, “I do not believe that what happened
was any serious abridgement of free speech or free assembly.”322
Unemployment Councils organized by Communists were only the largest and most
visible of groups involved in organizing the unemployed. Nationwide protests targeted official
relief, especially when it was being cut. The political impact of a place like Camp LaGuardia
should be measured in relation to those in organized political groups, not in terms of total relief
numbers, especially given Hodson’s declaration of a gendered relief program that targeted
breadwinners as the key to pulling entire families out of poverty. Seeing relief in this way
contextualizes Piven and Cloward’s conclusion that relief was not adequate. While fiscal crisis at
the local level was certainly important, and highlights the conditions which impelled federal
involvement, it also points to the fact that relief was never meant to be adequate. It was a
temporary holding place until private industry could pick up again and “absorb” the unemployed.
The Unemployed Councils (later renamed Unemployment Councils) were made official in 1930,
and favored direct action over organizing for the first few years of their existence. The early
depression was therefore a period in which the politics of unemployment were emergent, prior to
their institutionalization in the national Workers’ Alliance (in 1935), a coalition which unified
Communists, Socialists, and Musteites during the Popular Front period.323
Local relief administrators in New York City were undoubtedly attuned to actions of the
Unemployed Councils, which consistently made themselves known directly. Communists made
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it a practice to organize in the flophouses, municipal lodging houses, and breadlines. Yet their
scope was also wider. A report from the time documented that the majority of district relief
offices had experienced “frequent dealings with unemployed groups, most of them led by
Communists.”324 In 1933, for example, Unemployed Council members approached the Joint
Application Bureau on a weekly basis to register together for relief. This was a strategy to
undermine the relief program in general because the Bureau insisted that they apply as
individuals rather than as a delegation. Each single person or family had to demonstrate an
individualized need for relief. These encounters demonstrate, on a small scale, the willingness
within the local, institutionalized relief effort, to change its program in order to counter and
deflect the political positions and strategies of the Councils, or to avoid them altogether. Since
many of the encounters took place on Saturdays because of the work relief schedule, a staff
member submitted a request, approved by the supervisor, that they close the office early on
Saturdays, thus eliminating completely all possibility of confrontation with this group.325
From the outset Hodson also faced growing political radicalism among staff of the relief
agencies, especially among younger social workers who came from working class backgrounds
and identified with those on their caseloads. The line between staff and client, employed and
unemployed was equivocal,326 relief workers were paid among the lowest salaries of employees
of any city department,327 and the rapidly expanding profession of social work was in
considerable flux, giving workers the sense that their political actions would have impact. As a
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result of the “proletarianization” of sections of these workers and their lack of previous
experience in the field, they were “closely supervised.” While the social workers in private
agencies maintained status as a more experienced and professional workforce, public workers
increasingly were charged with impersonally managing and investigating vast amounts of relief
cases.328
In 1933, Emergency Relief Bureau workers organized into the Emergency Home Relief
Bureau Association, which the following year became the Association of Workers in Public
Relief Agencies (AWPRA). These workers were part of the growing “Rank and File Movement”
of Social Workers, which grew out of discussion groups nationwide in the field, and dated back
to 1931. According to Reisch and Andrews, the movement “arose primarily from the heightened
consciousness among social workers of the contradictions between their daily work and the
imperatives of a capitalist system.” The groups were formidable. By the mid-1930s, the growing
membership in the discussion clubs was double that of the membership of the American
Association of Social Work, one of two main national professional organizations. The New York
groups were large and “most radical of all,” in a political field which by 1934 had adopted a
“specifically anticapitalist program” and had joined with the Communist Party to form the
Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota.329 The Rank-and-File Movement, which “seemed to win
majority support” among social workers in the Department of Welfare, specifically embraced a
program which saw the interests of caseworkers and clients intertwined, and thus “enable[d]
radical caseworkers to engage a social context for diagnosis and treatment.”330 AWPRA was
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racially integrated. Black workers constituted 14% of AWPRA’s membership, inclduding
Division 4 of the Unattached and Transient Bureau, and there were five Black executive Board
Members on its citywide body that coordinated policy, which was then rare among New York
City unions.331 Perhaps the most important aspect of AWPRA’s success in organizing was
making relief political, against the intentionally apolitical program of the Emergency Relief
Bureau and Welfare Department administrators. After all, it was ERB workers who, based on a
complicated and ever changing schema of laws, had to tell a relief applicant that, if he was
evicted, “his furniture would be confiscated, his children would be placed in homes, and he and
his wife would be sent to shelters.”332 For clerical workers in the relief bureau to remain
occupied they were tasked with moving other workers, with whom many identified, through the
relief program after adjudicating their claims for relief. This was a de-skilling of relief workers
as they became managers for the administration.
The Rank-and-File Movement mounted some of the most vocal and persistent opposition
to early New Deal programs, especially the replacement of FERA’s “direct relief” with the
“work relief” of the WPA, which they deemed Roosevelt’s “work or starve” policy.333 Work
relief had an impact on the number of social workers employed by the relief program. When the
WPA was implemented, the Emergency Relief Bureau reported that a 40% decrease in its staff
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(1,800 jobs) was required.334 As home relief cases were transferred to work relief, AWPRA,
which represented employees who investigated home relief eligibility, and who were therefore
no longer needed after cases were transferred to work relief,335 organized a three-hour work
stoppage in the ERB in October, 1935. Hodson, in Buffalo at the time, received a telegram from
his Secretery, William McClure, that morning:
NEW REPUBLIC DATED OCTOBER THIRTIETH OUT TODAY
CONTAINING ARTICLE ALSO SEE TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES
STOP TOTAL ERB WALKOUT 2,936 IN BOROUGHS AND 536 IN
CENTRAL OFFICE OR SLIGHTLY OVER TWENTY PERCENT
ENTIRE STAFF STOP ERB MEETING TOMORROW AT FIVE. 336

McClure underestimated the number of workers who had walked out. The percentage
was actually about 45%, or 7,500 workers out of a total of 16,778 in the ERB in that month. The
action “crippled the machine at the central office” and completely halted the distribution of
relief.337 The union claimed that the number was actually higher, and that some employees
agreed to remain on the job to deal with “emergencies.” In response, the ERB initially rescinded
seniority rights for the striking workers.338 This punishment almost equaled job termination,
since 3,500 workers were disciplined for the action and downsizing would likely require 3,000
layoffs by January 1936. Under pressure from AWPRA and other unions, the ERB dropped the
sentence, and docked the workers for the time they were on work stoppage.339 Although the
strike did not block the layoffs, days later, on October 29th, the Emergency Relief Bureau signed
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a collective bargaining agreement with AWPRA.340 Many of the laid off workers were
transferred to WPA payrolls, while a substantial number were fired for “incompetence.”341
In the midst of this controversy, a New York Sun editorial expressed a logical solution
that the Board of Managers of the ERB must have contemplated: heightening the contradictions
to a political boiling point: “fill the places of the strikers from the ranks of the unemployed men
and women who will not try to dictate to the State and city governments.”342 The Daily Worker
claimed that LaGuardia suggested the same thing to an AWPRA protest against the Mayor’s
termination of 2,000 ERB employees in December of that year.343 Walkowitz identifies an
individual case where the recommendation of the Relief Bureau to a fired employee was that he
was eligible for Home Relief, and concludes that the circumstance demonstrates “one of the
tragic ironies of the decade—the unemployed could one day be dispensing welfare as a form of
work relief and the next day [be] receiving it.”
The AWPRA walkout of October 1935 mirrored the general politics of the early WPA. In
the first two and a half years of its existence, there were 571 strikes of WPA workers across the
country. The strikes were concentrated in four states, and New York had the third highest of any
state. The first strike in the country took place in New York City starting on August 6, 1935,
when the WPA was just one week old. Bricklayers, building the low income Astor Houses, went
on strike to protest a lowered hourly wage. Workers on other projects walked off the job in
sympathy actions for nearly two months until a compromise was reached that workers would be
paid the same monthly amount yet work fewer hours. As Ziskind put it, “In this first WPA strike
340
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almost every problem and situation to be experienced in the numerous future strikes was
rehearsed.”344
The fact that the WPA was a work relief program brought inherent contradictions. Chief
among these was the question over whether striking workers would get relief. Harry Hopkins
was adamant that they would not, but left home relief up to local administration. LaGuardia
deferred to him, stating, “The city administration will not scab for the Federal Government.” But
in one high profile case, pressed by the Unemployed Council, LaGuardia gave a worker’s family
not relief but “necessary food for his sick wife and children,” a turn of phrase which deliberately
begged the question.345 AWPRA’s early successes positioned it to protest consistently these cuts
in the relief staff.
This radicalism and solidarity extended into ongoing protests against emerging homeless
policy. Protests explicitly rejected the false choice between “forced labor in transient camps and
jail.”346 As funding dried up for the CWA and the workers were laid off, 1,000 demonstrated in
the Bronx and 250 protested outside the central relief administration office, where “Hodson and
his deputy commissioners were forced to receive delegation after delegation of workers
protesting C.W.A firings, discrimination against Negroes on jobs and relief, and demanding jobs
for the fired C.W.A. workers and unemployed.”347 In the fall of that year, 300 homeless men in
the Council of Unattached Men of the National Unemployment Councils demanded a meeting
with Howe at the ERB office and won demands over food and lodging.348 As federal aid ended
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for the FTP in the fall of 1935, the Unattached Local of the Unemployed Council organized a
picket on the ERB, at which a protester explained their purpose, “There is talk about sending us
to camps, where we will work for a minimum of $15 a month, but so far we have received no
order to go to the camps.”349 At the same time, a “week of uninterrupted picketing by the
Unattached and Transient Local 1, Unemployment Council” disputed the eviction from decent
lodgings of Black transient workers, and their relocation to a “flophouse.”350 March 1936
brought the occupation of the Unattached and Transient Bureau on Fulton Street by a group
affiliated to the Unemployment Council demanding an increase in relief. In May 1939, a threeday picket outside City Hall by the “Unemployed and Project Workers Union” of the Workers
Alliance was timed to coincide with Mayor LaGuardia’s meeting with out of town mayors
visiting New York for the World’s Fair. It “was run night and day, on four hour shifts, with the
local homeless, unemployed single mothers, not eligible for home relief, contributing a large
share of the man-power despite the fact that they eat only an unsatisfactory breakfast at the
Municipal Lodging House early in the day, and then must go hungry until five p.m.” One
rallying call on the picket was “Close Camp LaGuardia—Give Jobs!”351 These protests were in
the context of what groups affiliated to the Minnesota Farmer-Labor organization understood to
be the “deportation of single men to transient camps.”352
Surveillance was common practice for the Welfare Department. Under the ideology of
maintaining a “non-political” department based in scientific case management, left-leaning
affiliations were consistently targets. Howe was part of a wider controversy over the Welfare
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Department’s surveillance of political groups in the midst of the ERB walkout. Writing in The
New Republic in October 1935, I.F. Stone accused Hodson of colluding with the New York City
Police Department to target political opponents and organizers who were on relief rolls. Drawing
on a TERA investigation that was never published,353 Stone wrote that according to this report,
which quoted Deputy Welfare Commissioner Howe, the Welfare Department had assigned two
“special investigators” to work with the police’s “Alien Squad” to build a list of “professional
agitators, Communists.” One of the specific targets was Richard Sullivan, leader in the
Unemployment Councils. A July, 1934 report by a city detective corroborated, “[I] was assisted
during the entire investigation by Confidential Investigators White and McCormack of Deputy
Commissioner Howe’s staff of the Department of Public Welfare and will state that without their
coöperation this investigation could not have been made.”354 Howe was the First Deputy
Commissioner of Welfare under William Hodson, and went on to become Executive Secretary to
Fiorello LaGuardia in mid-1935, and his anti-communism was public. Acting as Commissioner
of Welfare at the end of 1934, the year that the camp opened (Hodson was on medical leave),
Howe argued that “The Communist Party is conducting a regular educational campaign to teach
[employable men] how to chisel. We are going to crack down on them.”355 Howe used his
influence in the Mayor’s office to push this agenda. In December, Hodson received a memo from
Howe with instructions to investigate an organization’s political position, asking for his “usual
spirit of cooperation.” His language shows that this was not an isolated request.
The Mayor has asked me to confirm my impression that the organization
circulating the enclosed petition is communistic. I interviewed a
delegation representing the People’s Press recently and concluded from
353
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their characteristic phraseology that this was the case. While this is not
exactly within the scope of the Welfare Department, I would appreciate it
very much if, in your usual spirit of cooperation, you would ask Levin to
make a special investigation for us.356

Camp LaGuardia opened on May 1, 1934 as Camp Greycourt, in the midst of these
ideological, infrastructural, and organizational upheavals. Its function to segregate, left over from
prison reform work camp design, remained. But, rather than segregating prisoners who corrupted
working people in “universities of crime,” the camp began to segregate relief recipients who
could be disentangled from universities of politics. The reversal accounts for the swing to the left
of the model’s proponents, pushed by agitation to defend and reconfigure its relief efforts. The
ideology that pure work was a cure remained, while the camp siphoned off a portion of the
unemployed to wait out the depression until they could be reabsorbed by increased investment in
private industry. Yet in contrast to other work relief projects, this one formed the basis of what
was intended to be a permanent function of Welfare.
“Camp LaGuardia: A Human Repair Shop”
A press release calling Camp LaGuardia “a human repair shop” described its
rehabilitation program.
New York City's Department of Welfare maintains a farm where, it
might be said, human character is grown. It is a rehabilitation project
operated on a 326-acre tract in peaceful Orange County. The farm is
known officially as Camp LaGuardia, and much of its success can be
attributed to the interest and energy of Stanley H. Howe, the former First
Deputy Commissioner of Public Welfare in New York City.357

Howe’s anti-communism were part and parcel of Camp LaGuardia’s operation.
Allegations of “outside agitators” characterized any opposition to camp policy, however modest.
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When residents of the camp staged a strike to oppose conditions, wage exploitation, and food
quality, Hodson threatened residents while reassuring the readers of the newspaper that
published the account: “I have strong suspicion that certain persons are at work at the camp
engaged in stirring up strife and confusion. I have a good idea of who they are. Among them are
some people who were formerly in the department. As to the agitators who are disturbing the
peace at the camp, I am going to take vigorous steps to discover who they are, and when I do I
will see that drastic action is taken against them.”358 Even if there was not consistent agitation
among the workers living at the camp, the Communist Press relied on the former understanding
of labor as punitive to politicize the Welfare Department’s unfolding policies. To them it was a
“forced labor camp” and their intended political intervention was to delink relief from the
requirement of work.359 However, what they did not consider was the possibility that the camp
was a place from which these politics were segregated. As McKay wrote to Eastman on the same
day, “no working-class pride exists here—no hope of a better nobler life for the workers.”360
McKay's explicit descriptions of the camp as lacking cohesion and the staunch anticommunism of its director are notable, especially since these observations came from an
experienced revolutionary who was a subordinate in the camp's hierarchy. Why would Clarke
even mention this to McKay? In fact, Clarke's personal indication to McKay that he was on an
anti-communist crusade was not out of the ordinary; it was his public representation of the
camp's purpose. Although the tactic was a dubious one given the numerous strikes on rural relief
358

“Too Much Hash Brings Protest at Relief Camp,” New York Herald Tribune, September 10, 1935. Hodson’s
reference to “people who are formerly in the department” is cryptic. Were they former staff, now on relief rolls? If
so, his comment directly references the constant overlap between relief staff and those on work relief, and the
resultant politics that he was attempting to hide or dismantle.
359
Howard Boldt, “Forced Labor, Relief Cuts Mark New LaGuardia Attack on N.Y. Jobless,” Daily Worker, May
18, 1934; “Councils Score Victory over Forced Labor Camp,” Daily Worker, December 3, 1934.
360
McKay to Eastman. December 3, 1934, in Cooper, The Passion of Claude McKay: Selected Poetry and Prose,
1912-1948.
128

projects, including the CCC and the CWA, Camp LaGuardia was imagined to be a place where
laborers would be partitioned from the prevailing political mood in New York City, including its
labor unrest and developing solidarities among those administering relief and those receiving it.
For New York City administrators, it made political sense to have a self-sustaining work project
located outside of the city.361
In an editorial in the camp newspaper in 1935, Clarke linked the rehabilitation program to
its pursuit of an anti-communist agenda. According to his argument, the camp's success would
hinge on the inmates' ability to withstand persuasion by communist saboteurs, who wanted it to
fail.
“[W]e know for a fact that Communists are being assembled here to
foment trouble, to tear down this work which has taken months to build
up.
And what have they to offer? NOTHING EXCEPT VAGUE PROMISES.
We know that they personally don't care, being paid propagandists. They
have their rates of pay. Here are some of them: For causing a local
disturbance, $3; speeches on street corners, $1 per speech, limited to $3
per day; for being arrested, etc. $5; for being “mussed up” by police, $8
while in hospital.
Greycourt actually gives what they can only promise. The graft and
greed within their own ranks makes it impossible for them to fulfill their
hypocritical promises. While they rant against “capitalism”, they have
never been known to refuse money. While they express horror at the
United States increasing its armed forces, -- the SMALLEST,
incidentally, IN THE WORLD per capita -- they themselves boast of the
mighty Red Machine of six millions of men, the largest standing army in
the world today, and greater than the combined armies of Italy, England
and France.
We will not bother these paid propagandists, my friends, just so long as
they are willing to abide by the camp rules: In bed by eleven o'clock, and
no drunkenness. So long as they do their fair share of work willingly,
Greycourt is theirs.
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But we don't need them and we can do very well without them, WE
HAVE NO ROOM HERE FOR CRACKPOTS!362

Clarke’s intentions could not fend off September and October actions at the camp that year.
The city faced the same problem it had on other of its work relief projects: unhappy
people with a common experience assembled in one place. It had a clear interest in defusing any
type of political alliance among workers that it could not control. This may have been why the
city capitulated to certain demands by the Unemployment Council, vehemently opposed to the
contingency of relief on “forced labor” at the camp. For example, early on, the Unemployment
Council advocated for Alexander Mendoza, who was dropped from relief after refusing a
placement at the camp. According to the Council, this was a marked victory that demonstrated an
end to established city practice: “The victory against the forced labor drive against single men in
the case of Mendoza marks a number of similar victories by the Unemployment Councils
throughout the city in winning relief for workers who had been denied relief after refusing to go
to Camp Greycourt.”363 Yet it may also have been a concession the city was willing to grant in
order to keep the camp segregated from those movements. In any event, the fact of Mendoza’s
successful defense corroborates McKay’s early vision of the camp, which disputed the city’s
official position, and as he described to Max Eastman in his letter of the same day.
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Camp LaGuardia was a model for managing the “local homeless,” and the city planned to
open a second, even larger camp in Columbia County immediately. Hodson told the New York
Herald Tribune “I'd like to be able to place 10,000 men in establishments similar to this.”364
Three years later, as the WPA pulled out and local homeless were transferred to city, Hodson
expressed his desire to “gradually work toward increasing the number of these camps until the
entire homeless problem is dealt with in that way.”365 Administrators anticipated that sites would
be cheap and easy to come by as federal transient and CCC camps were decommissioned.366
Intentions of expansion were accompanied by an increase in policing, a recurring pattern in New
York City’s history of welfare. Part of Hodson’s radio propaganda was to center legitimacy for
welfare provision in the state by calling into question the subsistence practices of poor people,
including what he called “charity rackets.” He dedicated a number of shows to this topic in the
late 1930s. Describing Camp LaGuardia’s function, he said, “With the cooperation of the police
department, begging has almost been eliminated.” According to this plan, Hodson confidently
proclaimed the end of need in New York: “No man, woman or child needs to go without food or
shelter in this city.” Throughout August 1935, New York Police Commissioner Valentine headed
a series of crackdowns on “Hoovervilles” and “derelict centers” in a round of arrests totaling
over 700.367
In mid-1937 the reallocation of federal funds for the WPA required that New York City
reduce its WPA workforce by nearly 30,000 people in the short timeframe between July and
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October. The elimination of Camp LaGuardia from the WPA budget was part of the first rollout
of cuts, along with layoffs from the Department of Hospitals, the Commodities Distribution
Project, and 1,200 Social Investigators from the Department of Welfare. According to a plan
devised by New York WPA Administrator Brehon Somervell, which he described in a
confidential letter to Mayor LaGuardia in June, 1937, layoffs from these projects, along with
“normal losses,” which included a moratorium on transfers from the Home Relief Bureau, would
“cause the reduction of approximately 5,000 persons between [June 11] and July 15.” More “cuts”
would be achieved after “the necessity of actually dropping 12,000 persons in July.” He assured
the mayor that Home Relief would only need to absorb half of this, an estimate based on
“experience in the past.” The plan was to transfer many of these jobs, including the spots at
Camp LaGuardia, to city departments. In the case of Camp LaGuardia, the expectation was that
the state would pay 40% of its future costs. One of the reasons the city wanted to hold on to the
camp was its low labor-materials ratio; work at the camp was manual, done without expensive
machinery. The city would have had to fund any amount above the federal allocation of $9.50
per person for “other than payroll” costs, which then stood at $15.60. (It was already paying the
difference of $6.)368 It achieved other savings through a pay cut. WPA pay rates started at $42
per month, with $24 deducted for “maintenance,” the men receiving $18 in wages. Later, the
camp rate was $30 per month with $15 deducted for maintenance, or $15 in wages.369
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When the city took over full financial responsibility for the camp in November, it began
negotiating with the state over partial reimbursement. Given the state’s hesitation, confusion over
the camp’s legality under the 1929 law, and the possibility of the camp’s closure absent state
funds, Hodson’s rationale for the state assuming 40% of the costs of the camp’s operation rested
precisely on the vague and moving distinction between relief workers and staff. He wrote a letter
to the State’s Department of Social Welfare, which argued:
The $15.00 monthly wage should not be regarded as a work relief wage,
because these men are performing the necessary work of operating a
relief institution. We make this distinction because there is some doubt
about the State’s authority under the law to reimburse on work relief
projects, whereas there is no doubt about the authority of the state to
reimburse on wages paid to men engaged in the administration of a
necessary welfare function even though these men have a relief status.
The organization of the Commodities Distribution Division furnishes an
excellent precedent for this view.370

In other words, the program at Camp LaGuardia collapsed the distinction between
different types of labor in its operation for purposes of finance and accounting, but maintained
them for purposes of rehabilitation in its ideological sense. Hodson’s letter revealed the changing
definitions of labor as they connected to politics. While Hodson’s Department established Camp
LaGuardia as a work relief program under the Civil Works Administration, at this moment in
time, his argument was that the workers at Camp LaGuardia ran the institution as well as
effected their own rehabilitation. They were administering relief (by actually running the camp)
and they were receiving relief (by doing the work of the camp).
When the state refused to reimburse on costs for the camp, the referral process changed
significantly. The city began to substitute single men from home relief for the homeless men that
had previously been referred there. That is, it intentionally reclassified home relief cases as
370
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dislocated homeless/transient cases. In the process, it solved two major problems of cost. The
state agreed to pay “40% of the cost of food and administrative personnel on the theory that the
operation of the camp was ‘an extension of the home relief program’ in New York City.” (This
meant that the city-state percentage of total funding of the camp was about 84%-16%. The city
continued to fund its portion through relief funding. “No part of its expenditures is included in
the regular tax budget.”) Additionally, the city saved on the costs of home relief, since the cost of
maintaining a man at Camp LaGuardia was cheaper by nearly $4 than maintaining a man on
home relief, a fact substantiating the city’s plan to establish many more of these camps,
recommended as late as 1940.371 However, as opposed to the Progressive feeling that “Any
unattached person ‘in the know’ would be a damned fool NOT to go transient,” the city
expressed extreme difficulty “recruiting” campers from home relief.372
The process for referring men to Camp LaGuardia was always closely monitored and
managed. Men were “selected on the basis of their apparent adaptability to the camp
program.”373 Staff in the central bureau as well as in the district offices maintained a list of men
which included their work histories, and men were chosen from this list when vacancies became
available. This list was carefully matched to the ongoing labor needs of the camp.374 In 1940 the
camp remained a springboard program for “unattached domiciled men…if active Home Relief
cases,”375 in addition to homeless men. The homeless continued to be referred to the Municipal
Lodging Houses on 25th Street and South Ferry and, for women, to the Emergency Shelter on
371
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East Sixth Street.376 For a “case” to be closed, that is, to be removed from the purview of the
Department of Welfare’s relief program, they had to be moved into private employment, a
federal government program such as WPA, CCC, or National Youth Administration, or to “local
homeless.”377 The men at the camp, therefore, were not considered “homeless,” a fact that was
ideologically central to Hodson’s understanding of relief, that they should be “[considered]
human beings…self-respecting and self-sustaining.” Further, this emphasis of their belonging
was important for maintaining a working relationship with other residents of Orange County.
The jobs secured “outside” to get men off relief were intended to be in the surrounding towns:
“Employment is secured for camp members in the surrounding towns and cities through the
camp Social Service Department,”378 an aspect of the program meant to counter migration to
New York City from the rural areas of the state. Therefore, although the camp’s budget fell
under “homeless relief” the consistent emphasis was that the men were a “cross section of any
neighborhood, of any borough, or of the city as a whole.”379 The camp began to more closely
resemble the CCC efforts—pulling people from home relief onto work projects, actions that were
consistently met with citywide protests.380
Conclusion
In “an unusual series of broadcasts,” Mayor LaGuardia “[put] his commissioners on the
spot” in order to defend his welfare programs against Tammany criticisms that it was ineffective
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and too expensive. An interview with Hodson in October 1937 allowed the Welfare
Commissioner to give specific examples of reforms made in the previous three years. Hodson
focused on infrastructural changes to the city’s shelter program, including appropriations of “half
a million dollars remodeling the Municipal Lodging Houses and its annexes” and the
establishment of “a rehabilitation Camp in Orange County called Camp LaGuardia,” expressing
that the “human repair shop” was central to Hodson’s overall plan for reorganizing the
Department of Welfare. By 1939 the city was displaying the innovative aspects of its
professionalized welfare program in an exhibit at the World’s Fair, which included vegetables
produced at Camp LaGuardia and a scaled relief map of its 326 acres.381 Hodson boasted about
the number of people that stopped to see the exhibit. Production at the camp was on the increase,
with the goal to can enough vegetables there for all of the city’s institutions.382 New jobs were
being added yearly. Yet the laborers there remained in a holding pattern—sustaining themselves
until the end of the Depression. Camp LaGuardia, like the Civil Works relief projects in the city
that substituted for the “dole” of the early New Deal, was merely the first of many farm labor
camps envisioned.383 By the late 1930s, Hodson could assert to Mayor LaGuardia, “you must get
to Camp LaGuardia soon. It’s one of the best pieces of work in your administration.”384 The
camp, once experimental and disorganized, was now a crucial addition for homeless men to the
Welfare Department’s customary programs of caring for the aged, veterans, the blind, and the
“needy unemployed.” It eased mobilization and demobilization of various aspects of the ongoing
381
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relief effort, helping to solve the problem of social and ideological reproduction. It extended the
penal system’s program of rehabilitation through labor to a segment of those unemployed
persons cared for by the city’s Welfare Department at the same time that welfare for the
unemployed, previously administered predominantly by private charities, was brought within the
centralized control of the state.
As this chapter has shown, homeless shelters have historically been places where the
processes of extraction and containment are worked out by the state. This is a process continuous
with the historical development of prisons, and visible in competing and overlapping programs
that are either corrective (for “the good”) or punitive (for “the evil”).385 Who do they extract, and
why? What are the purposes of their segregation? This contradiction, which lies at their heart and
was present from the very beginning, can be expressed simply by describing homeless shelters’
primary function: extraction for the purpose of integration. Yet this contradiction also shows the
inherent instability of the institutional model, and therefore its fitness as a place for revolutionary
change. Its masking function is both in the open and hidden. The following chapters take up this
masking function in greater detail. It examines the consolidation of the work program at Camp
LaGuardia around the ideologies of race and nation, and the various explicit programs for
cohesion among workers at the camp, especially through performances coordinated by its theater
program. Into the dramatic flux of political agitation, hierarchical salaries, types of workers,
relief functions, geographic scale, and state financing, in a segregated work camp in the midst of
the Depression, a minstrel show at Camp LaGuardia provided the basis for communal
identification among workers. This crucial aspect of New York City’s first modern homeless
shelter has never before been identified. As opposed to hip-hop, music of rebellion, in the camp’s
385
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daily, mundane mixture of ideology and experience “blackface minstrelsy conspired with
power.”386
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Chapter 5
Consolidating Consent, Part I: Contradiction and Camp
LaGuardia

Figure 5.1 Cover of “The Greycourter,” May 1935.
139

From the sidewalks of New York 800 men have returned to the soil at
Camp Greycourt.387

Introduction
The previous chapter established the importance of Camp LaGuardia, and similar
institutions designed on the model, to the national as well as the regional relief program. Though
disorganized as it opened, and referred to as an “experiment” by its designers,388 the camp
enjoyed widespread support, demonstrating the resonance of its enduring foundational ideologies.
Celebrities no less than Babe Ruth, who gave an inspirational speech to the men in March 1935,
visited the camp in its early days.389 The camp was a crucial part of an institutionalized relief
effort that required suppression of a collective oppositional consciousness then emerging to come
to terms with the particular historical moment of economic crisis and the politics of relief
administration and reform. Camp LaGuardia, as its newspaper insisted, was an innovative place
where a select few would learn that a “sit down job” was better than a “sit down strike,”390 and
where “wildcat schemes and shortcuts to utopia”391 were unnecessary. The broad narrative that
the camp drew on and helped to recreate, like the relief effort in general, was that crisis was an
aberration, rather than normal.
This chapter analyzes Camp LaGuardia, rural workhouse and early homeless shelter, in
its function of dissembling social crisis by veiling political challenges to efforts at stabilization.
While the camp played an important role in isolating its inmates geographically, it also
consciously developed programs that cohered life there, so that the men would accept and live
387
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out the premise of rehabilitative work. Removed from the political ferment of New York City’s
effervescent relief politics, the men at the camp, in their collective isolation, were completely
dependent on the state, even if the state, in a way, gave to them their own means of
subsistence.392 These “morale-building” aspects of the program masked contradictions at the
camp, especially the irony that the men were expanding the infrastructure of a former prison,
where they and future generations of homeless people would live, as their relief assignments. In
exchange for their agreement to participate in the program, the men living there received
consistent reassurance that they were not homeless because of their own fault: they remained
working class. As such, all men there, including new arrivals, were referred to formally as
“workers.”393 This chapter examines the demotic aspects of camp life given these particular
political and geographical conditions. It describes the consolidation of a fictitious white workingclass identity that encouraged inmates to buy-in to their sequestration in an upstate labor colony
to wait out the depression.
The idea of work as an aspect of rehabilitation, which extended from the productive
aspects of the city’s reform program, was connected to a historic 1930 revision of New York
City’s long-standing policy with regard to the homeless. In the Municipal Lodging House,
overnight stays had been limited to five nights per month for residents and one night per month
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for those without the entitlements of settlement.394 The need for a continuous labor pool for
planting and harvesting meant that in Camp LaGuardia long-term stays for the unsheltered were
institutionalized programmatically for the first time. In six months in mid-1935, the camp’s first
full year, it provided an average of nearly three months lodgings to each resident, and there was
only one new resident admitted in August of that year, demonstrating very little turnover.395 In
1938, nearly 70% of residents had worked there for over six months; 50 men had lived there for
over two years. Average time spent there was on the increase, and in 1939 was up to 14
months.396 By 1940, at least 55 men had been living there for more than 5 years.397 This was not
only a result of the impracticality and expense of transporting men back and forth the 70 miles
between the camp and the city. Workers with trans-seasonal knowledge about farming, gained
working there over a number of years, were increasingly valuable as the city strived for
efficiency in its production. Men with any farming experience were prioritized.398 Yet this aspect
of policy became a contradiction; both the administration and the workers themselves began to
view their employment there as permanent, when in reality relief status made their jobs
temporary.399
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The geographical knowledge that Camp LaGuardia drew on, and in turn helped to
recreate, was central to the camp’s coherence and expressed in its newspaper. The paper
comprised an assortment of features on the commonplace aspects of camp life. It included
nostalgic reminiscences about the mythology of the camp’s genesis, practical advice from the
clinic about working in the country and outdoors, instructions for administrative requests,
overviews of recreational schedules, and reviews of camp events. Yet in this assortment can be
gleaned a glimpse of the unifying structure of feeling underlying not only the camp, but New
York City’s relief program as a whole, and its anxieties about both the recent past and the near
future.400 Relief efforts aimed at making depression seem anomaly rather than norm, and men
needed ongoing convincing that proper recourse for their consistent, long-term unemployment
was work relief. This was imperative in the mid-1930s, five years after the stock market crash of
1929, and given that men at the camp averaged three years out of work.401 The paper’s mixture
of discipline, nostalgia, myth, and empowerment characterized the life of the publication,
informed the men’s consciousness of their experiences there and regarding the Depression, and
was the expression of the complex and contradictory nature of camp life.
While the blues named, minstrelsy masked. Minstrelsy relied on the rhetoric of apophasis,
ambiguously saying in order to hide, to deny what it articulated. In this process, not only were
relief efforts at the camp superimposed on already existing racist and gendered geographies and
practices, but also those racist and gendered geographies and practices were reproduced as a
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function of the relief effort.402 Racial perforations dramatized in a camp-initiated minstrel show
congealed an exclusive definition of the working-class at the camp: it was composed of white,
male workers. The camp members’ working-class identity was forged through a nationalism that
bound people from a diversity of places, international as well as national, in an upscaling of
“settlement” status to “citizenship” status with regard to relief benefits.403 Ralph Astrofsky, the
first Director of the Welfare Department’s newly-formed Division of Shelter Care, gave
Congressional testimony in 1940 regarding the city’s experience with interstate migrants. He
explained what he was trying to preserve but also to address, and gave a succinct view of the
state’s approach to rehabilitation at Camp LaGuardia and its connection to nationalism.
The homeless have a fairly good background in a variety of skills and
semiskills; the transient are the more capable by virtue of their more
recent experience in their regular occupations. Camp LaGuardia,
providing maintenance work relief to unattached men, has been a selfsufficient community by being able to draw from its population every
skill necessary to operate it — cooks, bakers, butchers, laundrymen,
workers, electricians, painters, carpenters, clerks, etc. Few of the men
have had an opportunity to remain long enough on a job to join any trade
union. They have worked, however, at one or more of their several skills
along their journeys and helped build this country by their appearance
when they are needed. The industrial migrant secures only seasonal work
of such brief duration that he does not accumulate sufficient credit to
entitle him to benefits of social security laws of any single State.404

The ideology of “vagrancy” that had regulated settlement had been institutionalized in the
vagrancy statutes of the poor law era. The old “benefits” of local relief accruing to individuals
who had settlement status in a particular county, no matter how slight, would be superseded by

402

Ruth Wilson Gilmore, “Fatal Couplings of Power and Difference: Notes on Racism and Geography,”
Professional Geographer 54, no. 1 (February 2002): 18. “Lawmakers and agencies of the nascent Keynesian state
reworked and made critical the very U.S. hierarchies that activists were fighting to deconstruct in radical organizing.”
403
In a survey of 5,234 Camp Members and their country of origin, 56% came from outside the United States from
53 countries. On this basis the newspaper declared that “our personnel has been made up of men in every walk of
life..and from nearly every country on the face of the globe.” “Browsing About,” Camp LaGuardia News, February
1938, 2.
404
Interstate Migration: Hearings before the Select Committee to Investigate the Interstate Migration of Destitute
Citizens, House of Representatives, Seventy-Sixth Congress, 204.
144

benefits accruing from the national relief effort. This was the practice of the Progressive mantra,
“we will take you in and consider you a worthwile citizen,”405 and was fused to reformers’
notion of work as a recuperative process in itself. Single men extracted from urban space had the
opportunity to mix their labor with the land, a “privilege” that would allow them to support
families if they succeeded. From the standpoint of social reproduction, this was a part of a
broader effort to keep a chosen segment of laborers productively occupied during the depression,
which required replenishing their labor power socially, physically, and psychologically, until the
crisis ended. At Greycourt, workers could “gaze out over the black velvet soil, a hundred acres of
which have been reclaimed by the sweat of their brows.”406
Race and Gender Politics during the Depression
Race and gender were central to general relief politics during the depression.407 Racism
adjudicated who got limited relief funds, while gender was formative in creating a distinction
between home relief and work relief. Naison argues that there was both strong pressure for black
communists to subsume politics of race to politics of class, especially after the 1934 National
Convention of the Party, but also that they were able to create space to organize independently of
the party line. During a period of intense proletarianization of black as well as white migrants
from the south to northern urban centers, New York City had the biggest, and one of the fastest
growing, working-class migrant populations of Northern cities.408 William Hodson claimed that
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relief was a “cross-section of the community,”409 but the unemployment rate among black people
was up to three times that of whites in New York City.410 Contemporary estimates of the Harlem
situation placed the unemployment rate among black workers as high as 85%.411 For single men,
this was as high as 64%, and for all household heads the rate approached 80%.412 Despite these
high numbers, there was only one relief office in Harlem in 1933.413 “Systematic discrimination”
was especially prevalent in the programs of work relief, according to the official contemporary
report.414
Harlem became forefront in the Communist Party’s organizing efforts beginning in the
1920s, a decade that ended with the genesis of the Unemployed Councils. The area was officially
a “national concentration point” of the party, evident in its high-profile defense efforts in the
Scottsboro case and its “black belt” policy of 1931. Both were expressive of a working-class
black nationalism on which a declining Garveyism had previously built. These politics were
strategic attempts to expand party membership in the early depression, leading up to the party’s
Popular Front tactics. Women provided the backbone of the Harlem Tenants League, a predepression organization which fought evictions and organized rent strikes, and which was the
prototype for the expanding Unemployed Councils.415 In April 1931, the Harlem Unemployed
Council had 500 members. By 1935, it was the largest in the city, with over 3,000 members and
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10 locals.416 A majority of the rank-and-file were women.417 Black women made up 70% of
Harlem’s Communist Party membership in general, and their activity was “concentrated in the
unemployed movement.” Leaders such as Grace Campbell, Louise Thompson, Esther Cooper,
Williana Burroughs, and Thyra Edwards all came from backgrounds of social work.418 Black
women’s labor sustained families during these periods of depressed conditions and high
unemployment. Sixty percent of all black women over 15 worked in 1931, a higher percentage
than both the recent pre-depression rate as well as white women.419 As McDuffie argues, black
left feminism of this period—with its layered understanding of gender, race, and class in an early
articulation of intersectionality, and which saw in the Communist Party a vehicle for liberation
even as it disputed and reworked Marxist-Leninist dogma—was a rejection of “the ‘worker’ as a
white male factory laborer, the ‘working woman’ as white, and the shop floor as the determinant
of class consciousness.”420
Part of the radicalization of various segments of the working-class during the Depression
were multi-racial alliances that challenged the New Deal’s authority, especially its definition and
treatment of workers. As Davis puts it, “far from pacifying those who suffered the effects of the
Great Depression, the New Deal served as a further catalyst for the organization of multiracial
mass movements.”421 At the same time, as Kelley details, left organizers encountered a
predicament with regard to the New Deal’s unfolding programs, because “Communists
nationwide were already placed in the ironic position of having to fight for improvements within
416
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the WPA while simultaneously trying to build an alliance with the WPA’s creators.”422 The
Communist Party explicitly fought “white chauvinism” in its ranks, in attempts to forge blackwhite political power among the working class.423 In contrast, the New York relief
administration exploited these politics, attempting to reverse political strength into weakness,
and to diffuse the Party’s influence among relief recipients, relief workers, and the unemployed.
Usually, the relief effort’s practical interests motivated these politics, rather than any generalized
ideological commitments.424 As part of that process, the administration exploited the Popular
Front strategy to maintain liberal influence over the relief program. In this way, Camp LaGuardia
demonstrates a break in the Popular Front coalition, specifically in the transformation of the
state’s carceral institutions managing surplus labor, a process that turned on race and gender.
Despite limitations, both the united and popular fronts’ “unity against fascism” expressed
a structure of feeling that could be detected in much of the cultural politics emergent from the
class struggle of the depression. As Naison puts it, “despite cynicism on both sides, the united
front had an élan and emotional force which should not be underestimated” and “opened the way
for a significant expansion of Party activity among Harlem’s creative intelligentsia…to generate
a black cultural movement explicitly identified with the left.” This emergent politics, consistent
with the Black radical tradition’s contestation of the working-class as white, male factory
workers, was still tentative. Clifford Odets’ play, “Waiting for Lefty,” performed at the Negro
Peoples’ Theater, was criticized on the left because it did not transmit “the experiences of the
422
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Negro people.” Marvel Cooke, reviewing the production in the Amsterdam News, concluded,
“Lefty’s pals did not quite convince us that they belonged ‘deep down in the working class.’”425
The minstrel show at Camp LaGuardia solidified white workers’ continued claims on
working class identity within the institutionalized relief effort itself. As described in the previous
chapter, the city saw the flourishing of radical organizations as a threat, indicated by its grouping
together of all “agitators.” Concomitantly, much of the Communist Party’s organizing was
underground or through relationships among affiliated organizations and memberships,
prompting relief authorities to see its influence everywhere. It is notable that these performances
were motivated by the politics that surrounded an early “homeless shelter,” an institution
emerging to smooth out political contradictions and to diffuse politics surrounding crisis, and
that the Communist Party was the political organization best positioned to reject the model. On
the one hand, the “socialist” nature of the camp as a refuge for white workers demonstrated to
those workers a generosity of the state in a time of need. This was particularly resonant in the
continuing struggle against the patronage of political machines, which presented a real
contradiction as the Democratic Party inherited its structure, a structure it fought against but also
drew power from.426 On the other hand, the Communist Party explicitly repudiated the camp, as
a result of its building energy around a united front against fascism that self-consciously
attempted to integrate concerns of white and black workers.
These politics were particularly evident in the AWPRA. It explicitly forged interracial
solidarities and was a keystone of the Communist Party’s Popular Front policy of “linking
groups which shared a strong consciousness of oppression, but possessed vastly different
425
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histories, cultures, and economic profiles.”427 As the AWPRA expressed this position, “The
union recognizes that it is not enough to seek united action on the economic front alone, but that
the same must be done in the cultural, political and social life of its members.” AWPRA fought
racism, which it viewed as central to the ongoing relief structure. Part of AWPRA’s strategy,
which shared office space with the Harlem Labor Committee and Frank Crosswaith’s ILGWU,
was to build consciousness among workers in segregated district offices, where there was “no
question of Negro discrimination in my precinct because ‘there are no Negroes,’ ” as William
Gaulden, the union’s Vice President, stated at its convention, in January 1936. It further
explained its tactics in a pamphlet, “were it not for the union’s consciousness, driving power and
initiative on the specific issues already mentioned, a community movement would not have been
built up.”428 AWPRA built community support in Harlem, which had the highest rates of
unemployment in the city, by tapping into long-standing religious and civic organizations. The
effectiveness of relief bureau agitations in 1932 and 1933, Hitler’s rise to power, and the Italian
invasion of Ethiopia, boosted Communists’ antifascist image in Harlem, even if official
membership in the party continued to be slow. Further, the “Harlem Riot” of 1935 was critical in
AWPRA’s ability to make connections with the rest of the Harlem community. The Communist
Party helped to turn the official commission investigating it, in part, into a critique of the entire
relief program, especially its racial discrimination, and an expression of the structural origins of
the uprising.429 This was the reason the final official report could conclude that, “the generally
low economic status of Negro workers is, of course, due fundamentally to the operation of our
competitive capitalistic system.” The Amsterdam News, claiming that Mayor LaGuardia tried to
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suppress the full report, including the chapter in which this quote appears, published it in its
entirety in the summer of 1936.430
Oswald Knauth, a relief head, advised staff not to participate in the mayor’s investigation,
and the city worked to counter AWPRA’s influence through a company union, the Five Boro
Civic League.431 Edward Corsi, who replaced Stanley Howe as Hodson’s First Deputy and
Director of Home Relief, after Howe became the Mayor’s Executive Secretary, testified at the
hearings that there was no discrimination on relief, and was challenged by Bernard Riback,
Executive Secretary of AWPRA, and others.432 Corsi received direct communications from the
investigative committee, including a memorandum written by Dr. Charles H. Roberts, Chairman,
and A. Philip Randolph, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Relief, recommending the dismissal
of Victor Suarez, Administrator of Home Relief Bureau 26, in Harlem. Suarez, acknowledging
his methods of increasing the rate of rejection for relief in Harlem, which he thought were below
the rates in other district offices, had said, “I wish no deserving family to suffer hunger. However,
your closings [of cases in the precinct by its investigators] are under the average of other
precincts throughout the city. Not even in jest should a prize be offered for such closings, but if
$5.00 were offered, we might be surprised at the result.”433 The united front growing out of these
politics created inertia to protest discrimination on the WPA, opening that fall. AWPRA was
instrumental in initiating the Joint Conference, which consulted for the Mayor’s commission that
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researched the causes for the uprising and which was followed by the All-People’s Party. It
subsequently affiliated to the National Negro Congress, in February 1936.434
These protracted contestations were obstacles in the city’s efforts to stabilize the relief
program, in which race helped adjudicate who got limited relief jobs and funds, and who did
not.435 The primary focus of the city’s official investigation of relief was to ensure that relief was
efficient, which meant withholding aid from those not deemed needy, or nearly three-quarters of
all applicants. Relief was therefore entirely structured as surveillance, a practice justified in order
to “protect the taxpayer.”436 First encounters with the system were meant to weed people out who
were poor, but not poor enough. Typically, only 27% of those applying for relief citywide
actually received it, and once approved, there was ongoing investigation into family relationships
and budgets for continued support.437 Many of the people doing this crucial policing work were
on relief themselves. As the City’s Department of Investigation put it, “The investigator is the
key to efficient administration of relief and the most important cog in its machinery. He
represents the chief safeguard against the receipt of relief funds by those who are ineligible.”438
So important was the role of the investigator that when Jack Bigel, an investigator in
Home Relief Bureau District Office 62, admitted to co-worker Vincent Marcellino, Property
Manager, that he organized his caseload into the Unemployed Council, he was immediately
reported and an investigation was conducted by the Department of Welfare. A full report was
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given directly to Hodson.439 This incident, and the resulting events, demonstrate the
contradictions faced by fledgling organizing efforts of the staff at this Brooklyn office. The
newsletter of the AWPRA-affiliated Lodge 1064-AFGE, the Beacon, “Issued by Communist
Party, D.O. 62” saw themselves “engaged in work which proves to us more clearly than most
other young people the widespread misery and unemployment which prevails to-day.” They
wrote that they were “constantly harassed with dismissals and speed-up” as they tried to do their
jobs.440 The rank and file of the AFGE, then part of the AFL, pushed its conservative leadership
to adopt more radical tactics as its ranks swelled with younger members employed with the
opening of New Deal agencies.441 In the midst of organizing to fight layoffs in the E.R.B. at the
end of 1935 and the beginning of 1936, this local had formulated a dual “program of our union”
that included demands for staff as well as clients. This was why Bigel had tried to forge
solidarity with those on his caseload. At the same time, these semi-permanent, but ultimately
temporary workers were fighting to keep jobs with the Emergency Relief Bureau as the
administration downsized it in order to save costs and to merge it permanently into the
Department of Public Welfare. The workers’ end goal was to maintain their employment in a
permanent budget. In his effort to “BUILD THE AFGE TO 100% MEMBERSHIP,” Bigel had
reached out to Marcellino, who was also taking action to preserve his job amidst severe cuts, and
who appealed to the administrators of relief and reported Bigel. Marcellino even requested a
meeting directly with Hodson, but it is not evident whether they met or not. Bigel’s interrelated
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mistakes, according to the thrust of the report, were explicitly forging a unity of struggle between
relief workers and those receiving home relief and his affiliation to a Communist organization.
As documents collected in the administration’s surveillance of the union’s activities
demonstrate, the “Men’s Service Division #4” was the first to suffer the job cuts. The Division
was obsolete when men on home relief were put to work on WPA programs. Part of the logic of
downsizing was to remove single, unattached men from the home relief rolls, and to transfer
them to work relief, paid for by the federal and state governments, rather than by the city. These
men would pull entire families off relief through their jobs as breadwinners. They were also the
ones usually framed as communists, those putting stress on the expenses of home relief rolls.
Camp LaGuardia and other camps were going to be the dragnet for these, now homeless, men.
Investigators, in similar logic, were laid off as a part of this process, their jobs no longer needed
as people were transferred from home relief to work relief. This was one of the reasons that relief
workers struggled to get out of “the field” and into the more senior, stable office positions.
Organizing in the home relief bureaus made these layoffs difficult. While at D.O. 62 the
elimination of “Men’s Service Division #4” went smoothly, the subsequent firing of Alice
Bierman, the Division’s bookkeeper, did not. She claimed that the mass firing of relief workers
was a pretext for her dismissal because she was a member of AWPRA. Her defense by AWPRA
rested on discrimination, which at this home relief bureau meant discrimination against Jewish
workers, who were laid off earlier and in greater proportion than Christian workers. The union
therefore urged “unity of the Christian and Jewish workers in their stand against the vicious
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policies of the Administration. Do not permit Ms. McNamara [the Office Administrator] to
divide us.”442
AWPRA efforts had a real impact on Relief Bureau policy, and early actions against
workplace discrimination and in the disbursal of relief blossomed into the capacity for more
organized politics. Various community actions, including sit-ins, demonstrations, and pickets,
ultimately brought success in winning more employment for black workers in the department.
Naison reports that, “In December, 1934, relief officials promoted several blacks to supervisory
positions in the 124th Street bureau, and in subsequent months, they appointed so many black
investigators that by the summer of 1935, relief workers constituted the largest group of black
professionals on the payroll.”443 Another spontaneous riot in March 1934, just months before
Camp LaGuardia opened, brought an estimated 5,000 participants. A boycott of the Empire
Cafeteria on 125th and Lennox, targeted for its discrimination in hiring counterpeople, was
supported by predominantly white home-relief bureau employees, who had been frequent patrons
there.444 These organized politics were not only threatening to the relief project as a whole, but to
its aftermath, as the union publically built support for permanent civil service status for relief
workers, against the open competitive examination format, a process they tried to expose as
racist.445 They were also part of a larger struggle then building, according to an article in the New
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Masses. The author argued that revolt in Harlem, beginning with the 1935 uprising, was also the
beginning of class struggle “without make-up.” While race had been highly visible to make class
invisible, “Harlem has a new sense of its position and importance. Frightened officials have
already let up on discrimination in relief agencies.”446
Thus, in contrast to the administration’s blanket denunciation and caricature of
“Communist agitators,” the Communist Party was going through a period of intense change and
institutional development throughout the Depression as it engaged social and economic crisis. In
agitating in Harlem in many forms, both the employed and the unemployed either embraced or
rejected specific campaigns led by Communists or where Communists were participants. From
this perspective, Camp LaGuardia was successful, because it defused much of the anticipated
and real political activity then taking hold as a result of the despair and uncertainty of the Great
Depression. This specific aspect of its rehabilitation plan had a distinctive effect on camp life,
which was transfigured according to longstanding methods adapted to camp life for the purposes
of stabilizing the state’s relief program.
“A normal and vital feature of American life”
The minstrel show, “a great American tradition,”447 was a crucial dynamic in the camp’s
reliance on a national socialism that emerged out of the material conditions under which it was
created, and which it sought to address. In the camp, we see how “Fascism represents the
triumph of the … preventive counter-revolution to the socialist transformation of society.”448
One issue of the camp’s official newspaper posited three fascist examples as model social
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movements: “One of our Irish patriots, who evidently has been reading the newspapers quite a
bit, wants to form a movement of ‘Green Shirts.’ He says, ‘They have ‘Black Shirts,’ ‘Khaki
Shirts,’ and ‘Silver Shirts’…so why not ‘Green Shirts[?]’”449 What does it mean that a successful
minstrel show was produced within the state’s relief machinery? Why did minstrel performances
resonate at particular moments of institution-building at the camp and place-making in the region?
How did an antebellum cultural form reappear in the institutionalized local relief efforts of the
1930s New Deal in New York? Why did this form resonate with the men who were working,
creating, living, and interacting within the institution? The performers at the camp did not merely
replicate acts that had been developed on the Bowery; they transformed the genre to address
contradictions and experiences that took hold given the camp’s particular position in the relief
effort and the dislocations that brought the men to upstate New York. The show was therefore an
expression of the fraught consciousness stemming from multiple and overlapping uncertainties:
first, of the uncertainty of unemployment, followed by the uncertainty of available relief, the
politics of which were already circumscribed by the structure of the institution itself and its
intrinsic geography. Class struggle was voiced and tempered by race.450 It is a reflection of the
response of workers to the state, which exploited their misgivings regarding relief as it
“organized scarcity not plenty.”451
There were two major “moments” of intensive camp consolidation during the 1930s, and
at both moments minstrelsy played a prominent, cohesive role. First, as the camp was getting off
the ground, and later, during the World’s Fair, when it expanded dramatically as a “catch all” for
recurring WPA reductions of work relief in New York. These moments, during which full
449
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control of the camp was located locally, in New York City’s relief administration, loosely
correspond to its efforts to depoliticize relief against Communist agitation, and its efforts to
institutionalize a long-term program for the management of homelessness. A “white workingclass structure of feeling,”452 indicated ultimately by the appearance of a minstrel troupe that was
repeatedly held up as a form of leisure and cohesion for the laborers, was central in securing the
existence and purpose of the camp under changing circumstances. Edwin Cunningham, the
Camp’s director, wrote in the “progressive…publication” that was Camp LaGuardia News and
its propaganda arm, of the “family” being developed in this “homelike” institution, “You have
made Camp LaGuardia a working reality...you have found yourself.”453 This is a far cry from
late 1934, when Claude McKay could describe such a dire situation there: “They are prisoners.
They hate each other.”
Historically, the minstrel show was always an expression of the complexity of white
working-class racial consciousness amid social and economic crisis. Eric Lott summarizes that
the minstrel genre, a northern invention that “mediated political conflicts,” was a “bulwark
against insurrection” and embodied contradiction in its pre-Civil War heyday. It “[captured] an
antebellum structure of racial feeling” and was a “historically new articulation of racial
difference.” 454 All male, white bohemian cultures often formed the basis for the dialectic of
“love and theft” which activated “white men’s appropriations of ‘black’ maleness.” Lott argues
that it “continually transgressed the color line even as it made possible the formation of a self-
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consciously white working class.”455 These “performance[s] of the superlatives of whiteness”
apply to many of the cohesive functions of the camp in the mid to late 1930s, whose primary
function as a “counterfeit of black culture” was “to suppress class antagonisms by stressing
degrading representations of blacks.”456 That is, according to Robinson, minstrelsy, rather than
revealing an emergent structure of feeling, represents the projection of a fabricated history to
make sense out of emerging social relations. It fostered nostalgia for a counterfeit past that never
existed.
The “home talent”457 of Camp LaGuardia’s theatrical club gave group expression to the
lived contradictions of camp life by staging them on a regular basis for the benefit of both camp
residents as well as residents of the surrounding region. While there was considerable turnover
among unskilled laborers at the camp, it is telling that the in-house theater personnel was longstanding, and performed year after year. Musicians and actors in the theater program were not
just performers. They maintained primary duties as laborers, and often had the most seniority in
the camp. Long-time performer John J. Sullivan, the head porter, was one of the original camp
members, and lived there for over five years.458 Four others—Joseph Fitzsimmons, John Marion,
Melbourne Brown, and Thomas M. Ryan—were also camp residents for at least five years, from
1935 to 1940.459
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The minstrel show was a local phenomenon that started before federal association with
the project, and returned after it ended. The Federal Theater Project made it possible for
“Congress to act openly and directly as a producer of culture.”460 The project was closely
coordinated by the director and regional directors who “decided on plays and policies every four
months.” On May 1, 1934 the NYC Department of Public Welfare took over the drama
department of the early Federal Theater Project, until the WPA took over in 1935.461 Although
the CWA supported the camp theater program,462 minstrel shows were not a part of New York
City’s Federal Theater Project; it appears to have been exceptional at Camp LaGuardia.463 Many
of the Theater Project’s plays were pre-scripted, and not designed from scratch like they were at
the camp. There is no evidence that these performances were coordinated by camp administrators.
However, the performers who put them together may have taken their cue from the mayor,
demonstrating the political power that this theatrical genre still held in the 1930s. Mayor
LaGuardia, who appeared in a minstrel show at the New York Elks Lodge, in which “Exalted
Ruler” Ferdinand Pecora, celebrated populist, Supreme Court Justice, and prosecutor of Wall
Street excess, performed in blackface with the chief city magistrate. Though LaGuardia and
former Governor Al Smith, performing together, ultimately “spurned the blackface stuff,”
apparently it was their original intent to do so, according to the original announcement.464
The origins of minstrelsy coincide with “the invention of, and the inventor of, a white
identity which was bonding foreign (principally Irish and German) and ‘native’ urban
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workers.”465 While in its heyday “minstrelsy was its own imperium” [which] “in popular culture
held absolute domain over blackness and the imagery of blackness,” its origins preceded mass,
popular culture.466 In particular, Irish immigrants drew on this type of performance; as a result of
their position as unskilled laborers, the Irish were seen as a distinct racial group, even used as
disposable labor in the South where black slaves were viewed as more valuable. Minstrelsy had
its origins in northern “labor camps of slaves, free Blacks, and Irish immigrants associated with
canal building...the nation's most significant examples of capital-intensive public works.”467
These temporary and dislocated laborers lived in shanty towns and work camps along the canal
routes, and “staged their imitations of Blacks for entertainment. Generally illiterate, their métier
was recital and impersonation.”468 “Whiteness,” in Robinson’s understanding, a social formation
without ethnic or class boundaries, was consolidated out of the forged and counterfeited idea of
“blackness,” which was the result of the presumed and attempted erasure of African histories and
their identity with slavery.469 By extension, “blackface, as a masquerade for public revelries,
ribald stage antics, or even city mobs, appropriated the class, racial, and ethnic ambiguities of
blackness.” The “stump speech,” for example, was white appropriation of black performers
already parodying whites. In similar fashion, northern minstrel stage professionals composed
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“Dixie,” which became the “de facto Confederate anthem.”470 Later minstrel songs depicted
blacks as drunks and vagabonds.471
Irish immigrants were dominant at the camp, in both numbers and in representation by
the newspaper. Over 20% of the inmates were Irish immigrants, exclusive of men of Irish
families born in the United States, according to the Department of Welfare’s reporting.472 The
newspaper wrote of the “Irish race,” and, in particular, the Irish property-holding class’s
contributions to the historical development of Orange County, specifically to counter the “Anglo
Saxon” hegemonic hold over this history. “Irish blood brain and brawn [sic.] have been a
valuable asset in the building of America,” and in particular the “vicinity of Albany and Catskill.”
The paper consciously tried to impart a claim to “original” colonization of the land in this area,
to make Irish settlement there compatible with colonial history, and to give the men a historical
justification for their attachment to the land. “Among these hardy pioneers were many of a
fighting nature who held the marauding Indians in check and repelled the advances of the French
while his more peaceful brothers followed the pursuits of tilling and building,” before they
“migrated Westward and played a leading part in the settling and development of the country in
its early day.” These were some of the “pioneers” that “blazed a trail of civilization through that
section [and] rolled back the Redman.”473 The piece also mentioned the Erie Canal, in terms of
its infrastructural and geographical innovation, rather than in terms of the conditions and social
relations of its laborers. When a camp member returned to the camp, he recounted his
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experiences with outside employment, another layoff, and his readmittance to the camp, in a
piece he titled “Return of a Native.”474
McKay overstated when he wrote that “the Captain and ninety percent of the crew here
are Irish.” Yet he was correct that in the first sixteen months of the camp's existence, under 4%
of those admitted were considered to be non-white. This contrasts similar camps in the state,
such as the CWA Camp at Bear Mountain, also in Orange County and twelve miles down the
road, which was 60% “Negro.” The men at Bear Mountain were required to commute by ferry
and train from New York City every day to get to the work camp, and to pay for their own
transportation, which amounted to almost a dollar a day, from meager wages. “Many…get up at
3:30 a.m. and don’t get home before nine at night.”475 They were docked for lateness or absence,
both of which occurred more frequently given this precarious commute. In contrast, at Camp
LaGuardia the men had accommodation, albeit in former cells, or later, in barracks-style annexes.
Hodson was fully aware of the camps at Bear Mountain, having written in March 1933, that it
was a site where he was sending hundreds of men from the Municipal Lodging House, one of
“two experiments with camps which have been quite successful,” and that should be the model
on which Roosevelt should coordinate federal with local relief.476
The Bear Mountain work camps were a continual source of political agitation for better
conditions, work schedules, and increased pay, and against deductions for the commute. These
workers were the first to strike under the Civil Works Administration, in winter 1933, as they
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boarded trains in Weehawken on the way to the work sites.477 Bear Mountain was the also the
site of numerous labor actions against the WPA. Between 5,000 and 6,000 men began working
there beginning in September 1935.478 The following month, workers went on strike to protest
pay differentials between men living in the city and men living upstate, who received lower
wages, even though they worked the same jobs. Wage levels were evened two weeks later.479
When men protested that they had to commute so far to work the site, they were kicked off relief
rolls. Credit for travel time was denied in November.480
Camp LaGuardia was, by design, an overwhelmingly white institution. 97% of the men
who lived there in 1937 were white.481 This fact paralleled the federal government’s policy for
the main work relief effort of the New Deal. The Civilian Conservation Corps camps, according
to military procedure of the day, were segregated nationwide.482 Racial politics within the CCC
were evident in New York State in the early 1930’s. Hodson was then Executive Director of the
Welfare Council, which had brought the industrial work camp model into existence at Blauvelt,
in 1931, and then at Greycourt, the twin camps that provided the institutional prototypes for the
CCC. He surely would have been aware of the “rebellion” of black workers at a camp in Preston,
New York in the summer of 1933. The camp at Preston was one of a group of segregated camps
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for Black workers located in Central New York State. But when the camp director promoted
white recruits to higher paying positions over black workers with more seniority, protests by
these workers over discrimination sparked their dismissal, and subsequent outrage drew attention
to the “forced labor” camps in general. The white workers were transferred to “an all white
camp…a wise and precautionary move on the part of [General Roberts.]” The protesters were
sent back to Harlem.483
Even if professional minstrelsy was in decline throughout the 1920s,484 its effects were
long lasting, as it migrated to other forms of commodified entertainment, especially Hollywood
films, but also radio, toys, and World’s Fair souvenirs.485 Commercial theater, already in decline
before the Depression, was one of the earliest industries to suffer from depressed conditions,
throwing many actors out of work as it contracted. Movie theaters, which provided a cheaper
alternative to stage performances, opened up viewership to wider audiences. Radio programs,
such as Amos ‘n Andy, similarly gained wide popularity. Unemployment in the theater industry
was widespread, especially among black workers, writers, and performers. Exacerbating this
situation, whites performing in blackface often took the few roles available to black actors.486
Thus, while minstrelsy was a product of the 19th century, its changing power continued to
evolve and grow, even if increasingly and consciously resisted, all the way up to the current
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day.487 It is unclear whether the performers at Camp LaGuardia were formerly stage
professionals displaced by its decline, but they were amateurs in the sense that they did not
receive remuneration from the camp. This makes all the more striking their efforts amid a group
of white and immigrant men living in an institution specifically designed with the goal of their
ideological reformation.
Alice Childress characterizes the minstrel show as hypnotic. It expressed a feeling in
which coercion and consent were not exclusive, but rather coexisted. The form masked cultural
difference while calling attention to difference as universal. At the same time it masked class
similarity while inventing a counterfeit of racial difference.488 This is why Lott describes
minstrelsy’s potency in the “mediation of northern class, racial, and ethnic conflict-all largely
grounded in a problematic of masculinity.”489 At Camp LaGuardia, this translated into a program
that could build group cohesion for the speed up of work as a grounds for working-class
masculinity. The newspaper chided, ambiguously, even likening camp labor to a “performance,”
“If that certain party feels he had contributed so much to the camp that he is compelled to seek
solitude and quiet in the camp hospital after each performance, Mussolini will get a nasty letter
that one of his subjects is goldbricking.”490
The official newspaper at Camp LaGuardia was highly suggestive in its impression of a
structure of feeling as it adopted aspects of the genre, which contributing writers reproduced in
turn. For example, one camp member’s letter to the editor after he had left for private
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employment described the importance of working the land toward the creation of a “new man,”
as well as his identification of Irish and Black workers. In this context, rural labor, often
erroneously identified only with black migrants from the South,491 created an identity of labor
that white camp workers simultaneously submitted to, yet repudiated.
I saw the new man in the making. But I cannot think of him, nor did I
ever see him as typical of any race. The predominating group were Irish,
of course – and may God bless ‘em – but after days of hard work in the
black dirt under the torrid skies, it would take an eye better than an Army
20/20 to tell which was which.492

His use of the term “race” to describe the various ethnicities that made up the camp’s population
was common at the time. But the claim that the program was for men of “any race” is
conspicuous, given the virtual absence of black men there. In its first sixteen months of operation,
less than 4% of enrollees were classified as other than white. By 1940, this number had declined
to less than 2%. At the same time, there was an increasing number of immigrants living there. In
August 1935, 61% of the camp’s residents were born in the US. By the 1940 census, 64% were
immigrants.493 Elsewhere, as the men prepared cotton stuffing for mattresses, they described the
“cinch” of the “cotton picking” job, “the old southern trade [they had] down to a science.”494
Traditional content for minstrel skits sometimes translated directly onto the newspaper’s
written page. For example, “Rastus,” the name often given to one of the endmen, was frequently
the vehicle for humor in “Laff it Off” sections of the paper. Familial deficiency or confused
syntax accounted for the punch line of jokes, inflected with exaggerated dialect. The paper
491

Hicks, Talk with You Like a Woman: African American Women, Justice, and Reform in New York, 1890-1935, 48.
John Lyle, “Letter to Editor,” Camp LaGuardia News, July 1935, 36.
493
“Routine Changes Made since August 9, 1935”; Department of Commerce-Bureau of the Census, “Population
Schedule, Enumeration District 36-5.” Ella Howard seems to mischaracterize who lived at Camp LaGuardia in its
early months when she writes that “approximately 70 percent of participants were city natives.” Howard, Homeless:
Poverty and Place in Urban America, 70. According to the Welfare Department’s report for the time period between
the camp’s opening in May 1934 through the end of August 1935, 35% of the camp’s residents were natives of New
York City.
494
“Construction Division,” February 1937, 14.
167
492

frequently singled out Chester Morris and “Goatee” Green, two of the few black men to live at
the camp long-term, as the butt of jokes and depicted in caricature.495 The newspaper reported a
fake story of Green describing his coming to the camp, in falsified dialect, as a mistake, after
which he decided to “jest stay a while at Greycote.”496 In a story “vouched for by the Editors of
Readers Digest,” Akuko Subash “an Indian native, who lost his job while sleeping on duty”
wrote to the colonial “District Officer” of “Abookuta” to ask for his job back. This fabricated
letter drew on the exoticized geographical imaginings of colonialism and the invented officer’s
inflated neologisms as the basis for humor.497
The newspaper’s explicit intent was to unify its readers, whether residents of the camp or
not. It masked and instructed with humor, and its content was sexualized and gendered. In an allmale camp, which understood residents’ deficiency as failing to be male breadwinners for
families, jokes about “feminine” men and the recuperative power of dominating women were
marshalled to assemble and expand morale. Another camp resident that the newspaper singled
out for caricature was Eddie Lavezzo, “ex-adagio and fan dancer, Greenwich Village and
Rittenhouse Square,” who came to Greycourt because “I love flowers…I think daffodils are
divine, don’t you? I love nature in May and I love to dance in the open and I love, oh I just love
everything, don’t you? Whoops!” At cards, the men played “with four queens to the deck, except
when Lavezzo is in the game.”498 The paper’s invented geographies paralleled the exoticization
of African tribes and the North’s invented understanding of the Southern plantation, staples of
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the genre, to expand a sense of nostalgia for “better times.” In general, the paper made
caricatures of racialized relationships, and was itself structured in the minstrel genre. Newspaper
writing, like the theatrical club, was a recreational activity. The writers and editors held jobs as
farm, kitchen, or construction laborers by day. It was a form of pop-culture rather than a way for
the writers to assert control through propaganda. Minstrelsy resonated with the camp’s members
and a long-standing working class cultural institution of the Bowery became an especially
cohesive aspect of the camp’s routine. Although Claude McKay was sent there explicitly to work
on its paper, it is no surprise that he vigorously declined.
The nationalism and anti-Communism of Camp LaGuardia easily transformed into an
orotund nativism at the same time that the camp was regularly preparing white immigrants for
citizenship.499 The Camp LaGuardia News sometimes referenced actual political events in
caricature. One issue retailed the story that, “Bill Morris stopped us the other day and asked if we
had heard the latest Harlem song craze. When we told him we didn’t he said it was ‘I Love
Salassie.’”500 A May 1936 issue included the racist “Oriental Row,” which ridiculed the Chinese
Hand Laundry Alliance, then organizing against the nativist attack by non-Chinese laundries,
supported by the Board of Aldermen, against Chinese laundries. Describing the “riot” of the
Alliance’s members “to elect new officers,” the paper wrote, “Three hours of sing—song
argument between opposing factions reached a climax amid a chorus of Bronx ejaculations, and
shrieks of ‘Communists! Radicals! Reds!’” In the period of restricted immigration following the
1924 Immigration Act, which continued the exclusion of Chinese immigrants, the Welfare
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Department reinforced a racialized nationalism as a crucial aspect of this program. After its
initial declaration, the Hand Laundry Alliance membership soared to over 3,000 as it challenged
these types of nativist attacks as well as the “power structure of New York Chinatown.”501
The content of the theater program supported these functions. The importance of “the
land” in the rehabilitation of camp inmates was dramatized by its theater club, under the
direction of Guy F. Bragdon, who was possibly a former director from the Bowery. The “camp
written and directed show,” which was the “climax” of first anniversary celebrations, was called
“Dirt Diggers of 1935,” a spoof that parodied the class pretentions of the film “Gold Diggers of
1935,” popular that year.502 It built on the previous effort the month before, the “Gala Premier”
of “The Greycourt Minstrels” by Bragdon in collaboration with Jack Shelley, which was “A
Greycourt Presentation,” with a fifty-member cast and “28 big numbers.”503 The Mayor of
Boston, witness to a performance of “Dirt Diggers,” was convinced that Boston needed a similar
institution, and the show toured other Orange County institutions, including New York State
Warwick Training School, the New York City Reformatory at New Hampton, and Camp
Roosevelt.504 The newspaper advertised, “The show has a cast of more than thirty embryo, citybred farmers and packs about as many laughs as were ever squeezed into an amateur
endeavor.”505 It was followed by the “ ‘LaGuardia Follies,’ another outstanding home talent play,”
in August, and then a “prison play,” in 1936, in which camp actors played guards as well as
501
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prisoners. The reviewer “had a number of misgivings about a show of this type being staged
here,” but concluded that the “home talent” gave a performance that “was equal, if not superior,
to some of the old CWA shows that were given here, presumably by experienced actors.”506
The following month the newspaper reviewed another performance by the Theatrical
Club, led by a new director.
In the recent Minstrel Show, the band did much to add to the enthusiasm
of the stage performers; so much in fact that they [were] invited to
present the show at Hampton Farms, where they were accorded an
enthusiastic reception at the hands of a critical audience. As was
promised by the Theatrical Club Director, Rupert H. Clarke, the recent
show was not a minstrel show though it was called such. This had us
puzzled until we saw the performance then we understood, as it was truly
unlike any such show we had ever seen.507

While it is unclear what innovations this minstrel show introduced, what is certain is that it, too,
was adjusted to the real conditions at the camp, rather than just a reproduction of previously
composed acts. More importantly, this show anchored the camp’s recreational programming and
sedimented its position in the area. First, it built relationships among the city’s far-flung
institutions. The city’s nearby reformatory, “Hampton Farms,” which hosted it, came to do a
performance in return. They received “special permission” from the Commissioner of
Corrections, because it was “the first outside performace they have ever given.” The theatrical
club’s “six piece orchestra”508 played weekly at nearby Greenwood Lake. The “camp thespians
were invited to perform over Radio Station WGNY, Chester in their amateur hour” and “carried
off the first prize of $10.00.” This was followed by first place finishes in other contests, over the
radio and in Middletown, leading to their booking on the station “and a three night vaudeville
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engagement in Middletown.”509 These relationships were continually reinforced and refreshed.
“Plans are going forward to secure further outside engagements for the thespians [sic.] minstrel
show.” Second, the show was the basis for social events that were both prestigious and rare in
the austere context of relief and depression. A party for the theatrical club in Spring 1936 at the
“Four Deuces,” a restaurant on Highway 17, was “its first … of the year,” featuring “an excellent
dinner served by two attractive young ladies,” and ending well past the camp’s normal curfew of
10:30, at “about 3:00A.M.”510 These were some of the few regular times that men were
encouraged to leave the campus, since most recreational activities were designed specifically to
“induce [the men] to remain on the camp grounds.”511 The dramatic club had celebrated “the
successful completion of another show” at the “Buck’s Lodge” the previous year. When “Mr.
Clarke suggested that the club get together once a month for such an evening…a vote was taken
on this bright scheme [and] no dissenters were found.” Finally, the program was a lynchpin that
held together a number of recreational activities at the camp. At the gala, “Martinkus spoke of
the close connection between the Theatrical Club and the Camp Baseball Team, Mr. Clarke
being director of both of these enterprises.” Clarke was also the “guest of honor” at the dramatic
club’s end of the year dinner, held by Guy Bragdon, the director of the club.512 The club’s
activities were reported in the “Social Services” section of the paper, demonstrating its
programmatic centrality. More space was dedicated to describe the theater club in this section
than any other activity.513
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The minstrel show, long-standing Bowery institution, evoked particular geographies.
According to Lott, while it once had broached unity between the North and the South in the
antebellum period, as the Civil War approached, it increasingly expressed geographical division,
as it “faced west [to become] a major national signifier of western migration.”514 Camp
LaGuardia’s minstrel show had a geographic component as well. It was part of a policy seeking
to appease local anxieties about a transient camp nearby, a process that was ongoing. From the
beginning the camp’s situation in Orange County was problematic from a local perspective. In
1937 the town of Chester hired its first police as a direct result of the unease felt by the
community over the camp’s opening. The official report said, “Relations with the surrounding
communities have presented a difficult problem to the camp administration,” which was why
“ ‘The LaGuardia Theatrical Club’ often performs in town halls of the neighboring communities
and also invites the townspeople to attend the performances at the camp.”515 The newspaper’s
use of a masculinized mythology of colonialism infused its revisionist camp history and buffered
these relationships. Additionally, nostalgia tempered displacement and saturated camp ideology.
Performances played with gender, as in “Cuddling Cuties [by] John Sullivan and Edward
Lavezzo,” geographic displacement, the “10th Avenue Farmer,” and nostalgia in “Two Breaths
from the Ould Sod.”516
Commissioner of Welfare William Hodson linked relief and production through his
understanding of nationalism. As he explained on a radio program titled “Battle of Production”
in July 1941, “America is like a great giant of unlimited power who does not know his strength,
and has not yet focused that power through complete coordination of brain and muscle. A giant
514
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who has not yet been able to concentrate his full emotional as well as physical strength to the
task at hand.”517 In this explanation, given just weeks after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, he
combined his view of the function of an industrial reserve army with the permanent need for
public assistance to continually mobilize it as a productive force, so that “goods may be
consumed in ever-increasing quantity” by “reducing idleness.” While relief was meant to restore
peoples’ “purchasing power” when the “social and industrial mechanism gets jammed,”518 the
“emotional” preparedness of workers rested on their clear vision of this “task at hand.” Thus, his
intensive crack-down on “chiseling,” panhandling, and “charity racketeering” were necessary to
awaken this great giant.519 As Camp LaGuardia News put it, “All chiselers are not sculptors.”520
He envisioned the camp’s dormant raw materials of land and labor to be assembled to achieve
this “coordination of brain and muscle.” (See also the “Black Dirt” section in the following
chapter.)
At about the same time that the Camp LaGuardia minstrels had their widest coverage in a
piece by “[New York] World-Telegram feature writer,” Earl Sparling, the newspaper ran a story
containing an interview with Stanley Howe. He described the Communist strategy as a
coordinated effort by single men to overload the relief effort in order to destabilize the state.
“Chiseling” was an attack on the U.S. government by communist organizations. “Members of
these organizations,” were, in particular, misled single (immigrant) men, who needed tutoring in
the ways of nationalism and hard work, precisely the program on offer at Camp LaGuardia. He
had thus instituted a “new intake system” at relief access points below 14th Street that deterred
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single men from applying from home relief. According to Howe, this had caused the “migration”
of communists to points north of 14th Street, and he planned to implement this strategy citywide
to close the loophole. Howe justified his actions, which, the paper concurred, would cut down on
costs with the stricter application process.
It has been obvious for some time that there has been an organized raid
on the relief rolls by communist organizations. Under the tenet that the
end justifies the means, members of these organizations have been urged
to perjure themselves in relief applications to make the relief load so
heavy that the city, State [sic.] and federal relief administrations would
eventually break down, and with them, they hope, the whole government
structure.521

Reformers have periodically interpreted homelessness through a nationalist lens to gather
political support for its amelioration, and, drawing on frontier mythology, have even understood
it in exceptionalist terms: a quintessentially American phenomenon. Frances Perkins,
Roosevelt’s Secretary of Labor, described displacement: “mobility has always been and still is a
normal and vital feature of American life.”522 Echoing the head of New York City’s Division of
Shelter Care, whose testimony was quoted in this chapter’s introduction, Nels Anderson
expressed this thesis in even more detail.
Hobos have a romantic place in our history. From the beginning they
have been numbered among the pioneers. They have played an important
rôle in reclaiming the desert and in subduing the trackless forests. They
have contributed more to the open, frank, and adventurous spirit of the
Old West than we are always willing to admit. They are, as it were,
belated frontiersman. Their presence in the migrant group has been the
chief factor in making the American vagabond class different from that
of any other country.523
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Farm colonies in general drew on this form of frontier nationalism, a policy which
institutionalized the analogous process of exporting surplus labor to overseas colonies.524 The
program of the national farm colony, which opened in Matanuska, Alaska in May 1935, achieved
resonance because the Great Depression was widely believed to have been the result of the
frontier being closed. Now largely forgotten, it was the largest project of FERA’s resettlement
program, which envisaged the colonization of Alaska before it became a U.S. state.525 The
colony was open to people “of Nordic type and fitted by living habits to adjust to the Alaska
environment.” These colonists, like the LaGuardians, were a step “above” the transients who
built the colony and did all of its most grueling manual labor. In its founding mythology, Camp
LaGuardia’s original members were always described as “pioneers” in the same way, especially
in retrospectives, even though there had been a similar institution on this site for over a decade
before they arrived.526 Camp administrators and newspaper writers drew on and appropriated a
presumed longing for “nature,” the escape from capitalist time domination that was assumed to
motivate hoboes. The move to country labor thus became “natural” for the Camp LaGuardia
“pioneers.” At the same time, longing for nature was itself “naturalized,” exploited and
simultaneously put to a specific purpose. This was part of the “dual relationship of city and
frontier” that characterized the content of minstrel shows, even as they “transcended
regionalism.”527

524

David Olusoga and Casper W. Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust: Germany’s Forgotten Genocide and the
Colonial Roots of Nazism (Faber & Faber, 2011).
525
Orlando Miller, The Frontier in Alaska and the Matanuska Colony (The University of Chicago, 2009). Alaska
Far Away describes and celebrates this historical process. Paul Hill and Joan Juster, Alaska Far Away: The New
Deal Pioneers of the Matanuska Colony (Juster Hill Productions, 2008).
526
A Veteran Greycourter, “The First Year,” Camp LaGuardia News, May 1935, 6–7.
527
Saxton, “Blackface Minstrelsy and Jacksonian Ideology,” 13 and 9.
176

With wits sharpened by city contacts, farming has come as naturally to
them and with much greater ease than if their status were reversed….and
they had first come from the farm to the city.528

The nationalist impulse, which became indisputable in the fall of 1937, also took on a
frontier aspect, an idea that had always been central to the administrators’ idea of the camp and
the identity of its residents. “Frontier hero” Johnny Appleseed was a vagabond caretaker of
working class settlers “who gave to the West apples to eat” so that “their children might have
fruit to save them from the scurvy.”529 A Thanksgiving issue of 1936 likened camp residents to
Pilgrims, who in their efforts to form “a co-operative community in which all of the people
would share in the food, drink and clothing” waged “continuing battles … with [marauding]
Indians. They had to protect their homes, wives and children from the dangers of these raids and
from roving wild beasts…How much like these Pilgrims are we here at Camp LaGuardia.”530 A
geographic structure of feeling informed this narrative because historical obstacles to westward
expansion were equated with the struggle to build up the camp.
The newspaper’s writers imagined themselves as leaving behind the problems of the city
and beginning anew in an idyllic, pastoral wilderness. “A City man Walks through Country
Lanes” by William Kirby, later the newspaper’s editor, describes how he was “consumed with
the great desire to commune with Mother Nature.” His hike takes him to higher elevations in the
countryside, where “At the top of the hill…in a southwesterly direction, [I saw] the Camp,
squatting contentedly on its perch.” He describes the walk in great detail, so that others might
take the same path. But at the same time, he ultimately negates this experience in what is
528
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supposed to be the humorous culmination of the piece, “NOW DON’T GET ME WRONG! The
hike is really delightful, interesting, and the scenery beautiful. It is something YOU SHOULD
NOT MISS….BUT YOU CAN TAKE THE WALK……….I’LL STAY HOME AND READ A
BOOK.531 Charles F. Carroll, a Camp LaGuardia member who wrote poetry for the newspaper,
summed up the geographical idea that was at the heart of the rehabilitation program at the camp
in his poem, “Prospective.” In the piece, the “lowlands” of the city were ugly, and the Ramapo
mountains of upstate New York were “Heaven.” The frontier geography, enabled by the state,
manifests both the idea of freedom as well as nostalgia “to be back with [his] kind.”
PROSPECTIVE.
I am weary of life in the lowlands
In the spell of the heat and the
rush,
I am longing to sit on the hilltops,
To thrill at the song of the
thrush.
I am sad when I see me like others
In the mad rush for God knows
what,
I yearn for the winds in the high
mountains,
To run from the fate of my lot.
I can’t see the people about me
When they dash thru the streets
at my side,
But to watch these from heights
should be Heaven,
To see where they slink and hide[.]
In the lowlands the life seems so
ugly,
In the mountains pure joy I’ll
find,
But perhaps when I climb to the
hilltops,
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I’ll long to be back with my
kind.532
The camp was an extraordinarily large presence, comparable in size to the rest of the
town of Chester. In 1950, 906 people lived in the town outside of the camp; 104 of the 241
households were farms.533 According to the official plan, as the camp developed, with all of its
modern infrastructures and technologies, the surrounding rural area would also develop. This
went to the geographic core of the camp’s existence. Indeed, how would men find jobs in New
York City with only one-day furlough granted for every thirty worked? Yet this was not just
ideologically important but had a direct impact on the camp’s relief function. Its end goal, fitting
its imagined function of disbursing population from the city to the country, was to find the men
jobs in local private positions. After all, a major obstacle of the Federal Transient Program in the
state was a lack of work assignments in major urban centers such as Buffalo and New York.534
Therefore, at Camp LaGuardia, “Contacts are made with local employers. Advertisements are
sometimes placed in local newspapers.”535 The camp newspaper boasted, “Positions have been
secured for a number of men with our neighboring farmers.”536 Even though fewer than half of
the men who left had gotten jobs outside,537 a positive image of the unemployed workers at the
camp was necessary to achieve this objective. Hodson took this aspect of the camp up when he
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said, “many intelligent persons talk about the folks on relief as if they were a class apart” when
they were actually a “cross section of any neighborhood, of any borough, or of the city as a
whole…doctors and skilled workers, clerks, stenographers, teachers, lawyers, doctors and
dentists.”538
Employers, the logic went, would need a positive image of workers if they were to give
them a job. The paper boasted, “it is no unusual sight to see men wandering along country roads
and comparing the crops reaped on our farm with those of our neighbors.”539 These
interpretations were attempts to substantiate the view that the camp would modernize the rural
countryside through its enhanced infrastructure and cultivation. Camp services and buildings
were often presented as the “best” or “most modern” in the county. “Camp LaGuardia boasts the
most picturesque and finest baseball, soccer and athletic field in Orange County.”540 The garage
was to be “the most outstanding building of its type in this section of the County…to
accommodate the Camp’s fleet of cars.”541 The dental office, open to residents of the town, was
“one of the best equipped and most complete in Orange County.” The root cellar, reinforced with
steel, was dynamited out of rock and compared to the ongoing construction of the subways.
Building it was “one of the most difficult jobs” at the camp, and it was “the largest and the finest
of it’s [sic.] kind in the County.”542 A Department of Welfare Fire truck, a “modern fire-engine,”
was housed there, and provided services to the area. New annexes featured radiators and
electricity, and were “modern, convenient, and comfortable to live in.” A “New and larger”
piggery was being built. Even the barbershop was “modern”! The buildings recently constructed
538
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with WPA funding, including the administration building, storehouse, garage, administration
dormitory, and “several lesser buildings,” “will add no little to the material worth of the property,
no matter what use it might be put [to] in the future.”543
Diplomacy tutored the men living at the camp as well as area residents. The News
continuously published articles on Orange County facts to acquaint campers with their
surroundings,544 social knowledge that was intentionally regional. These lessons were nearly
always published next to the “What do you know about your city?” feature. Camp LaGuardia
News even reproduced a custom map for its readers, with the title “where to walk and how to get
there” to familiarize new camp members with the surrounding area.545 Town officials, including
the judge at Middletown, wrote glowing letters of appreciation for the men at the camp.546 While
it became more prevalent later on, this specific tactic seems to have been in place from its early
days, as it consciously took part in county social events. The paper covered the crowning of the
“Queen of the Black Dirt,” awarded at “Orange County’s first Onion Harvest Festival” to “an
unmarried girl, between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five, who either now or at some time in
her life has worked in the fields---planting, weeding and harvesting.”547 Clarke, the Director,
wrote to Howe in June, 1935 that he would be reaching out to the “Orange County Fair
committee [to] discuss with him the space for the Camp LaGuardia exhibits.”548 These efforts
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strongly contrast the later days of the camp, during which race was utilized to express social
division (see final chapter.)
Later, Hodson used similar strategies to publicize the Welfare Department at the World’s
Fair, and at which Camp LaGuardia maintained a “vegetable exhibit.” He ceremoniously
presented Mayor LaGuardia with “a sample box in which was contained a variety of vegetables
grown here in Camp, along with several cans of tomatoes and beets put up in the Camp’s own
cannery” at the Mayor’s “Summer City Hall” at the World’s Fair.549 He also used theater to
explain the functions of modern welfare. In a radio play broadcast over WNYC to publicize the
relief effort during the World’s Fair, he presented a history of “the dramatic story of public
welfare in New York,” and its transformation from “punishment to security.” It documented
institutional reconfigurations that addressed those things “beyond the control of workers and
employers,” as “a country once predominantly agrarian was being rapidly transformed into the
greatest industrial nation in the world…this was progress…but…the cities were crowded with
wage earners…men who left the soil knew hunger for the first time.” In the process of evolving
into the “largest relief job in the world,” New York City ended its reliance on the “almshouse or
workhouse…a hovel that was hospital, insane asylum, and jail…all in one…(SOUND OF WHIP,
SCREAM OF PAIN.)” That institution enabled a “form of slavery,” in which workhouse labor,
“when [it] became overcrowded,” was “[farmed] out … to avaricious employers.” In contrast,
after “men who fought in America’s army were found homeless and starving,” New York State
finally initiated a method to address “the last and most feared of the [Four Horsemen of
Insecurity]…unemployment.” The piece concluded, “The heroic but makeshift measures of
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private unemployment relief had failed…and…New York City began to meet its biggest
problem—relief—with government aid…Relief to the unemployed was recognized to be a
permanent function of government.”550 The following chapter examines Camp LaGuardia’s
position in this transition. Its work program reversed geographically the traditional function
harnessing labor in a workhouse. While historically workhouses sought to integrate displaced
rural workers into urban wage labor, Camp LaGuardia intended to send displaced urban wage
laborers into employment on the city’s rural outskirts.
Conclusion
Nationalism was a way to structure the depression as an anomaly, rather than as a
periodically re-occurring crisis of reproduction. This temporal and spatial displacement, like
Cedric Robinson’s definition of the conceit of “racial regimes,” rested implicitly on “forgeries of
memory and meaning.” It was also structured to oppose communism, then making inroads
electorally in the restructuring of the Democratic Party and in terms of its Popular Front
concessions to “Americanization.” Black-white unity was often expressed as a distinctly
“Communist” politics, and the fight against it was also the fight against racial equality. As
Martin Dies, who led the “little red scare,” said in Congress’ Un-American Activities hearings in
December 1938, “racial equality forms a vital part of the Communistic teaching and
practices.”551
With federal money supporting the operation of Camp LaGuardia, its minstrel program
went on hiatus for three years. When the WPA pulled out of the camp in November, 1937, the
newspaper reported that “all former recreational activities will once more be resumed.” The
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following year it was revived in a stage performance titled “World’s Fair Auditions.”552 A fullblown minstrel show, “BIGGER AND BETTER” than previous efforts, was composed and
performed in 1939, the year of the World’s Fair. The following chapter examines these
developments next to structural changes happening in the Department of Welfare,
simultaneously to phase out emergency relief and to institutionalize a long-term program to
manage homelessness. It investigates how the stories told at Camp LaGuardia provided a
meaningful narrative for these material changes.

552

“Camp Transition,” Camp LaGuardia News, November 1937, 11; “World’s Fair Auditions,” Camp LaGuardia
News, December 1938, 4.
184

Chapter 6
Consolidating Consent, Part II: Managed Men

Figure 6.1 Flyer advertising “Old-Fashioned Minstrel Show” by the Camp LaGuardia Theatrical
Club, as a benefit performance in Washingtonville, NY553
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Camp LaGuardia News. May 1939, 41.
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Of all tools used in the shadow of the moon, men are most apt to get out
of order.554
Handling the men is probably our biggest farm job.555
From the chaotic condition existing before the establishment of the
Central Registration Bureau in 1931 and the confusion arising from the
divided responsibility of the Emergency Relief Bureau and the
Department of Public Welfare, there has finally emerged a close
approach to a fully coordinated program for administering care of the
destitute homeless.556

Introduction
This chapter continues an analysis of contradictions, stemming from material and
ideological processes, that account for why and how men were placed in state custody. Camp
LaGuardia helped to mobilize work relief, by providing jobs outside the city’s normal purview,
and then to demobilize it, by cutting down on expansive home relief rolls as the WPA “tapered
off.” The second “moment” of consolidation of Camp LaGuardia was in the late 1930s as the
“entire responsibility for the homeless was placed in one agency” with the merging of the
Emergency Relief Bureau and the Department of Public Welfare, as 1937 closed.557 The Welfare
Department was institutionalizing its provision of unemployment relief, supplementing its other
“traditional” fields of aid, such as Veterans and Old Age Assistance and Child Welfare. The
prototype to stabilize, emergency relief, was over six times larger than the previous size of
ongoing, permanent welfare.558 In September 1939, a Division of the Care of the Homeless
within the Welfare Department was established, with Ralph Astrofsky at its head, as the WPA
was downsizing by 75,000 jobs in New York City. The Division, which focused primarily on
554
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single men, included a Registration Department; the Municipal Lodging House, with its separate
annex for women; Camp LaGuardia; and a Women’s Emergency Shelter; and paid commercial
establishments to house men on a nightly basis.559 Consolidated in a context that increasingly
pulled housed men to Camp LaGuardia, the Division was part of a “fully integrated” network of
Public Welfare agencies given the merger of emergency relief with permanent Public
Assistance.560 The historical strands of development of the farm colony model, made material in
Camp LaGuardia during the political turmoil of the Great Depression, had been institutionalized;
“homelessness” was formalized by and in the state.561 Surplus labor, whether taken from prisons,
lodging houses, or the ranks of unemployed, and put to work for its “rehabilitation,” was an
integral aspect of “reform” in a new Homeless Division of the Department of Public Welfare.
As the Division consolidated, it sought to export men from lodging houses on the Bowery
to new lives in upstate New York.562 Hodson’s 1937 Annual Report for the Department of Public
Welfare, titled “Public Welfare in Transition,” drew on the geographic imagery that had
activated the Regional Plan a decade earlier. The cover depicts a suspension bridge that leads the
reader’s eye into the distant horizon. The words of the title cross the flowing water below. The
bridge in the picture is an approximation of the George Washington Bridge, distinguished by its
conspicuous rivets and square frame, which was both the symbol of and material link in the new
regional geography of New York, and over which men would need to go to get to the camp in
Orange County. The Welfare Department was apparently the bridge to a modern New York City.
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The chapter places the changes happening within the Welfare Department next to the
daily life of the camp, explicitly cultivated to incorporate its program, in order to demonstrate
Camp LaGuardia’s function in stabilizing wider institutional reform. It looks at the stories told
by the camp newspaper to gain an understanding of how the men processed their contradictory
experiences there. The focus on the World’s Fair, and performances by the Camp LaGuardia
minstrels, obscured intensive changes that were re-structuring the entire Welfare Department,
and that were the intent of William Hodson and Fiorello LaGuardia since the beginning of their
administration. While the Welfare Department intended to preserve its capacity for moving
people in its efforts to manage dislocation, it also needed to preserve a feeling of stability. To
these ends, every piece in the relief program was designed to be interchangeable, with
procedurals and manuals helping to standardize the relief process. Administrative changes in the
centralization process closed loopholes for those seeking shelter, aspects of aid that were actually
helpful for people. For example, men could no longer go directly to the Municipal Lodging
House to get shelter; they had to apply for a referral at a Lafayette Street office, and then go over
to the Lodging House. This maintained the power of management to move people and to
maintain people as moveable.
At the same time, these aspects of power were concealed. By the end of the 1930s, the
camp administration had a twofold problem. First, men saw their positions as “semi-permanent,”
making turnover too low because it prevented the churning of large groups of men. Permanancy
of the workforce played into the administration’s vision of efficiency for the camp. It also
allowed the camp to maintain a low staff to worker ratio. There were only 17 staff positions for
the camp budgeted in 1939, employees jokingly referred to as “bourgeois” since they ate in a
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separate dining room.563 All the workers reported directly to foremen, over 50 “straw bosses,”
who were camp inmates themselves, but who were paid more due to their seniority. There were
at least three grades of these higher paid foremen and Hodson was in contact with them. An
administrative memo from his Secretary in May, 1937 listed the task, “Check up on DiMartini at
Camp LaGuardia.”564 Orestes DiMartini, camp member, ran the Social Services Department. The
straw boss configuration drew on the expertise of the more experienced workers to boost the
farm’s production and run the camp’s other programmatic aspects. The second problem was that
the men on home relief recruited to labor there understandably did not want to leave their homes
to enroll in an upstate farm camp, a program that must have felt like punishment. Even though
the rehabilitation program was similar to those in workhouses and reformatories, the
administration was at pains to distinguish it from prison.565 The recommendations of the
Herlands commission were therefore that the men at the camp should be re-convinced that their
jobs were relief and not permanent. The spatial confinement (isolation) that had activated the
geographic importance of the camp was weakened, and time once again became a driver of camp
policy. The allotted time for the men’s “rehabilitation” was set at 6 months, rather than
indeterminate, with a maximum of one year. The City’s claim that it had “stabilized the
maximum stay at six months” is doubtful, but demonstrates the pressure that it placed on the men
in this regard.566 While the consolidation in the previous chapter was based on a nostalgia for a
past that never existed, the administration’s plans for a homeless infrastructure relied on a vision
of the future that never came to be.
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Figure 6.2 The cover of the New York City Department of Public Welfare’s 1937 Annual
Report567

Managed Men
Camp LaGuardia was isolated geographically from the intense political changes of
depression-era New York. Symbolically, new recruits entered the campus by crossing “Howe
Bridge,” named for the anti-communist Executive Secretary to Mayor LaGuardia who was the
main administrator in getting the camp off the ground.568 Its newspaper was central to
consolidating the administration’s program, as acknowledged by Superintendent Edwin
Cunningham in a piece in the fourth anniversary issue. “In the absence of a Central Recreation
Hall as a meeting place, I am using the medium of your magazine to address a few words to you
men.”569 The camp’s prison architecture continued to influence daily relationships there. Its
newspaper acquired a power to dictate and reinforce particular forms of social interaction. Over
567
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its eight and a half years of publication the house newspaper at Camp LaGuardia, while passing
through distinct formats, documented New York City’s institutionalized version of the farm
colony model in its most complete, concrete form. It enunciated an amusing parable that the men
lived in an extended drama. They were urban workers thrust surprisingly into a pastoral way of
life. For its writers, time slowed down, stretched over space. But, in addition to trivia, “facts and
fancies,” puzzles, comics, and jokes, one can read in its pages the intentional masking functions
of the camp as its rehabilitation program addressed the social contradictions stemming from
depressed conditions and the resulting institutional reforms. The newspaper consciously enabled
a “means of group expression,”570 and, along with its recreational activities, like the theater and
sports programs, was intended to smooth over relations with the surrounding communities.571
Given the upheavals of the depression, where both revolutionary energy and social dislocation
were exploited as well as controlled, minstrelsy resonated as “a form in which transgression and
containment coexisted.”572 Just as the minstrel acts of the 1850’s “institutionalized the social
divisions they narrated,”573 so too did the Camp LaGuardia newspaper, and eventually an actual
performing minstrel troupe, provide a flexible expression of both unity and differentiation.
The mimeographed monthly ran recurring reports that initiated incoming campers into
the cadences of camp life. It reinforced the programmatic aspects of the camp, surveilled
residents’ behavior, and generally formed the ideological narrative of the camp’s goals as they
570
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related to men’s lives there. Its message was delivered in a jocular tone that upheld a confident
and robust white masculinity, and its comedic, whimsical, and mischievous voice tempered the
psychological pain inflicted by the dislocations of the Great Depression. Early issues clearly
targeted camp readers. Running lists of jokes characterized the “Camp News” sections, and
expressed novelty of being recognized in a newspaper, and, usually, these inside jokes were too
cryptic for an outside reader to understand. “Charley Holler is recuperating from a recent
furlough. Charley, from the reports we hear had quite an excursion.”574 The intent of the program
was consistently described and reinforced in review for newcomers; the camp’s functions and
structure described in detail.
Later, as the camp’s program emerged in full form, issues had a dual audience that
included outside readers. The periodical was “sent to the neighboring schools and libraries, and
is [sometimes] used in school classrooms.”575 Camp rituals further intended to ease the men into
livelihoods within the social life of Orange County, buttressing official efforts of the staff:
“Employment is secured for camp members in the surrounding towns and cities through the
camp Social Service Department,”576 a Department Fiorello LaGuardia singled out as “very
worth while and shows what can be done and what is done in a practical way to promote the
welfare of the members of the Camp.” Overall, the Mayor congratulated the paper’s staff, and
conveyed “best wishes for the continued success of the publication.”577 Clearly, the newspaper
was crucial to camp life as well as to announcing the camp’s purpose to the extent that its
success was linked to the success of the men themselves. The integrated publicity of the camp
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placated local consciences troubled by a homeless colony in their community, which was central
to the men’s success in their “rehabilitation.”
Odes to the camp demonstrated the publication’s distinct form of coaching. “Camp La
Guardia Farm” summarizes the interacting impulses of the camp’s purposes, while also deflects
workers’ grievances by insinuating that the psychological “pain” felt in living at the camp was
due to the absence of women. The poem linked difficult work, love of the soil, the novelty of
agricultural labor, and male sexuality in a convincing mixture that was, nevertheless, delivered
with subtlety and humor.
I till the soil…..for endless hour I toil
Under a blazing hot sun…and just broil.
Yet I find farming is charming, my love for it alarming,
And that’s not passing out any banana oil!
The sows and the cows, the tractor plows,
The sowing and hoeing grip me, though I boil;
I state it’s great, but I calculate
I’m astounded, confounded and in turmoil!
It gives me pain to be profane as I complain
For the farm has charm….a sweet rustic lane,
Shady nooks, rippling brooks and shimmering waters….
The reason I’m hissing, something is missing:
Wherinell do they hide those farmers’ daughters?578

Stanly Howe, architect of the nation’s “first public agricultural colony,” described it as
“[an experiment] to bring abandoned men and abandoned land together and help them put new
life in each other.”579 The counties of Southern New York State provided an ideal place for these

578

This poem’s bland language may have been the point. It was published on page 30 of the July 1935 issue. Page
30 of the copy of the same issue, in the Welfare Department Correspondence files of Mayor LaGuardia, has a
different page 30, which contains the “LaGuardia Camp Song” with lyrics and music. Stanley Howe had written to
Clark in May that he wanted to “have an opportunity to see the final copy for your next issue before it goes to press,”
since it was the issue honoring Mayor LaGuardia and the name change of the camp. “Camp LaGuardia Farm,”
Camp LaGuardia News, July 1935, 30; “LaGuardia Camp Song,” Camp LaGuardia News, July 1935, 30, Welfare
Department Correspondence, 1935, Box 3155, Box 8, LaGuardia and Wagner Archives, LaGuardia Community
College; Stanley H. Howe to George L. Clarke, May 20, 1935, Welfare Department Correspondence, 1935, Box
3155, Box 8, LaGuardia and Wagner Archives, LaGuardia Community College.
579
“Relief Farm for Boston Urged.”
193

purposes. Characterized by a dark, mineral-rich soil, they are together widely referred to as the
“Black Dirt” area of the state.580 Historically, the region was not ideal for building because
foundations shifted easily in the excessively moist soil. While good for farming because of its
richness, mechanized agriculture was difficult as a result of the softness of the earth. A longer
planting season was possible since the dark soil heated up quickly, and therefore could be
planted earlier in the year. The season was extended even further through plantings in February
using hotbeds, which expanded in number each year.581 While a portion of the counties in the
area just west of the Hudson River had a history of radical populism, Orange County itself seems
to have been spared much of the anti-rent wars of the mid-nineteenth century, because of a wider
system of “freeholdings” as opposed to “feudal tenure,” which dominated nearby.582 These
environmental and social attributes made the area ideal for a labor-intensive work program that
was supposed to supply food for city agencies and to employ many laborers. Other attributes,
however, contributed to its difficulty. The dense soil easily caught fire and needed special
attention and expertise to make it yield produce. Sinkholes in the swampy marshland were
common, and it took much labor to clear and prepare it for cultivation.583 Nevertheless, it was the
“most valuable agricultural land in the county,” including large patches near Chester.584 The
general relief effort targeted 21,000 acres of this “muck land” for drainage.585
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Figure 6.3 The icon on the back of each issue of Camp LaGuardia News points to the ideological
importance of working the soil that the camp cultivated.

As the program developed, labor at the camp fell under three categories, “house and
maintenance” (services); “construction” (infrastructure); and “farm, cannery, piggery, and
rabbitry” (production). These accounted for 38%, 20%, and 42% of the positions at the camp, out
of approximately 1,000. While the productive jobs accounted for a plurality, an official report
advised a significant increase in production, since “the full productive possibilities of Camp
LaGuardia have not yet been realized.” Crews were led by “straw bosses,” an aspect of the
camp’s “self-sufficient” character and its cost-saving function. Straw bosses were camp members
who had seniority and acted as foremen. For this role, they received a higher pay, but were still
not considered full-time employees of the Welfare Department. The administration exploited this
hierarchy. Campers read about promotions in the recurring “Camp News” section of the paper.586
There were just nine supervisory employees at the camp in 1940.587 Without supervision from
dedicated staff members (or guards) the hierarchical structure among workers took on added
importance for achieving both consent and motivation, especially through the prospect of higher
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wages. Likewise, it was necessary that the men internalized the camp’s ideology, largely
expressed through the newspaper.
Camp LaGuardia News continually chronicled the changing personnel within the camp.
Simultaneously, its confidential and conspiratorial tone expressed an upbeat feeling meant to
lighten the grimmest aspects of the depression, and also to constantly initiate new members.
Monthly announcements told of deaths of current and former residents, and the Social Services
Department consistently reported on official visits to camp members recovering in Bellevue
Hospital. There was a separate “receiving station” of men waiting for their official camp
assignments, in which one author felt “like he has been plopped down right in the middle of
Ireland.”588 The station was colloquially called “Hogan’s Alley,” a reference to the slum that was
home to the “Yellow Kid” in the minstrel comic strip of Richard Outcault.589 Through a
description of the receiving station the newspaper documented, in July 1935, that the camp had
reached its peak census to date, and that it anticipated filling up even more in the near future.
Before the WPA constructed congregate barracks to supplement the cells of the former prison,
men waiting for entry into the program lived in tents on the grounds, reminiscent of the famous
“Hoovervilles” dotting U.S. urban landscapes in the 1930s. Men were segregated in the receiving
station until they received their official assignment and they could be assimilated to the camp’s
culture.590 The issue described the importance of the “tent city” to a growing institution.
Tent city, down by the Receiving Station, is now a thriving little hamlet,
the last two quotas of men arriving in camp having taken up each of the
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48 available bunks with a steadily growing waiting list full of applicants
assuring “full house” all this summer.591

The importance of the institution’s distinct means of socialization is found in the fact that
a separate recreation hall was planned for the receiving station in the spring of 1936, a “long
needed improvement [that] will help to segregate us from that riff raff up on yonder hill and will
further minimize the danger of contamination which we have been subject to in the past.”592 This
quip from the receiving station coordinator, in which he inverted “riff raff” to mean the men
already in the “permanent” housing of the camp, is revealing, because it demonstrates a
consciousness that goes beyond the men being unwitting dupes of the administration’s politics
and policies. This was the importance of the joke itself. Although the men can’t possibly have
believed that they were in “danger of contamination” from incoming members, they nevertheless
submitted to the program, because they had few options. Men without other resources poked fun
at the camp while simultaneously buying in to what it offered. Camp LaGuardia was one place
that actually provided them with a place to be, work, and survive, even if it was an insufficient
last resort. At the same time, the men were not deceived, because they got the joke.
The WPA began a radical reorganization of its presence in New York City in the summer
of 1937, a process that necessitated the initial reduction of work relief jobs for the city by 30,000.
Curiously, the Summer and Fall, 1937 issues do not take any position on this, or describe how
any of the possible cuts in funding would have serious consequences for the men living there. It
does not mention that the WPA is leaving until the November issue, after the changes had
already been made. “With the exodus of the W.P.A. from the Camp, the Department of Public
Welfare once more resumes to take complete charge of all activities here in Camp La
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Guardia…all former recreational activities will once more be resumed.”593 Diminishing of
federal work relief meant a steep rise in costs for local relief agencies, who paid for direct relief.
Work relief and home relief were related in inverse proportion, as indicated by the Emergency
Relief Bureau’s final report, “When WPA lays off people, the direct (home) relief load
climbs.”594 How strange that a camp newspaper, published “by and for the members of Camp
LaGuardia” would have no news on such an important subject.
Diminishing work relief meant that local agencies were strained at the same time that
needy cases would increase. All 1,233 WPA positions assigned to work in the Department of
Welfare were cut in July 1937. Hodson tried to save 700 of these jobs by turning them into
permanent Welfare Department jobs, the majority of which were in the Central Office. 243 of the
requested positions were in the Municipal Lodging House and its annexes. In fact, nearly all of
the jobs added since 1930 for the “institutional care of the homeless” had been work relief jobs;
the city had the same number of these permanent positions that it had at the outset of the
Depression. Since the shelters that the city had opened for the homeless were run by WPA labor,
the elimination of these jobs would mean that “it will be necessary to close these facilities
down.”595 Hodson concluded to LaGuardia, “I think the time has now come to recognize frankly
that we shall have a permanent load of homeless men and that we are no longer justified in
relying upon W.P.A. and work relief personnel.”596
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WPA reductions posed specific difficulty to the ongoing survival of the camp because
they occurred at harvest time, when all men were required to perform their seasonal duties in the
farm program. Each fall, all of the men there, despite previous work history, were reduced to the
same level as farm laborers and expected to contribute to the camp’s production.597 While the
fluctuating population had reached an all-time low immediately prior to manpower reductions,
one month after the WPA left the camp grew by 850 men. In November and December of that
year together, over 1,000 new men arrived. “Since the reorganization on November the 7th, at
which time we had an estimated population of 161 members, we have steadily grown until at the
present writing we have approximately one thousand.”598 As WPA reductions initially
diminished the Camp’s labor force to this extraordinarily low number, it still managed to
produce “the largest crop since the Camp’s inception” during the following month’s harvesting
by “the endless stream of teams …going to and from the black dirt.” The paper announced relief
reductions discursively in its “Farm News” section, “And yet, in spite of the curtailment of men
working the Farm this past month, the harvesting is coming along handily.” It explained that its
monthly reporting was abridged because “with the enormous amount of work we have on hand,
it is impossible to give you the usual amount of news about the Farm.”599 Simultaneously, the
camp’s infrastructure was expanding due to the work of the WPA, which had to be finished
before the end of the funding. A new root cellar was completed in the summer of 1937, which
was “the largest and the finest of it’s [sic.] kind in the County, and will afford a proper place to
store the large crop of vegetables which are required to properly provision the Camp over the
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period from the fall until the following season’s crop.”600 “Annex No. 2,” a congregate
dormitory being built “on the highest point on the Camp grounds” originally envisaged to house
another 1,000 men, was under construction, and moving quickly.601 “Where only a few weeks
ago only frameworks were visible, one now is able to see the outer walls and roofing nearing
completion.” The largest project occupying the construction teams was the “all-metal and cement
garage.”602
Camp LaGuardia epitomized an administration of welfare that understood single male
incomes as supportive of entire families, in the economic context of industrial production, and
seeking to alleviate the demographic shift in political economy that was sending more and more
displaced people nationwide into cities seeking work. This gendered aspect went directly to the
core of the relief program in the late 1930s, and imagined home relief to be for women and
women with children, while men were put to work. Yet this program was always in flux, and was
related to the costs incurred by the city. When federal funding dried up, Camp LaGuardia turned
“unattached domiciled men” from home relief into “local homeless,” because it was cheaper—a
savings calculated at $3.64 per month, per man.603 Camp LaGuardia was therefore in the
contradictory position of being both a WPA cut, in terms of jobs, as well as the solution to WPA
cuts, because it became a cheaper alternative for single, unattached men on home relief who
were transferred there to receive work relief. In this new referral process, further, the State
reimbursed the city in part for these men, now off home relief rolls. The change, put into effect
in October 1938, enacted a demographic shift at the camp. In 1939, 30% of the men came from
this domiciled group. Therefore, after the WPA pulled out of the project, and the city changed
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the referral process to draw down money to fund the camp, there was a resurgence and
revitalization of the camp’s purpose, as the administration sent more and more types of workers
there. While the original Camp LaGuardia inmates were those that maintained settlement in New
York City (in the Poor Law context) and did not have eligibility for home relief without an
address, this newer cohort of men was taken specifically from home relief.604 In this particular
way, the camp more closely began to resemble CCC camps, an occurrence demonstrated in, and
reinforced by, the overlap in personnel and coordinated recreational activities between the two.
Their sports teams competed against one another,605 and men shuttled back and forth between the
federal camps and LaGuardia, as the Social Services Department helped men secure positions in
the CCC.606 One editor of Camp LaGuardia News went on to edit the newspaper of a CCC camp
in nearby Middleton.607 Yet there was also obvious resistance. Administrators had difficulty
recruiting men living at home to leave New York and work at the camp, which official reports
interpreted as acculturated experience of their environment: “Former unattached domiciled men
do not adjust readily to the congregate care given at the facility.”608
In 1932, as the city dealt with the overflow of men applying for shelter at the Municipal
Lodging House, it had begun to pay commercial lodging houses on a nightly basis for their
accommodation. That year, the city paid for 29,696 lodgings, or stays for 81 men per night. Yet
this policy got increasingly unwieldy and expensive. By 1937, it was paying for 2,226,978 yearly
lodgings, or over 8,000 per night, in nearly 70 establishments, many of which began to house
604
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only homeless men. It cost 5 cents more per night per man for a night’s stay a lodging house on
the Bowery than for them to sleep on a cot in the Municipal Lodging House. Thus, if the city
could have housed all of the homeless men needing shelter in a municipal lodging house, it could
save $131,415 dollars per year, which was more than the $111,213.03 that it had spent on
lodgings at the municipal lodging house and its annexes in 1937.609 Camp LaGuardia, which had
expanded to have a capacity for 1,000 men, and whose internal laborers were working to double
this capacity with new annexes, would be a considerable start to housing this 8,000. Part of the
reason that the administration wanted to cohere the camp into the country was to legitimate the
camp form itself. The goal of more camps was to eliminate the use of commercial lodging
houses, and to free up space in the Municipal Lodging House for those awaiting transfer to
camps or other institutions. Hodson bluntly expressed his future plans, of “working toward
increasing the number of these camps until the entire homeless problem is dealt with in that
way.”610 The administration assumed that these new camps could be rolled out easily, because “it
should be possible to obtain such sites as abandoned federal transient and CCC camps at no great
expense to the city.”611 This was an early ideological articulation of New York State’s prison
geography, which has come into existence over the past forty years, but with work camps for
homeless men, the evolving progressive rehabilitation program of the day.
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Astrofsky, the future Director of the Division of the Care of the Homeless, was, like
Stanley Howe, worried about the Communist threat posed by single, “unattached” men. He wrote
to Howe in June, 1935 just before he took over from Elmer Galloway as the Director of the
Unattached and Transients Division of the Emergency Relief Bureau, and as the Division was
beginning to receive single men, both black and white, who were transferred to its custody from
“Home Relief District Offices 25, 26, 28, 31, 32 and 33.”612 As a “consultant to the Department
of Public Welfare on Camp LaGuardia,” he anticipated the “problem of Unattached” without
federal funding, as the Federal Transient Program ended.
Moreover, it will not be before a month after Mr. Galloway departs that
all of the unattached will be under our care. There is dynamite in this
problem of Unattached, both of those under care and those to be
transferred [Poor Law removal], and unless the job is done efficiently as
we have been doing it right along, there will be an explosion. For this
reason alone, a change at this time would be extremely dangerous. You
know that the Unemployed Council and other radical organizations are
made up on the whole of unattached men. So far we have practiced a
considerate but firm policy, taking under care only those genuinely in
need. I can still safely say that we have no chiselers on our rolls…After
the unattached have been taken over, we want to strengthen care for the
local homeless and transients and arrange for as many of our clientele to
be absorbed by the Federal Work Projects as possible. As a matter of fact,
I have a crew now of twenty-five persons registering all our clients for
the work projects contemplated by Washington. We are one of the very
few cities doing this job.

This memo describes the city’s solution to the problematic interaction between the
gendered balance of home and work relief, and the specific, nationalist politics that activated it.
The longstanding policy was always to use the WPA to relieve the city of home relief costs.
Astrofsky assured Howe that he would “carry out the plans we have in mind. As you know, we
are not working in the dark, but along very constructive and definite lines, which I feel will save
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the City considerable funds and at the same time rehabilitate maladjusted individuals.” He
describes a prospective employee for the Division, who is “very loyal, a virtue which is essential
for the able administration of our Division,” and who “is quite remarkable in tightening up
operation of Home Relief Precincts.” He himself was very loyal, “Mr. Galloway and I have
always felt that our first responsibility was to the City of New York and to yourself.”613 What
made individuals maladjusted, clearly, was their politics. When the WPA was no longer an
option, Camp LaGuardia continued to be the solution to this contradiction.
Narrating a Regional Geography of Scarcity
Consistent with the newspaper’s method of reporting contradiction with a masking humor,
this period of intense change at the camp was depicted in burlesque in the magazine. Throughout
these structural changes, stories serialized in the newspaper took on a staged feeling, a fact that
demonstrates how different groups’ emerging consciousness of crisis and their concomitant
visions of change impressed a concrete understanding of what “relief” was supposed to be. These
elements of the paper give a glimpse of why the camp’s specific program of rehabilitation was so
important, but also marked by inconsistency. While the majority of men at the camp remained
laborers, 64% unskilled and 30% skilled, the remainder were formerly clerks (6%) or even
professionals (less than 1%).614 The paper’s “Construction Column” described the surge in
numbers underway in 1940, “with the complete re-population of the Camp in sight, at present
some three hundred men are busily engaged in construction work.”615 A recurring “campus
comics” section lampooned men unaccustomed to manual labor. As two men carry a stretcher,
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another asks “Accident?” They reply, “Naw-pickin up tired clerks and watchmen on Farm Draft.”
In the same comic, a fireman comes to the foreman in uniform, hose and axe in hand. “D’ja send
for me?” “Yeh!” replies the foreman, “You’re gonna plant cabbage!”616 In December, a
fashionably dressed man with shiny shoes is accompanied by the caption, “Naw-dat aint no city
slicker-its one o’dem new-dressed campers.” In the same issue, a man observing a busload of
men arriving at camp remarks, “maybe there’ll be something besides artists and dishwashers on
this one.”617
The newspaper also provided a confident narrative for men unsure about their presence
and future in Orange County. In a revealing piece titled “A.D. 1950,” which was published
serially in 1936 and reads like the script of a stage play, the anonymous author self-consciously
detailed the future of former Camp LaGuardia workers in their lives as colonists of Orange
County and around the State.618 The story marks one of the most explicit instances in which
prison was named in order to refuse its association with the camp. It provides a sustained
elaboration of a counterfeit history, meant to leaven the men’s time spent collectively in a former
prison through comic relief. The outlandish aspects of the story provide humor at the same time
that the author reflects on a shared and imagined past. In the story, former “LaGuardians” are
attending an annual reunion in the “Town Hall of Guardiaville,” in their self-contained town on
Staten Island. The town is comprised of former camp members, and others “return” to it for the
reunion, purely by chance. The one who did not come had escaped “to Paris three years ago and
has never returned.” The characters, all of whom are former camp residents, occupy the most
important political and social positions in the town, as well as in the state and nation: President,
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Senator, Mayor, Fire and Police Chiefs, Inspector of Water Supply, a “big money mogul” from
New York.619 In almost all cases, the men were successfully wealthy, company heads, or
property owners. Times were good again, and the narrative inverted their present condition,
placing them in the position of condemning intransigent laborers. The Senator remarks on the
“shortage of labor,” lamenting, “It seems a pity, doesn’t it? Now that there’s all kinds of jobs
nobody will go to work.” The Mayor of New York, former camp member, likewise complains in
a speech, “Here I am, self made man risen from the ranks to bring the country out of depression
and now nobody’ll work.”
These successful men conduct the “trial” of the one man who has failed in his
rehabilitation, a prisoner held in the town jail, an inconceivable fact to the others: “surely it must
be a stranger and not one of the residents.” “No it’s ---- it’s one of us.” They head to New York
to attend a theater performance of one of the camp singers who now has an opera career, a trip
during which the prisoner escapes and the Chief is robbed, a detail that expresses the depravity
of the city. “Every time I go to New York something like this happens!” Since one of them is the
Police Chief, the men police themselves. The Chief, without the stolen money, cannot pay their
cab driver the fare, and the driver threatens to call the police. “Why Mr. Fletcher, you wouldn’t
do that! And anyway, the police are already here.” Without other options, he is resigned to a
prolonged period of waiting, paralleling the men’s own extended and precarious existence. “I
guess I’ll just have to stay here until you guys pay me.” They prepare to go to sleep at the
Chief’s house, and as they do, find that the prisoner has returned of his own accord to recommit
himself, “I got sleepy over in New York so I came back to go to bed. I couldn’t get in the jail so I
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came here.” The next morning, when another character sees him for the first time and remarks,
with surprise, “I thought you were in jail!” He responds “with gloom,” ambiguously articulating
his presence in the non-existent jail, “I am.” The feminized members of the surrounding
community enter the story in the character of the Police Chief’s wife, angry that there is a
“prisoner” among them in her house. “The last time you were out like this you brought home ‘A
big Wall Street Man.’ When we got up the next day both he and my silver spoons were gone,”
she reprimands, but reluctantly lets them stay if they “get to bed, all of you.”
The next day, before the reunion, the men must conduct the trial. Finally, we hear the
charges brought against the prisoner, “After wading through a mass of legal technicalities, [the
Chief] reached the charge: ‘-----and you, Edmund Rogers are hereby charged with openly flirting
with Clementina McNally [daughter of the town’s mayor, also a former camp member, making it
a self-referential accusation] on a public thoroughfare in the broad light of day--.” Clementina,
asked to corroborate that the accused had flirted with her, declares her love, which sends the
town into “pandemonium,” before the band restores order by beginning “a lively air.” After
everyone returns to their seats, the Mayor, diplomatically, gives a speech on the difficult state of
affairs.
My friends, this evening when we are gathered here like a big happy
family, it seems a shame that we should have to contend with the
presence of this wolf in sheep’s clothing, Edmund Rogers. To think that
this—this wastrel had the effrontery to so much as look at my pure
undefiled Clementina. I will leave it to the audience as to what is to be
his fate.620

The mayor’s “ancient political foe” Martin Harney, suggests a marriage as the solution,
challenging the mayor. After a comical, childish argument between the two,
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Mr. Harney spoke with some spirit, ‘just what have you ever
accomplished aside from getting elected mayor by a fluke, then living off
the taxpayers money. Why, you aren’t even a graduate of Camp
LaGuardia. I remember now—you took a day’s furlough to go to Goshen
and it took you so long to find your way back to the camp that they
dropped you for being AWOL.

They all fight. “A furore of the first magnitude had broken loose. Fists, screams, and
juicy remarks flew at random.” The mayor and Harney show down in a fistfight, during which
the couple escapes and gets married. The town reunites with music, “for the next four hours, the
Town Hall of Guardiaville was the scene of hearty, carefree revelery [sic], as the couples swayed
to the tantalizing rhythm of the band.” They had successfully, if haphazardly, negotiated splits in
their ranks to leave New York City behind for good, a geographic view that was also racialized.
The whites who remained there were classified as hillbillies, while the successful Camp
LaGuardians proactively colonized the countryside: “There will be none of this frivolous Honkey
Tonk dancing like they are doing over in that wicked city of New York.”621
Surveillance was part and parcel of the Welfare Department’s actions as it stabilized its
efforts, ostensibly to depoliticize the administration of relief. As the Workers Alliance and other
groups achieved some success in organizing relief workers, Department administrators took
action. Hodson received detailed reports, from at least 1936 to 1938, from a man named Frank
Quinn, and an investigator working for him, about meetings of the Association of W.P.A.
Welfare Employees, who were attempting to organize against WPA layoffs in New York City at
the end of 1936.622 David Lasser, head of the Workers Alliance, addressed their meetings.
Reports indicate that the young organization had a difficult time getting off the ground and
recruiting members, and the leaders expressed discouragement that more people were not
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attending the evening meetings. Many of the group’s participants were workers in the newly
created divisions of the Welfare Department, staffed with predominantly temporary relief
positions, rather than in its traditional bureaus, Veterans and Old Age Assistance, and Child
Welfare.623 Although the investigator concluded that “the organization would have to fold up
because of lack of cooperation and funds,” nevertheless Hodson kept an eye on them and their
affiliations with the AFGE and the Workers Alliance. What was important was not a single
organizing group, but the links between groups that focused on similar, but isolated, issues.
The mass meetings took place after leaders of the organization had a private meeting with
Hodson in his office. Mr. Slater, a representative of the group, directly asked about a
contradiction in the labor of the WPA, “My job is the same as the person sitting next to me who
is a Civil Service worker.” Hodson responded, “I am saying to you that if the WPA goes out, the
administration will not take these jobs over.” Related concerns included the low pay of workers
on Welfare Department projects and the intensification of work as workers tried to cover
increasing caseloads given reduced hours.624 The meeting convinced the committee that their
jobs were “less secure today than at any time in the past” and that “we cannot cope with these
problems by acting individually. We can only attempt to solve these vital problems when the
entire staff is united behind a solid, strong association.” In the midst of a WPA investigation
regarding “current need,” flyers advertising the meetings announced, “Dismissals stare us in the
face!” and asked, “What will happen to our jobs after January first [1937]? How can we further
our efforts in attaining Civil Service [permanent employee] status?” As the merger of the ERB
and the DPW approached, the administration increasingly focused on relief labor unrest.
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McClure wrote to Hodson in a memo on May 25, 1937, “There is a contemplated one-day work
stoppage by W.P.A. employees for Thursday, the 27th, in the City and the D.P.W. Association is
meeting tonight at five o’clock to vote on possible participation.”625 A sit-down strike organized
by Workers Alliance Local 57 in Washington Heights, against the “miserable relief standards”
and in favor of “raising the relief budget,” coincided with the approaching consolidation date.626
As the layoffs continued in early 1938, protests of the ERB terminations as it closed shop
escalated. In the reorganization into the DPW, 900 investigators were laid off, making caseloads
rise. The mayor was flooded with telegrams of protests from individuals and staff of dozens of
district offices, many organized through the State, County, and Municipal Workers Association.
The primary demand was a cap of caseloads at 50,627 as the size of a typical caseload was rising,
eventually to hit 65.628 District Office 67’s position was that “the present caseload being carried
at this time does not warrant dismissal of a single investigator.” Yet, demonstrating the
precarious nature of employment, the official notice of layoffs was merely 48 hours. The “two
weeks notice clause” was part of the Department’s personnel policy, and was not being honored
for emergency workers.629 Evans Butcher wrote to the Mayor, “In November 1933, you needed a
job. We Negroes and ERB workers assisted in your election as mayor. Now we need our jobs
and your assistance. You cannot fail us…Why are you depriving investigators of our two weeks
notice with pay?”630 “Experienced staff” were the first to be laid off, consistent with Somervell’s

625

William Hodson Papers, Box 6, E-H, 1937.
Workers Alliance Local 57 to Fiorello LaGuardia, December 1937, Protests, Workers Alliance, Folder 2,
LaGuardia and Wagner Archives, LaGuardia Community College.
627
For example, Staff of District Office 67 to Fiorello LaGuardia, February 1938, Protests, Welfare Department
Terminations, Folder 14, LaGuardia and Wagner Archives, LaGuardia Community College.
628
Herlands, Administration of Relief in New York City, 15.
629
Staff of District Office 4 to Fiorello LaGuardia, February 28, 1938, 4, Protests, Welfare Department
Terminations, Folder 14, LaGuardia and Wagner Archives, LaGuardia Community College.
630
Evans Butcher to Fiorello LaGuardia, February 28, 1938, Protests, Welfare Department Terminations, Folder 14,
LaGuardia and Wagner Archives, LaGuardia Community College.
210
626

averring that those on relief longest would be the first to go. Protests argued that the city’s
examinations for civil service opened competition for their jobs to prospective employees
without the necessary experience. The staff of the “Local Homeless Division of the Department
of Welfare” argued that “having given years of service to the city of New York, it is not
unreasonable to request that dismissed investigators be given two weeks’ severance pay at the
time of their discharge.”631 307 members of Local 42 of the Workers Alliance demanded the
mayor “stick to your committee report on relief question.”632 Finally, in May 1938 Hodson, in
Executive Order 40, banned staff from being “actively engaged in a political campaign or
activity,” an order that was long-term and reinforced in official communications to staff.633
While Hodson had always maintained that the Department should be apolitical, this was simply a
charge against the political patronage of the Tammany regime, and cover for ensuring a smooth
transition between emergency relief and the permanent, ongoing functions of welfare.
Given its purpose as an oasis of anti-communism, the low staff-inmate ratio, and its
function of reducing the costs of home relief in the transition, surveillance at the camp was
important. The jocular tone of the publication developed strange forms of scrutiny,
simultaneously overt and hidden, indicating that the journal’s constant banter could be
marshalled with intent. For example, “Operator 13” was a monthly gossip column by an
anonymous writer, one of the various “secret agents” and spies placed throughout the camp, who
“Seezall, knowzall, tellzall,” that acted as a surveillance mechanism to establish rules and
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punishments in order to monitor and regulate the men’s behavior.634 “902 and also his lanceman
here in the camp” relied on this “line up” of “field agents” for information, and to keep order.635
Operator 13 described his presence at the camp, humorously referring to a symbiotic relationship
that the column promoted, “Greycourt needs me. I need Greycourt. That is why I am here.”636
The column is important for a number of reasons. First, it alludes to the paper’s function as a
type of panopticon, which enforced discipline on the “inspection principle.”637 Second, it
expresses how the program of Camp LaGuardia served as a mask for the anxieties of the
depression and uncertainties about its future, and the ways that the journal both named and
concealed threats to the camp and its purpose. And finally, it established a balance between
social coherence and individualization at the camp, given its members’ collective isolation in
upstate New York.
The column named threats to the camp in a joking manner in order to identify them, but
also to defuse the impact and appearance of authoritarian presence.638 The fear that the men were
supposed to feel for the double agents was expressed humorously and, at the same time, voiced
through race. “Goatee” Green, “Harlem’s contribution to Greycourt [who] hasn’t learned to
speak Gaelic yet,” was accused of being “Operator 13,” the paper said, so that he would “turn
white with fright” and the doctor could see the iodine spot on his arm to give him an

634

“Report of Operator 13,” Camp LaGuardia News, February 1935, 4–5; “Operator 13,” Camp LaGuardia News,
March 1935, 9; “Operator 13,” May 1935, 4–5; “Pinch Hitting for Operator 13,” Camp LaGuardia News, July 1935,
16; Joseph Graham, “The Roving Reporter,” Camp LaGuardia News, July 1935, 12–13.
635
“Pinch Hitting for Operator 13,” 16. “902” is a reference to the Central Office of the Department of Welfare,
located at 902 Broadway.
636
“Our Own Nosy Reporter: Why the Devil Did You Come to Camp Greycourt, Anyhow?”
637
Melossi and Pavarini, The Prison and the Factory: Origins of the Penitentiary System; Michel Foucault,
Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).
638
“Blackface defused such meanings without denying them.” Saxton, “Blackface Minstrelsy and Jacksonian
Ideology,” 11.
212

inoculation.639 Operator 13, “IN PERSON --- The one and only!” teasingly was to appear in the
“Dirt Diggers of 1935,” the theatrical club’s show to celebrate the camp’s first anniversary.
Jokingly publishing the “secrets” of the camp, the author warned inmates to be careful or they
would be sent “over the bridge,” the euphemism for the ultimate discipline, exiting the camp and
going back to New York City. This phrase sought to depict those who got out of line and
received this ultimate punishment as crazy; they went “over the bridge.”
There is a certain gentleman in the Farm Gang who has had several
warnings about his drinking and shooting his mouth off about the
officials of the camp, even his own bosses. This is to advise him that he
is in the pitiless glare of the spotlight and one more move, and zowie!
Over the Bridge he goes! ----The Shadow.

Accusations attempted to embarrass those who were “goldbricking,” establishing the
condition that men work diligently to maintain their placement there, as well as cover for the
program of work relief over direct relief.
There’s a guy around the camp who’s had almost every position
available, except that of “Outsider Looking In” for which he will be
nominated shortly. He’d better stop his squawking and bulldozing and
really do some work---the 17 karat goldbrick!---“I Spy”.

These direct admonitions demonstrate the salience of dissimulation in the function of the
newspaper, and editors, in conjunction with the administration, drew on this simultaneously
overt and hidden strategy. Camp Director Clarke was worried about discipline at the camp in
1935, and wrote urgently to Howe that “three way supervision [resulting from the institutional
configuration of shared administration between the WPA, ERB, and DPW]…is creating
confusion in the minds of the men as well as the supervisors themselves…Men have been heard
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to remark, ‘Clarke can’t touch me. I would like to see him try to fire me.’”640 But, more tellingly,
the column expressed the real anxieties of camp and Welfare Department administrators in a
conspiratorial tone, as the column veered into the political, in July 1935.
Who was it that phoned the Skipper [Clarke] from New York some
weeks ago, long distance, - one who is in touch with the so-called
‘plotters’ and warned him specifically to watch a certain gent whose
personal ambitions ran away with his business sense[?] Undoubtedly,
three quarters of the camp has been watching this comedy of errors and
is deeply interested in the result.

This was confided by “G-Man,” someone “from our own G dormitory, perhaps?”—an allusion to
both the system of labeling dormitories by letter as well as an alleged government secret agent
who was also living at the camp.641 G-Men was a term sometimes used jokingly to refer to the
WPA administrators who had office space in the main building. Two months later, in September,
at least 70% of the camp (not quite three quarters) walked off the job, an event that “threatened
to cause the discontinuance of Camp LaGuardia.”642 Reports in mainstream newspapers implied
that the major reason for the protest was food quality. Other, secondary, concerns were the
removal of money for their room and board, and dislike of Joseph Mannix, the camp’s interim
director after Clarke left. But none of Ziskind’s complete compilation of the 571 strikes on WPA
projects mention food as a demand; it is likely that this strike had to do with the switch to the
WPA.
This issue would continually haunt the Welfare Department. Camp LaGuardia was a
WPA work project, but the men also lived there. This was the reason for its existence. WPA
projects were not supposed to duplicate work done during normal times, one of the reasons the
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Welfare Department established the camp in Orange County and why the men were occupied
there building its infrastructure. Payment was “deposited to their credit in the camp bank” and
“given to the camper at time of discharge” after deductions for purchases at the canteen,
including for clothing, which was not provided.643 At the same time, the city was also landlord,
and drew nearly 50% of men’s wages for their “maintenance,” which supported overhead and
staff salaries.644 These were the ways that the city had made the project “self-supporting,” and
also why the wages were never secure. Official recommendations in 1940 were to reduce the
monthly wage again, to $10, in order to “save about $60,000 per year” and to bring take home
pay into line with the men on the CCC, who were required to send $22 a month in their wages to
families.645 But the “unattached” men at LaGuardia contended that these maintenance costs were
inflated, and wondered why they would not be receiving the full WPA wage.646 This was an
especially sensitive issue for administrators, since it had also been contested from the right as a
local source of “profit” at the expense of the Federal Government. Congress later investigated
Mayor LaGuardia, Hodson, and Camp LaGuardia, in 1939, accusing the misappropriation of
over $54,000 in WPA funds, a story that made national headlines.647 Another Orange County
strike of over 3,500 workers, almost simultaneous with the Camp LaGuardia action, must have
forced administrators to reevaluate their political tactics and options.648 An Unemployed Council
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formed in neighboring Middletown, N.Y. in May of that year, with the understanding that
unemployed relief there was “lower than anywhere else in the state.”649
William Goetz and James Ahearn led the “mass meetings” that brought about the protest
at the camp, and at which camp members urged each other to “Keep away from [Howe]! He’s
responsible for everything.” Goetz, whom Hodson “did not refer [to] by name” may also have
been who Operator 13 specified in the run-up to the mass meetings. Only a demonstration by an
estimated 500 men at the camp’s administration building saved Goetz and Ahearn’s initial
dismissal. Goetz left the camp as the protest ended because he had found a job, reported the
Herald Tribune, which now described the protest as over food by “diet-conscious transients,” a
feminized construal intended to belittle real demands.650 By means of reform, the Department of
Welfare replaced Mannix with a new Director, Edwin Cunningham, in late 1935, and hired a
new steward, Raymond LaSalle, who was a camp mainstay for years.651
The masking aspect of Operator 13’s column was resurrected in a column called
“Browsing About,” which began in November 1937, as the WPA was completing its dramatic
reduction of its presence in New York City. Throughout the previous six-month period during
which WPA work was seriously curtailed, Camp LaGuardia News made zero mentions of
changes in the relief program. It was also that summer, during what should have been the most
anxious period about pending relief reductions, that the newspaper published its first “Historic
Orange County” section, which used a form of nationalism purposefully to legitimate the camp’s
presence there—“this part of the country played an important part in the building up of our
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nation”652—and self-consciously created a geographic knowledge of the region for men getting
jobs and starting lives outside of New York City. The editor announced that “Browsing About”
would contain “newsy items about the members of this Camp” and that “the Browser will be
among you, unknown of course, and pick up what ever [sic.] he thinks worth printing.” The
writer conspicuously reiterated the claim that “CAMP LA GUARDIA NEWS is YOUR
magazine; created to serve as…YOUR…medium of expression. Whether news is good or bad is
dependent upon the interest shown in it by the members of the camp.”653 The anonymous column,
tellingly, was one of the only sections that broached serious structural changes. “In all
probability some of our closest friends will be leaving to enter the Civilian Conservation Corps
real soon.”654
Finally, there were stories in the paper whose purpose was to re-center Greycourt
specifically as a location of redemption in absolute space. The men at the camp were invited to
identify with Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, whose “true fairy-tale” was told by dramatizing the
rescue of his daughter, “America-Frances,” in a piece called the “Cinderella of Greycourt,” in
December 1940. A nobleman who settles in his “Garden of Eden” in the town of Greycourt and
transforms himself into an “American Farmer,” Crevecoeur was later jailed for his “refusals to
join [the] labors and ardors of the Revolution” which “made him an enemy of the colonists.”
When he returned from jail—“(yes, the man who tried to mind his own business was jailed by
both sides)”655—his “paradise” had been “burned to the ground by Indians.” His tribulations at
Greycourt eventually led him to become “a close friend and confident [sic.] of two great
652
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Americans—Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson,” relationships that “soon turned the
‘disinterested and disloyal’ Orange County farmer into a strong partisan of the American
Revolution,” … “a miracle that even the Goshen jail failed to accomplish.” During his absence,
which was the result of his disloyalty, Crevecoeur somehow got to France and became the
“American Consul of ‘His Christian Majesty’, the King of France.” With his newly-found power,
the result of his hitting rock bottom in the “paradise” farm of Orange County, he is able to return
to the United States and find his daughter, the “barefoot Cinderella” who is now able to assume
the title, “Countess of France.” To top it off, he subsequently wrote his “Letters of an American
Farmer” while at Greycourt “and told Europe as no other book had ever done, what American
life was really like.”656
In the story, Greycourt was figured geographically as the men’s ground zero for
rehabilitation through a nationalist awakening. Although it acknowledged that the work program
was extraordinarily demanding, and would present numerous individual challenges (failures
were peremptorily attributed to individual effort), it did so in order to articulate the genesis of
their new, more promising life, that would follow the inevitable, numerous setbacks. The story’s
message contains all of the elements of redemption that Camp LaGuardia was designed to
address. After spending unjustified time in prison, Crevecoeur manages to pass from his unAmerican behaviors, through magic and miracle,657 to a full supporter of the American
Revolution living among colonists in Orange County. He returns to save his family, able to give
his daughter a life of luxury and nobility. The narrative repudiated any “European” connection; it
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was a purely “American” trajectory. It established identity between the soil of Greycourt,
clandestine and noble origins, and the genesis of a rehabilitated, productive life.
An “Old Fashioned Minstrel Show”
In general, WPA work assignments were limited, because work relief was not to
“compete” with private industry, a historical characteristic of all rehabilitation programs in
workhouses, prisons, and homeless shelters. The relief program of the New Deal generalized the
limitations of carceral institutions with regard to prison labor. This meant that work relief, by
definition, was far from adequate. Ziskind estimated that government works programs employed
from between 1.3 to 4.2 million people, while unemployment ranged from 8.5 to 15 million
nationwide. After the experience of the CWA and the FTP, the WPA sought to “stabilize
makeshift activities” of these programs by building on their successes and rectifying their
failures. In short, “the Works Progress Administration was intended to remove persons from
relief status by providing them with employment until private industry could take over.”658
Given this restriction, and the necessity of producing “new” work assignments, jobs were
often produced in the bureaucracy of relief itself. In Buffalo, the transient camp was printing
one-half of the documents that the state transient agency needed.659 One of the industrial jobs
therefore became churning the state’s own propaganda efforts. Similarly, the jobs at Camp
LaGuardia served this purpose; they were makeshift jobs that fit the program of relief as well as
stabilized it. The kinds of work were thus afterthoughts rather than actual “training.”660 Referrals
to the camp took into consideration which labor was then necessary there, and men were
assigned to work that resembled their previous occupation. To the camp, then, rehabilitation
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meant “to restore … morale and normal work habits,”661 as men at the camp were “assigned to
duties commensurate with their previous work experience.”662 Like the WPA more broadly, in
which anyone who encountered a position amid this managed scarcity of opportunity was lucky,
and was made aware of it, there was a sense of privilege and opportunity built into the
functionality of Camp LaGuardia. In this framework, even camp expansion, which should have
been a signal that the depression was deepening, was depicted as a benefit to men who were
already there. An editorial explained, “More men means MORE WORK, more work means
PROMOTION, and promotion means REHABILITATION.”663
As noted, Camp LaGuardia, in some aspects, was a long term, permanent version of the
CCC camps. The labor performed in the different types of camps was sometimes similar, but the
array of services offered at Camp LaGuardia was astounding in comparison, and its program was
intentionally more exhaustive. In this regard it was designed as a “model of the ideal society.”664
The Mayor of Boston, on visiting the Camp, reflected that the “most impressive” aspect of the
camp was its “self-discipline and morale,” which allowed the men to “act as a microcosm of the
large city from where they have been sent,” but with the important distinction that “they arrange
their own discipline, enforce their own rules.”665 More importantly, while there was no farming
done at the CCC camps or in the transient program, Camp LaGuardia, in contrast, played an
important productive function. However, in addition to the primary work departments, including
661
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crews in farming, carpentry, kitchen, painting, and landscaping, the camp also offered canteen;
doctor; dentist (frequented by Orange county residents); blacksmith shop to repair farm
equipment; full, modern laundry; tailor; shoemaker; barber; religious services; and optician.
There were also police and fire crews, as well as a Department of Welfare fire truck.666 The local
state’s version of a company town facilitated an economy that was supposed to make it selfsustaining. As the paper described, “Unlike the CCC and similarly operated camps, the men here
purchase their own clothing from their earnings, which tends to give a feeling of individualism
and arouses a friendly feeling of outdoing one’s neighbor.”667 On this basis there was thus an
understood hierarchy between Camp LaGuardia and the other camps, a difference which the
paper explicitly demarcated based on its ambiguous sense of settled permanence. This feeling
saturated even the farm work, which was supposed to be the entry-level rehabilitation tool for
general laborers. The yearly, acquired experience of the farm crews was apparently the reason
for the increased productivity of the institution.
This permanence required that the camp establish an ongoing rapport with the
surrounding towns. Community opposition to relief camps was systematic, and a number were
forced shut as a result.668 Local hostility toward similar camps, such as Bluefield, informed the
implementation of Camp LaGuardia, the city’s centerpiece program.669 A mixture of unease and
acceptance characterized Orange County’s response to Camp LaGuardia due to the concerted
efforts of the camp’s programs. On the one hand, the village of Chester hired its first police
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officer in 1937 as an explicit response to the camp’s presence.670 At the same time, the camp had
successes integrating with the surrounding towns because of its outreach. Stanley Howe was the
best man at camp member Ralph Renaldo’s wedding to a woman from Chester, “in a pretty
village church in the hills of Orange County.” Renaldo had “secured a position with one of the
local farmers;” the “onion grower’s daughter” had “persuaded her father to give him a part-time
job.”671 The wedding was covered “in the Chester and Middletown papers.” At the party
following, “every member of the theatrical club either sang, played or danced as his contribution
to this very unique occasion.”672 Other men dated women from the area, and events encouraged
this interaction. A dance in town was attended by camp members, who held their own dance the
following St. Patrick’s Day. Town members used the on-site dentist. Furloughs were spent in
Middletown, the largest city in the county.
The longevity of the camp proved to be an obstacle to the Welfare Department in other
ways. It required balancing concessions to the men to secure their consent with the men’s own
expectations. Everyday programmatic elements were geared toward this end. Social services
granted one-day furloughs for every month of work, because “this policy removes any possible
feeling of incarceration,”673 a tricky maneuver, since the men actually were living in a former
prison. Howe’s successful proposal to change the name to Camp LaGuardia eliminated “the
odium attached to the name Greycourt because of its use as a prison.”674 The men were not
“doing time” as a contractual obligation for wrongs committed against the social order, but they
were doing time for an unknown period, during which the Department needed them to be
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acquiescent, but also vigorous and obedient in their daily labors. Cartoons often deflected the
program’s closeness and association with prison. One mocked the tedium of repetition that the
men would have known well. As two men enter a prison mess hall, one remarks to the other, “I
always eat here.” Another comic referenced the improvements made to Greycourt when it was
converted into Camp LaGuardia. It shows a prison guard inspecting a cell, still sparse, but with
curtains, a rug, and a lamp, who comments to the prisoner, “I suppose the next thing you’ll want
is venetian blinds.” A third used this same punchline, but expressed it through gender. In an
extravagantly decorated room in the camp’s former cells, at the regular “quarters inspection” by
the Camp Director, the inspector tells the camper, “Very nice, Mike-but I think you went just a
wee bit too far this time.”675 When the barracks were completed, the living spaces for the men at
the institution was an actual hybrid of prison and homeless shelter, and remained so. It had both
cells as well as congregate, dormitory sleeping arrangements. Similarly, the length of time
granted to men for their rehabilitation was a continuous a point of debate. How long did it take to
reconstruct them? Herlands, writing the official report on relief administration, wanted to cap the
length of time that a man could stay at the camp at six months, because he saw in it an
institutional example that could manage the movement of thousands of people. In his view, the
men were becoming accustomed to their relief jobs as permanent, and wanted to prevent them
from a squatter’s-type claim to their positions. But this cap would also hurt farm productivity,
since seasonal experience was so important for the labor-intensive cultivation of the historically
rich, yet difficult to till, soil.
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Figure 6.4 Still from “The 51st State,” showing the cells at Camp LaGuardia in the mid-1970s.
They were 6’ x 7’ and could fit “two men, two lockers.”676

The wide variety of jobs, along with the changing nature of unemployment during the
Depression, meant that there was slightly more class diversity at Camp LaGuardia than, for
example, in contemporary shelters. At the same time, it was necessary to build a camp culture
that would sustain men separated from their families and homes. Many aspects of camp
recreational activities were geared toward this purpose. Originally, when “relations with the
surrounding communities … presented a difficult problem,” the administration attempted a
number of tactics to keep the men on the campus. Hodson approved serving beer at the
institution in 1938, which “had the effect of keeping the men in the camp in the evening, where
they can be better controlled and observed.”677 Sporting events as well as the Camp LaGuardia
News were other examples of self-contained, in-camp activities. They were later expanded to
cultivate relationships with the surrounding area and its institutions. “The LaGuardia Theatrical
Club” was the most prominent example of the “helpful” way that “the number of complaints …
greatly decreased.” By 1939, “the community relations of the camp no longer [presented] a
676
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serious problem.”678 This process manifests the most astonishing example of the links between
surrounding Orange County and the camp. The minstrel acts that were central to this program
were crucial in building both camp cohesion as well as regional acceptance. Theater
performances were a respite from backbreaking work, in difficult jobs that were never secure.
There was always the chance that these men would find themselves right back “on the streets of
New York.” Performances offered men, some of whom were over 70, a venue to laugh after an
average of nearly three years of unemployment. It also was entertainment for community
residents, who were experiencing the intense effects of the Depression themselves.679
The reinvigorated minstrel show at Camp LaGuardia emerged out of the excitement over
the upcoming World’s Fair. Robinson is specific about the centrality of World’s Fairs in
promoting the new scientific racial regime of the late nineteenth century; they played a large part
in signifying and propagandizing a break from “an earlier and more vulgar representation of the
racialized order.”680 The Chicago Exposition in 1893, for example, sparked “an amateur
blackface minstrel movement in the country which was drilled and amused by skits and
suggestions for costumes and makeup by [guidebooks].” Similar factors combined to produce
what the Camp LaGuardia newspaper endearingly called “our touring minstrels” in 1939,681 in
the issue dedicated to the New York World’s Fair of that year.
The spring of 1939, ten years after the start of the depression, was the high point for all
unemployment relief. In February, 364,000 families were receiving home and work relief in New
York City, and Congress had just mandated the dismissal of another 75,000 from WPA
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employment.682 Hodson was explicit on a WMCA radio program that “we must stabilize this
relief program,”683 and he used the World’s Fair to boost morale. In the News’ expanded issue
dedicated to the World’s Fair, Hodson, drawing on the image of exodus to motivate, wrote a
radiant “editorial” addressed “to the men of Camp LaGuardia”: “Go forth to conquer and the
world will help and applaud you.” In the same issue, Grover Whalen was even more explicit in
linking the intent of the camp to the intent of the fair, in an open letter to the men,
“Rehabilitation of the individual is the purpose of Camp La Guardia, and rehabilitation of man’s
ideals and faith in the future is the purpose of the New York Fair.”684 But in reality, the World’s
Fair was a source of anxiety for Fiorello LaGuardia with regard to dislocated workers, because
he thought it would bring an army of homeless that would never leave and become dependent on
New York City, especially given relaxed Poor Law legislation.685
After a long hiatus, the theater program put together its first production in the winter
leading up to the fair. “World’s Fair Auditions” was “a vaudeville and variety show staged and
presented by the Camp membership,” anticipated by the newspaper’s preview “after too long an
absence” of “LaGuardia’s thespians.” Performed on December 22 and 23, 1938, the premise for
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the piece was that the variety acts were auditioning for actual jobs performing in the upcoming
World’s Fair. The campers were therefore invited to actually imagine themselves being
redeemed socially and financially by the upcoming festivities. It featured camp member Frank
Brady “as a Broadway show producer, ably assisted by Leo Saxe, as his secretary.” After the
opening chorus, and John Sivell’s redition of “Danny Boy,” Joseph Fitzsimmons, “our silvervoiced tenor,” sang “two familiar tunes,” nostalgic reminiscences about southern plantation life,
“Stay In Your Own Back Yard” and “Are You From Dixie.” (“…Gee! but I've yearned/Longed
to return/To all the good old pals I left behind./My home is way down in Alabam'/On a
plantation near Birmingham…”)686 After these wistful performances,
Charles Gray and John Sullivan lend a touch of Amos and Andy to the
program with black-face and songs. Their offering of “Dinah” was well
received by this critic, and they sure go to town on “I’ll Be Glad When
You’re Dead You Rascal You.”

Sullivan later returned for an encore, to sing the hypnotic lullaby “Sleep Baby, Sleep,” whose
“echo emanating from Gooseneck [possibly nearby Goose Pond Mountain, one of the highest
elevations in the area] will lull half the audience to peaceful slumber.” These pieces were
interspersed with instrumental numbers by the “Camp LaGuardia Swing Band” and the
“Intermezzo from the Opera Cavaleria [sic.] Rusticana,” played by Adolph Siering, who, “when
he isn’t working over a hot range, offers a delightful piano recital,” and poetry readings by
Stanley Johnson who “dramatically recites [Kipling’s] ‘Gunga Din.’” “Last but not least, came
the LaGuardia Swing Band...[which] offered some modern tunes, ending up with the spirited
‘Stars and Stripes.’”
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The program demonstrates that the show was intended to touch various conflicting
emotions during the long and isolated winter season at the camp, and to explore what the
expectations of the World’s Fair would have meant for the men, most of whom probably would
not witness it in person. Although the newspaper advertised the “Sunday excursion offered by
the Erie Railroad” to get to the fair, elsewhere it sardonically pointed out, “New York City has
its World’s Fair and Camp La Guardia has its New Cannery so we break even.” There was never
any coordination by the Social Services Department in its section on requesting furloughs, or
organization of group trips. There were no comedic “reports” of men attending the fair, as was
normal for the paper describing trips off campus.687 The reviewer concluded, “All in all, it was a
very fine first attempt and we sincerely mean it when we say let us have more of these shows
during the winter. By all means, more shows and newer….as well as the old, talent.”688
The minstrel show was so successful that it “went on tour in the surrounding community.”
It first gave a benefit concert in Washingtonville, about eight miles northeast of the town of
Chester, which raised money “to perpetuate the memory of Duane May, who came to
Washingtonville with a group of orphans and was placed on a farm.”689 Advertisements and
reviews for the show consistently depicted scenes and costumes of actors in uniforms associated
with Southern convict labor (see figures 6.5 and 6.6). The performers were once again “making a
name for themselves and for the camp” as they performed for local audiences and nearby
institutions. They performed multiple times at the reformatory, where they had previously been
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“guests of the administration of the Camp, at a dinner at the Irish Villa, in Monroe.”690 The April
1939 show was “localized,” tailored specifically to address the audience at that venue, and was
“one of the most enjoyable nights this writer has spent outside of the Camp.”691 The reformatory
inmates had spoofed the Magistrates Courts in its performance of “Night Court Scandals of 1938”
at Camp LaGuardia, on December 20. It was “a fast moving show…chocked full of songs,
dances and humor,” and took place “[entirely]…in a Night Court.” In the opening chorus, men
appearing before the court sang and danced together to “This is My Lucky Day,” before “Leo
‘Sargie’ Helfer” gave his “excellent comic portrayal of the presiding judge.” Numbers staging
longing and aching included “Pocket Full of Dreams” and “Four Street Sweepers.”692 Taking its
cue from the LaGuardia minstrels, the performers from New Hampton followed in March with
acts drawing on nostalgia for the Old South as well as Jacksonian agrarian politics.693 Their show
included “ ‘Plantation Echoes’ … and ‘Copperhead’ sang ‘Southland’ after which a chorus of
southern belles and their boy friends…blended their voices in ‘Swanee River.’” They spoofed
homelessness in “Hobo,” after which followed “Al Williams…with a novelty combined
monologue and song which was an impression of how ‘Old Black Joe’ would sound if it had
been written by Eugene O’Neill.” According to the Camp LaGuardia News, this show “hit a
bull’s eye.”694
The Theatrical Club built on this energy and momentum for its newest offering. In March,
it “took to the stage again…and presented an old-fashioned Minstrel Show. The Old South was
brought to life again with the songs of Dixie ringing from the rafters.” It represented the
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plantation as “timeless,” both close to nature and exotic, in a south that was a symbol of “a
collective rural past.” For minstrel performers, “The South became symbolically their old home:
the place where simplicity, happiness, all the things we have left behind, exist outside of time,”
because it “became the antithesis to both…new cities and new frontiers.”695 In this show, the
club brought an “authentic” Bowery minstrel show to the residents of Orange County. Each time
it was performed, Camp Director Cunningham introduced it with a letter from Mayor
LaGuardia’s secretary, “expressing the Mayor’s regret at being unable to attend, but wishing the
show lots of success.”696 The newspaper reviewed it at length.
An influx of visitors from the surrounding community made it necessary
to add extra seats to those already provided, and the auditorium was
packed to the doors.
Excellent costumes and colorful lighting effects made it an outstanding
show. The Endmen had authentic costumes and some of the entertainers
were dressed to really represent their characters.
Frank Brady, as Interlocutor, kept the Endmen, Mel Brown, Charlie Gray,
Leo Saxe and W. Scheffler, on the go with gags and cross-fire which
kept the audience laughing. Adolph Siering was at the piano as
accompanist. John C. Burns handled the lights and John E. O’Neill acted
as property man.
The show got off to a flying start with the opening chorus, “Are You
From Dixie?” and from then on it was a melange of songs and patter…
…Following him came Mel Brown who sang “Wagon Wheels” and
encored with “Willie the Weeper”…
…Frank White and Ray Gregory followed with a comedy skit called
“Ham and Eggs In Jail” which elicited a great deal of laughter from the
audience.
…Joe Fitzsimmons opened the second half with “Carry Me Back to Old
Virginny” and encored with “Old Black Joe.”…
…[Another act] was followed by another comedy song depicting the
types of people one will meet at the New York World’s Fair…
695
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…C. Gallagher …played Irish jigs and reels in fast tempo on a violin,
and with those two acts following each other, it seemed to this reviewer
to be a preview of St. Patrick’s Day. Charlie Gray, one of the Endmen,
sang “Mandy” and then “Darktown Strutter’s Ball.” Eddie MacDonald,
our favorite Scotch comedian, came out attired in a costume that well
portrayed a broken-down Englishman and sang “Burlington Burt.” After
changing costumes, he came out in his kilts [and] he sang “The Waddle
O’ the Kilts”, “Bell O’Duncon” and “Roamin’ In The Gloamin’” which
was then followed by the Grand Finale…

Figure 6.5 “Scenes from our Minstrel Show.”697

Figure 6.6 Camp LaGuardia performers in blackface makeup.698

The minstrel show was the basis for the “charitable” efforts of the men at the camp,
demonstrated by their donation of proceeds to causes in both Orange County as well as New
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York.699 The World’s Fair marked the high point of the camp, as well as its theatrical club and
minstrel show. Coverage subsequently dwindled in the newspaper, although it did describe the
travels of the group that summer. The troupe “with Mr. John Diffily, Postmaster of Chester, took
to the road and…staged another minstrel show in Pine Bush, N.Y., where the entertainment was
sponsored by the Pine Bush Fire Department.”700 This was followed by performances in Goshen
and Bullville, New York. Sports overtook the minstrel show as the focus of recreational coverage
that fall. The paper tried to stress work as a “panacea,” but this effort seemed flat compared to
the motivational usefulness of the high-energy, “cross-fire” theater program.701 Nationalism
surrounding the war seems to have been more effective, and the following year Camp LaGuardia
men began to register for the draft, a social aspect of the camp that the Campus Comics turned to
for inspiration. One comic sums up this change in feeling at the camp in the early 1940s, as the
prospect of the draft offered a feeling of escape. As two men observe a camper walking
cheerfully with a shovel, whistling in time to a military march, another camper remarks, “Yep!
Ever since he got that draft no. he’s in a world of his own.”702
Conclusion
In a letter to William Hodson in 1934, Lorena Hickok, Administrator for the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration, explained that a confidential investigation was more
concerned about the “physical condition and morale” of those on relief more than the “local
carrying out of the policy.” Her statement goes a long way toward explaining both the leeway
699

Representatives from the Police Athletic League in the city came to perform at the camp, and the camp members
sent a donation in thanks, in 1940. “Over 250 Camp men have subscribed $1.00 ea. To the P.A.L. as Associate
M’b’ers STILL TIME TO JOIN THE PARADE!” John Morris, “Dear Ed:,” Camp LaGuardia News, February 16,
1940, 3; “Browsing About,” Camp LaGuardia News, February 1940, 2; “Police Athletic League Appears Before
Members of Camp La Guardia,” Camp LaGuardia News, February 1940, 4–5.
700
“Browsing About,” July 1939, 2–3.
701
“Editorial: The Panacea of Work,” Camp LaGuardia News, February 1940, 1.
702
“Camp LaGuardia Men Register for Selective Service,” Camp LaGuardia News, December 1940, 36; “Campus
Comics,” Camp LaGuardia News, April 1941, 12–13.
232

that local administrators had in dictating policy, as well as the interest administrators at all levels
had in eliciting workers’ consent for temporary crisis measures.703 Against Hodson’s notion that
“idleness breaks morale,”704 the official opinion was that the camp “performs a very real service
in restoring the health and morale of unattached men who have been crushed by the
depression…with a little money to tide them over.”705
The Welfare Department ramped up Camp LaGuardia at the end of the depression in the
build-up for war. Unattached men were not given home relief, but were given cheaper work
relief, taken out of homes in New York City and placed in state custody in Orange County.706
The WPA had pulled out of the project in 1937 and the City was under pressure to pay for its
operation, which to that date had been bankrolled by the federal government. At the time, the
official budget request was dire, “Unless another method for financing the camp is found, a
sound welfare enterprise will have to be abandoned.”707 With the onset of a war economy, many
of the aspects of the camp that had given it inertia ebbed, and referrals dwindled. By 1944, there
were 444 men living there, and they were canning half of the vegetables used in New York
City’s institutions. Farm production was not what it once was, and while “some [of the
vegetables] are grown on the camp acres,” the city was purchasing “most of the vegetables
used … in the open market.” Despite this, Leo Arnstein, the new Welfare Commissioner,
confidently predicted that it would produce all of the city’s canning needs the following year.708
When they could no longer recruit men from home relief, the Welfare Department turned back to
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the Department of Corrections. The city formally revised its procedures for sending men to the
camp in 1944, and it began to refer men on probation there just before it was it was taken over by
the Department of Purchase, which continued to run the cannery using prison labor.709
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Chapter 7
Camp LaGuardia Coda
The use of the institution…for experimental purposes of one kind or
another has apparently ended in failure.710
The residents of Camp LaGuardia are not a credit to New York City or a
credit to our community.711

The contradictions that Camp LaGuardia attempted to hold together became unraveled
after World War II. In mid-1943, it was transferred to the Department of Purchase, which was
responsible for procuring food for the city’s hospitals and schools. This department ran the camp
as the “Municipal Cannery” using a “permanent prison population of 125 prisoners” drawn from
Riker’s Island, in addition to “men who were inmates of the camp when it was used as a
rehabilitation center for derelicts and chronic alcoholics.” The administration spun this setup as
another “experiment” in rehabilitation, as reported in the New York Herald Tribune, “The
cannery was opened four months ago as a three-way experiment in war-time food conservation,
municipal economy and rehabilitation of inmates from the city penitentiary at Riker’s Island.”712
It was one of two canneries that the city maintained in Orange County, the other at New
Hampton reformatory, in its efforts to implement the Federally urged program of “cooperative
community canning” and given that “a major food shortage [was] possible.”713
The canning project was part of a wider effort at collaboration between the Welfare
Department and Corrections, given the reduction of manpower at the camp. Noticing that a
majority of men who had engaged with the Division of Shelter Care had also been entangled
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with the courts and “spent considerable time at Rikers Island,”714 the collaboration attempted to
use the Welfare Department to integrate men into jobs either after they had served time and were
on parole, or as an alternative sentencing. A report on the first year of this program boasted that
it had “eliminated to a great extent the much deplored ‘revolving door’ process of arrest,
arraignment, sentence, workhouse, arrest, etc. ad infinitum, but also has given us a more
complete understanding of the homeless man, and enabled us to make more appropriate plans for
his assistance.” Camp LaGuardia’s position in this project was determined by the “type” of man
sent there. Following the long-term characterization of the camp’s population, the men sent there
in this relationship were those whose “capacity for self-maintenance and self-direction had been
so impaired that a satisfactory adjustment would not have been likely without a period of
rehabilitation in a controlled environment such as is offered at Camp LaGuardia.”715
After the first year, it is unclear what happened to the program, but the search for a
purpose to the institution continued. The farm program, which was the center of the camp’s
program, had dwindled; as the labor pool at the camp shrank, so did its farm operations. In
August 1943, there were 444 men at the camp, less than half of its full capacity of over 1,000 just
a few years before. While some of the “raw materials” for canning continued to be produced at
the camp, the city had already begun to contract out for food purchasing, to farmers in the
Hudson Valley (who in turn hired “farm help from Florida,”) and in Texas, Georgia, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. The distance separating these farms from the cannery was
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extremely inefficient and contributed to the food’s spoilage; the Commissioner of Purchase
wrote that it needed to “be canned same day harvested.”716
Despite the uplifting language promoting the camp and its contribution to the war effort,
the pretense of rehabilitation also was eventually stripped away as the cannery fell into disorder.
Outbreaks of gastroenteritis at the City’s Hospitals forced the Commissioner of Hospitals to
forbid canned food from Camp LaGuardia to be served in those institutions. With the availability
of frozen foods increasing, he “hoped to eliminate a great percentage of canned products.” This
situation provoked investigation of the canning operation. Resulting reports led the mayor to
condemn the food from Camp LaGuardia then sitting in storage in a Long Island City warehouse,
a loss of nearly $130,000 at a time when the city faced “an impending deficit of $3,500,000 in
[its] food appropriations.” Options for recouping this money were limited. The State Constitution
of 1938 prohibited prison labor or the products of prison labor to be “farmed out, contracted,
given or sold to any person, firm, association or corporation.” On the other hand, these products
could be “disposed of to the state or any political division thereof.” The Commissioner of
Purchase, worried that without the cannery the city would not be able to “procure supplies for
city institutions,” advocated for its remaining open, and for distributing the condemned food to
other city institutions, once it could be “resterilized.” It is unclear what became of the
contaminated food, but after three years of Department of Purchase oversight, Mayor O’Dwyer
closed the cannery.717
Given this closure, the future of the camp was once again uncertain. Paul McGinnis,
Secretary of the State’s Prison Commission, petitioned the Mayor for the institution’s return to
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the Department of Corrections for women prisoners, arguing that “the use of the institution [by
the Department of Welfare] for experimental purposes of one kind or another has apparently
ended in failure.” The Prison Association of New York supported this request, but Budget
Director Abraham Beame advised that, like in 1934, it would prove to be too expensive, and that
the Women’s House of Detention provided ample space for the women in the custody of the
Corrections Department. Commissioner of Welfare Edward Rhatigan also immediately asked for
the institution to be “returned to his jurisdiction,” a request that the Corporation Council
ultimately advised, “so that the City may continue to receive state reimbursement,” and that the
Mayor enacted in October 1947. The equipment, which the Department of Welfare and the
Emergency Relief Bureau had purchased at “considerable cost,” and the Department of Purchase
had expanded, was apparently given to the City’s Department of Education. The use of the
institution bounced back and forth between corrections and welfare for another ten years, given
fluctuating arrest and employment rates.718
The one aspect of Camp LaGuardia that remained in force was its objective of “cleaning
up” the Bowery. It was presented as a “voluntary” institution, an escape from New York’s skid
row district, a place valuable for social scientists at Columbia University in developing theories
of deviance and disaffiliation to explain alcoholism and homelessness.719 By the 1970’s, the
camp was a place to which older men from the Bowery fled, as one documentary put it, so that
they were not preyed upon by the “new breed of derelict, younger stronger,” who “stalked the
old men on the streets and in the broken down hotels, trapped in narrow rooms, easy victims in

718

Charles E. Murphy, Corporation Council to William O’Dwyer, Mayor, “Re: Camp LaGuardia,” January 3, 1947,
Box 12, Folder 115, Camp LaGuardia, 1946-1948, New York City Municipal Archives, O’Dwyer Subject Files.
719
S. Henshaw, Camp LaGuardia: A Voluntary Institution for Homeless Men. (New York: Columbia University,
Bureau of Applied Research, 1968); Howard Bahr, Homelessness and Disaffiliation (New York: Columbia
University, Bureau of Applied Research, 1968); Howard, Homeless: Poverty and Place in Urban America.
238

the open dormitories of flophouses.” (See chapter two.) “Some of them huddle in the city’s
overcrowded shelter on East Third Street, where 1,400 are fed every day. But others decide that
they can no longer survive in New York, and for them Camp LaGuardia, the city’s upstate home
for penniless, forgotten men, is another place to go.”720 This configuration meant that the work
component of the shelter system was reversed in Camp LaGuardia’s final days. The place was
seen as a “resort,” and men were referred from it to work programs in the city. They were not
expected to find work in the upstate economy, and tellingly, were exempt from restrictions
requiring people in shelters to look for work, which was imposed on others in the system.
The politics surrounding the camp in the early 1990s informed its eventual closure fifteen
years later. While there were always those in New York City as well as in Chester who wanted to
see the facility closed, as the homeless shelter system within New York City developed, these
politics gained more traction when younger men were sent to the camp. A recent change,
explicitly meant to eliminate the similarity between living at the camp and incarceration,
motivated concerted, organized action by politicians and residents of the surrounding area. The
initial panic was over letting the men have leeway in moving through the surrounding
communities. The Coalition for the Homeless in New York, responsible for monitoring
conditions in the unfolding shelter system, had advocated for this change. Area politicians,
increasingly anxious about young black men living nearby, openly protested this more “lenient”
policy, figuring the surrounding towns as having no crime apart from the camp. They placed
pressure on the city to hire more security guards, build a fence, and institute warrant checks for
shelter residents. HRA installed vending machines in an attempt to keep men on the campus
rather than patronize local stores. One State Senator couldn’t figure out what kind of institution
720

Kotuk, “Camp LaGuardia.”
239

was necessary, a hospital, a jail, or a psychiatric ward, but certainly not what Camp LaGuardia
had become, “Frankly…parents, many of whom both work full-time, are extremely concerned
with the welfare of their young children while unattended patients, many with criminal records,
are allowed and encouraged to integrate with the surrounding community before their treatment
has been completed.”721 Local newspapers repeatedly harped on HRA’s negligence to generate
fear among residents of the nearby towns.722 Sensational headlines broadcast a new plan:
reforming surveillance, since, town leaders worried, “under HRA’s open facility policy, men
transported to Camp LaGuardia may the next day leave the Camp and assume residence in any of
the surrounding communities.”723
In 1992, an attorney in Chester who was also on the town board wrote to New York City
Police Commissioner Lee Brown and presented him with arguments as to why Camp LaGuardia
was no longer structurally relevant in its new shelter model. He argued that the city failed to
contain the men who were living there. “Peace officers” at the Camp had no jurisdiction outside
of it, a situation that “taxed our local police forces”— forces, he could have added, which had
their origin in the terror over the presence of Camp LaGuardia’s original residents.724 In addition
to bolstering the physical plant of the jail-like facility, such as repairing “holes in the fence
around the property,”725 the policy proposal was to implement mandatory warrant checks for any
person moved to the camp from New York City. According to the strategy, this would ensure
that New York City was not “unwittingly … [assisting] an accused felon [to] escape from the
721
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criminal justice system” through the anonymity of its shelter system. Assembly Member Nancy
Calhoun concurred, while giving meaning to the camp through her own invented history.
Camp LaGuardia, while initially a shelter for older non-violent homeless
men, has developed to a point that requires security checks of those
coming to our area as many now utilize this once quiet facility as an
escape from the New York City legal system.726

In a letter that equated “being racist” with being against providing for the homeless, State
Senator Benjamin Gilman wrote to New York City Mayor David Dinkins, “Please bear in mind
that our constituents are not racist, not opposed to providing for the homeless, but most of all
want to make certain that there is adequate security for effective internal administration so that
the LaGuardia residents will be good neighbors and not a threat to the community.”727 These
letters’ rhetorical motive emphasized the argument, which they stated in order to both exploit
and deny its power. These reforms would prevent “much more radical demands [by the town],
e.g., closure of the Camp altogether.”728 This was a significant threat because Camp LaGuardia
still represented a major portion of New York City’s single shelter beds. In 1990, there were just
under 9,000 spots available system-wide for singles [How many for men?]; the camp provided
1,000 of these, and, in the winter of 1991, the city was dealing with the winter “surge” in its
homeless population. A vision of containment, therefore, began the process that blocked further
use of Camp LaGuardia and prompted continued expansion of the city’s emerging infrastructure.
“How the shelter was like a prison” was specifically the crux of the surrounding politics.
Orange County wanted to make Camp LaGuardia more like a prison, similar to those under
construction in upstate New York. New York City, for its part, needed to provide enough shelter
726
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beds to comply with the Callahan Consent Decree, and was then implementing its armory-toshelter plan (see chapter 2). The regional contradictions brought up legal issues. If the requests of
upstate lawmakers were granted, it would turn the entire HRA into an agency for the surveillance
of homeless people to uncover former convictions, a process that would generalize policing
throughout the entire, emergent shelter system. HRA lawyers therefore resisted, “Regarding a
special system of screening clients before they are assigned to Camp LaGuardia, I believe that
any such unique treatment would also be objectionable from a fairness point of view. If HRA
does not screen shelter applicants assigned to any other facility, it would not be appropriate to do
so for Camp LaGuardia.” Dinkins’ advisors concluded, stating the obvious, “Since Camp
LaGuardia is not a prison, there is no basis to restrict [the men’s] movement.”729 Both of these
arguments, significantly, overlooked the continued violence enacted on men living in the
shelter.730
The institution that came to be known as the homeless shelter had its beginnings in
Progressive Era prison reform. Out of the lineage of city agencies dedicated to social welfare
emerged New York City's Department of Homeless Services in the early 1990s, an agency with a
current annual budget of over $1 billion.731 During this time, national welfare was dismantled
and the number of shelters located within the city ballooned. Simultaneously, Camp LaGuardia’s
importance waned. Orange County became increasingly aggressive toward residents of the
shelter, and it closed in 2007. As the shelter system described in chapter two rolled out, the
previous spatial configuration of New York’s shelter system also finally came to a close. Its
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legacy was the establishment of a resilient model for the management of homelessness in New
York, a dedicated agency and infrastructure, and a policy format that foreshadowed national
transformation. The city sold the site to Orange County for $9.5 million and diverted its $19.5
million to DHS's operating budget.732 The county, ironically, has been involved in developing
housing on the site ever since, a project that has been delayed for the past decade. The
institutional continuity between prisons and homeless shelters endures, now with geographic
reversal. A recent investigative report found that a majority of men released from upstate prisons
and returning to New York City now receive State referrals directly to Bellevue Shelter, the
City’s intake point for homeless men. The reporter concluded that, parolees, immediately thrust
into “freedom and homelessness,” and “who are trying to escape their past, are often sent into a
system riddled with drugs and violence,” as they go from being a “ward of the state to the
responsibility of the City.”733
Greycourt is not an official place in the atlases and gazetteers of New York State. It
names the physical and environmental attributes of the area, but also communicates historical
inertia. It was a colloquial way to refer to the self-contained area within what came to be the
town of Chester. Greycourt’s founding as the town’s original settlement lent it a sense of local
meaning and importance. Later, as a junction on the Erie Railroad, it signified transition, and the
place continued to be imbued with a sense of nostalgia and historic consequence. Throughout its
history in Orange County, Camp LaGuardia was consistently advertised as being in “Greycourt,
NY.” The place’s eponymous historical myth contributed to the meaning granted to the camp as
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a place of both isolation and of change. These meanings both haunted and provided ground for
the camp’s existence, even as the camp drew on and reconfigured those meanings toward its own
purposes. As a transitional place, for both the men living there as well as for the city’s evolving
institutions, these meanings were central to defining its purpose and creating its own momentum.
Camp LaGuardia is no longer a prison or a homeless shelter, but it contributed its own legacy to
New York City’s newest program of engaging with displacement.
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Appendix B:
This is one small but illuminating section of R.’s story, in which he describes the link between
his drug use, his job, the institutional overlap between prisons and homeless shelters, and
learning to navigate the shelter system itself.
R: My drug abuse took off, whew, it took off crazy. I went to my boss and I told my boss
I was using. The particular job I had I was working for the New York City Board of Elections, in
which I had a badge. It’s like a city official badge. And I knew I was doing wrong. I had that
badge in my wallet and I was going to cop crack cocaine on the street in spots, and had I gotten
arrested it would have been in the newspaper. And they was generous enough to hire me, an exfelon. So I thought it was the least that I owed to them and I could tell them that. So here it is,
I’m sleeping in train stations, in the park. This was the summer months. I’m trying to cope with
going to work and being homeless at the same time. They sent me to a city agency for help,
employment assistance, EAP, Employment Assistance Program, where they enrolled me into a
drug program. And it didn’t work. She was required by law, because they was paying for her to
report to the job of my participation and my urine and things of that nature. She gave me a break
the first time my urine was dirty. She said, “[can’t hear] Officer W, I’m sorry, I’m gonna have to
report this.” When she reported to my employer …
C: The second time?
The second time, they let me go. They said, “We’re terribly sorry, you’re an excellent
worker, but we have to let you go.” I was granted a severance pay, which was about $3,100 I
believe. And I blew that. I could have took that and went and got a room somewhere. And even
though I was laid off from the job or fired, I could have at least tried but I didn’t. And my drug
addiction was spiraling out of control. So I was homeless.
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When the money ran out I found myself begging for food. Begging for change. Very
hungry at times. Now it became a matter where my drug use wasn’t that important. What was
important was a place to stay. I tried staying in Bellevue. It was terrible. It was so terrible that I
would rather stay in the street. I went down to the Bowery to a church and they let you stay
overnight. It was much cleaner, but you would stay overnight. I had trouble with that, meeting
their curfew. You had to be in at a certain time. So I was breaking their curfew rules. And they
were like, “You can’t come in here like that. It’s best that you go to another place.” In the midst
of that I was still dabbling with drugs, because I would be depressed. Like sometimes I would
not get nothing to eat. Or I would see an old friend on the train. The police would kick my foot.
“Hey, buddy, let’s go.” I still had my identification so I didn’t get ran through the system. They
would be like, so I had my old identification from the city. He was like, “Hey, you work for the
city?” I was like, “Naw, I used to.” “Well are you ok? Do you have any drugs or weapons on
you?” I was like, “No sir, just tired. I just need somewhere to stay.” So my every day adventure
besides looking for food was riding the A train. That was my favorite train because it’s like the
longest train. So I would ride that train out, because that was the summer time, [but] now it’s
cold out, very, very cold. And that was the most depressing, terriblest thing I ever witnessed in
my life.
And it led me to a burglary charge. I went past…now we going from the year, I was, we
going to the year 2006 of February. I went to a late night convenient store, where the window
spins. And right next to the window is the register. And the guy was in the back in the chair. He
was back in the chair I think resting. And I peeked in the window and seen that the register was
open and there were a few bills I could see sticking out. This was in my neighborhood. And this
guy know me. He know me by face. It’s not like I had a mask or hood. And I punched the
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window out and was trying to grab the money. And he came and he was like, “Hey, what you
doin, what you doin!?” And I was like, “Back up, back up.” And this wasn’t actually for drugs.
It was actually so I could feed myself. So I could at least go into McDonald’s and have money at
night to eat. That became like a first priority. And never in my adult life experienced hunger
pains. Like man, I’m hungry, like really. This was crazy. I didn’t even want no drugs. I’m not
starving, but I’m hungry. And for the first time I felt those hunger pains. At any rate, he knew
who I was. I guess when he called the police, they probably asked him to come to the precinct,
maybe he see my mug shot, or whatever like that, he described them to me, gave them my
nickname, because he knew my nickname. And a month later they arrested me on the street. I
was feeling so bad, so down and out, that I told them the truth. I said, “Yeah, that was me.” Up in
the 28th precinct in Harlem. They had me, the robbery, burglaries call, whatever, they said, “Did
you break through this man’s window? Did you try to remove cash from his register? Was that
you?” And I said, “Yes.” And I had a criminal history. So the judge, he could have gave me
more time. But I wasn’t fighting it. The lawyer, he was like, “You made statements here. Why
did you do this?” And I said, “Because I did it.” He said, “Because you did it, you at least wanna
let them prove it! Jesus, you just giving yourself up like that?!” And I said, “Yeah, because I
don’t have nowhere to go.” And I found jail at that time to be a blessing. As crazy as that may
sound. And it was cold out. It was March and it was still cold out. But I had a place to stay. I
didn’t have to worry about feeding myself. You know how prison is, jail, Riker’s Island. Food
wasn’t all that great, but it was great. I didn’t have to run around scrapping, begging for food.
Going into restaurants asking them do they have any food left over and things of that nature. The
judge gave me flat five years. This was in 2006.
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I was released from prison April of 2010, last year. And not wanting to experience
someone the power of saying, “Get out,” I said I have to find somewhere to go that would assist
me with housing. And that’s when I read a connection book. It’s a book that they give to
correction facilities. It be in the library and it has connections. And I read [name of program] for
formerly incarcerated homeless men, it assists you with programs. I said, “Wow, a chance to
save money. This is up my alley.” As soon as I was released I had to go to Bellevue to get a
reference letter to this program here at [name of program.]
C: So you went back to Bellevue?
R: I went back to Bellevue overnight. I was released from prison to a shelter system in
Brooklyn. But I came to [the program] and they said, “No, you can’t come in here like that. You
must get a HA number.” I didn’t know what that is. “What is that?” A homeless assistance
number, whatever, HRA number. And you gotta go to Bellevue to get that. Or Bedford-Atlantic
[armory shelter]. I said, “Wow, I’m released from prison, I’m healthy, I’m clean.” I said, “Hey, I
gotta go to Bellevue?” They said, “Yeah but just for overnight. Just get that letter, report to your
parole, and come right here. We got you man. We got you.” And that’s what I did. I stayed
overnight in Bellevue. I went upstairs to the lady’s office. She wrote the letter. Packed my stuff.
Or I already had it packed. And I came here to [name of program.] And that was April of last
year. And that’s pretty much where I am today.

249

Appendix C:
Locations of private lodging houses that the city used to house homeless men in 1939. It paid, on
average, 25 cents per man per night for this accommodation. Data is from Herlands, William B.
Administration of Relief in New York City. New York City: Department of Investigation, 1940.
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